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ABSTRACT 
Since the late 20
th
 century there has been increasing interest in China’s role in Africa, both in 
academia and popular media. This interest reflects the general curiosity and concerns related to 
China’s political and business interests. Research into African-Chinese relations is usually on the 
macro level and rarely provides insight into the lived realities of the people at the heart of these 
interactions, particularly Africans. As such this thesis examines Nigerian-Chinese elite exchanges 
by interrogating the stock/conventional narratives constructed in political discourse and popular 
media (and to a large extent by academic research), in which China appears either as benevolent 
investor or neo-imperialist; and Africa appears as a passive recipient without agency at the mercy 
of greedy politicians and elite-pacting. 
 
Nigeria is one of China’s most important trade partners in Africa. In response to this relationship, 
the Nigerian government has constructed a complex public relations campaign that taps into the 
aspirations and dreams of Nigerians and links them with Nigerian-Chinese relations. The 
campaign is centred on three key areas: big business, entrepreneurship and education. 
Throughout this thesis, I explore the experiences of aspirational and elite Nigerian actors who 
attempt to take on the promise of Nigerian-Chinese relations through these three key areas. I 
argue that although the grand narrative is sold as accessible to all, it is mostly those who have 
access to capital, both financial and social, that are able to transform the promise of Nigerian-
Chinese relations into a reality. 
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Chapter I-Introduction: Elite Exchanges  
The Promise of Nigerian-Chinese Relationships 
On the outer edges of Lagos State far from the hustle and bustle of Lagos city is a quiet parcel of 
land. This land is envisioned to be the prototype for Nigerian-Chinese alliances. Three flags are 
hoisted above the entrance: Chinese; Nigerian and one specific for the location. The third flag 
boldly states the name of this place-the Lekki Free Trade Zone (LekkiFTZ). LekkiFTZ is held 
up as a bastion for international businesses to operate in Nigeria. The zone’s marketing campaign 
and stated objectives highlight management’s desire for the LekkiFTZ to be viewed as a global 
cosmopolitan town. At The Economist’s Nigeria Summit 2011, Lagos State’s Commissioner for 
Commerce & Industry Sola Oworu spoke on a panel discussing the LekkiFTZ. She stated that 
the LekkiFTZ was “not a zone, this is a new town that would bring to life the future of [our] 
dreams”. During a visit to the zone Fola Bankole, one of LekkiFTZ’s engineers, stated that by 
the time the zone was completed it would be a town on its own where one wouldn’t “have to go 
anywhere” to have his or her needs met.  
 
LekkiFTZ investors plan to fill the 165 km² of land that makes up the zone
2
   with a variety of 
businesses and amenities, including: manufacturing plants; entertainment and tourist amenities; 
residential neighbourhoods; high rises; an international airport and a seaport. To begin with a 
small portion of the land, around 30 km², will be developed by the Lekki Free Zone 
Development Company (LFZDC). This is the development which much of the media coverage 
and discussion about the LekkiFTZ revolves around. The partnership for the LFZDC is a 
complex formation three investor groups comprised of the Nigerian government, China-Africa 
Lekki Investment Limited (CALI) and Lekki Worldwide (LWW). The Nigerian government’s 
contribution was the land provided to the partnership to create the zone. This resulted in a 20% 
share for the Nigerian government. CALI, a private Chinese firm has a 60% share and LWW, a 
Nigerian organisation, has the remaining 20% share. CALI is comprised of four Chinese 
organisations: China Railway Construction Corporation Limited, China Civil Engineering 
Construction Corporation, China-Africa Development Fund and Nanjing Jiangning Economic 
& Technological Development Corporation. 
 
                                                             
2 Compared with Manhattan which is 87km² 
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LekkiFTZ is one of twenty free trade zones in Nigeria. Most of the free trade zones are either 
still in the planning stages or under construction
3
. Lekki and Ogun Free Trade Zones encapsulate 
the promise of Nigerian-Chinese alliances as promoted by the Nigerian government. This 
alliance promises economic and social growth and a futurescape with all of the amenities and 
technology anyone would want in one town, in a rapidly emerging market. The lifestyle offered 
by the LekkiFTZ partners is an exclusive one with plans for neighbourhoods full of high-end 
flats/apartments and homes. With small homes in areas near Lekki already going for £100,000, 
the prices for homes in the zone are expected to exceed this. LekkiFTZ presents a new paradigm 
for international development which emphasizes mutually beneficially economic development 
as the focal point for the relationship between Nigeria and China. Despite all this, Lekki is 
practically empty. Its grand promises of modernity remain unfulfilled.  
 
This raises questions surrounding how exclusive and elite the dream of Nigerian-Chinese 
business relations is. Who does it benefit and how does it animate the aspirations of young 
Nigerians and hopeful entrepreneurs looking to do business with China? After all, to what extent 
does this great promise of Nigerian-Chinese relationships as encapsulated in the LekkiFTZ bear 
fruit? And for whom? Development landscapes are not just about infrastructure. They serve to 
enliven and shape individuals’ aspirations for modernity (Cross 2014).  
 
This thesis explores the promise of Nigerian-Chinese relationships promoted to the Nigerian 
public, the manner in which the promise of is communicated to the Nigerian public, and the 
organizations and individuals who seek to turn the dream into a material reality. I seek to 
interrogate the tendency of popular media and academic research into African-Chinese-
relationships, which focuses on China as a potential neo-imperialist in relationships with Africans 
who are portrayed as either encumbered workers or greedy politicians. We are rarely presented 
with an analysis of the elite Africans who create, broker, engage with and transact Chinese 
business and investment, particularly those outside of political circles.  
This thesis explores Nigeria-China relations through an analysis of elite interactions in three key 
domains, promoted by the Nigerian government as cornerstones of Nigerian-Chinese 
                                                             
3
Two FTZs are operated in conjunction with Chinese partners, the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone and the Lekki Free Trade Zone (LekkiFTZ). 
The OgunFTZ is located in Ogun state, the host state for Chinese firms including GNIM operations (See Chatper 3 and 4 for a discussion on 
GNIM the Chinese family owned firm). Negotiations for the OgunFTZ began in 2004 and construction which began in 2009 was initially delayed 
due to funding. The OgunFTZ is home to a variety of business enterprises owned by Chinese, Nigerian, Lebanese and Indian entrepreneurs 
(Brautigam and Tang 2013: 8). By early 2015 there were sixteen firms operating within the zone and over 4,000 jobs were available for 
Nigerians to fill (Awoyinfa 2015). The OgunFTZ’s management promoted the area as an exemplar for African-Chinese relations. 
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partnership: big business, entrepreneurship and education. Through the chapters of this thesis, 
I trace the interactions of elite and aspirational actors in various sites, from a Chinese multi-
national company to aspirant Nigerian entrepreneurs to students and educators eager to make 
good on the opportunities that they envisage China bringing to Nigeria.  
 
Over the past decade, there has been an increasing interest in African-Chinese relationships from 
scholars, primarily from political economy, international relations, economics and development 
studies (see for example Strauss and Saavedra 2009; Cheung, Yin‐Wong, et al. 2012; Edoho 
2012; Mohan 2013). This research has mainly focused on macro-level analysis of foreign direct 
investment in extractive industries along with the new forms these take vis-à-vis Chinese 
investment in comparison to ‘Western’ investment (Berger and Wissenbach 2007; Shinn 2009; 
Melber 2013). Majority of the businesses I study are outside of the extractive industry. Moving 
beyond extractive industries and honing in on other industries including manufacturing, retail, 
construction and service provides comprehensive insight into the areas of development in which 
China is engaged. While extractive industries such as oil and gas are of great importance to the 
economy of Nigeria, non-extractive industries are significant yet neglected components of 
Nigeria’s economic growth story.  
 
Limited attention has been paid to the extensive Chinese influence and involvement in other 
areas including retail, shipping, manufacturing and telecommunication which have their own 
particular set of relations, norms, and challenges. “If you focus only on oil, you’re missing the 
boat on what the Chinese are really doing in Africa. They are actually engaging in more 
fundamental investments: infrastructure, telecoms, textiles, tourism, food processing” (Michel 
and Beuret 2009: 33). There is a critical need to refocus our attention towards non extractive 
industries, as well as to smaller and medium sized entrepreneurship alongside corporations and 
to place greater attention on examining the social relations that are both created and facilitated 
by these processes of capital investment, transnational business deals and the regimes they 
produce. This thesis examines Nigerian-Chinese relationships ethnographically in a quest to 
understand the social and political dynamics that arise when two emerging economies engage in 
elite exchanges.  
 
More recently scholars have begun to unpack the day to day of these processes of investment 
and how the operations they generate are actually taking shape on the ground (Nabine 2009; 
Oyeranti et al 2011; Babatunde 2013). It is evident that African-Chinese interactions are 
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composed of a multitude of players at various levels, including: small to large business owners; 
government officials; students; elites and neighbourhood organisations. Yet what is missing from 
the picture is an analysis of the experiences of these actors. At the same time, there has been an 
increase in the study of elites and transnational elites in anthropology (Fechter 2007; Fechter 
2007a; Fumanti 2007; Fumanti 2007a; Abbink and Salverda 2013; Crewe 2015; Harrison 2015). 
I build upon this work in order to examine the agency of elites participating in Nigerian-Chinese 
relationships, particularly Nigerians related to corporations; entrepreneurship and education. 
Elites are an instructive group of people to study due to their access to resources and 
opportunities which place them in positions where they are more able to materialize the potential 
of Nigerian-Chinese engagements.  
 
My main research questions are as follows: What is the relationship between Nigerian and 
Chinese elites? What are the key areas for Nigerian and Chinese interactions? What is the 
Nigerian government’s official discourse surrounding Nigerian-Chinese relations? How is this 
discourse conveyed to the public? Which Nigerians are able to take advantage of the promise of 
Nigerian-Chinese relations? How are these interactions initiated and maintained? What is the 
role of social relationships in Nigerian-Chinese connections? How do aspirational and elite 
Nigerians utilize Nigerian-Chinese relationships to further their goals? 
 
I seek to explore how the promise of Nigerian-Chinese relations is cultivated and stoked by the 
government’s public relations mandate to drive and shape the aspirations of Nigerians. Then I 
examine the operations of a Chinese firm in Lagos through the experiences of Nigerian senior 
management. An examination of the firm’s utilisation of brokerage follows. I then move outside 
of the firm and into the world of Nigerian entrepreneurs to explore how they engage in business 
and social relationships with Chinese counterparts. I end my ethnographic analysis by 
interrogating how Chinese language education takes place in Nigeria, via the experiences of 
educators and students.  This thesis presents a story of Nigerian-Chinese relations which counters 
commonplace visions of corruption, exploitation and un-reciprocal extraction. 
 
I begin by analysing the historical and current context of Africa-China relations and Nigeria-
China relations. This is followed by a literature review of Africa-China relationships; elites and 
my anthropological approach to this research. I then discuss methodology and provide an 
overview of the thesis. 
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The Historical Context:  
African-Chinese/ Nigerian-Chinese Relationships 
While there have been some attempts to capture the general historical experience of “China in 
Africa” these remain at a relatively superficial level. Therefore it is essential to position my 
ethnographic study with the historical context of the relationship between Nigeria and China. 
This historical and contemporary overview of Africa-China and Nigeria-China relations serves as 
a background for understanding the landscape in which my research is situated. The relationship 
has had its highs and lows, ranging from periods of intense communication to periods of very 
little contact (Alden et al 2008: 4). In the 1950’s China formally re-established ties with Africa 
(Chidaushe 2007: 108; Alden et al. 2008). Until the late 1970’s China’s interest in Africa was 
primarily centred on political and ideological issues which were strongly motivated by China’s 
competition with the Soviet Union, United States and Taiwan for loyalty from African countries 
(ibid). When Deng Xiaoping began to open China’s borders and centre on international 
economic development.  
 
With its oil wealth and position as a regional economic hegemon, as of 2015, Nigeria is China’s 
second largest export partner (Udo 2015). But it is not only this current dominance in terms of 
Chinese investment in Africa that makes Nigeria such an illuminating case for examining 
empirically elite, African-Chinese relations; the two countries share distinct and long historical 
ties. As the most populous and influential countries in their respective regions, China and Nigeria 
share similar status, as regional economic hegemons. And as Alden points out: as a “commodity 
based economy (Nigeria)[with] a weak democracy, the relationship between China and Nigeria 
is one that bears close attention due to Nigeria’s vast oil supply, market size and stature in the 
African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)…” (Alden 
2007:68).  
  
China and Nigeria began trade relations in 1961 (Obiorah et al 2008: 274) and formal diplomatic 
ties were made ten years later (Mthembu-Salter 2009: 6; Fernando 2007: 365). This relationship 
was consolidated in 1979 when the Chinese State Council allowed select firms to enter foreign 
markets including Nigeria (Brautigam 2009: 64). Once abroad, entrepreneurs like Jacob Wood, 
a restauranteur, and Shen Wenbo, an enamel factory owner, stayed in Nigeria and became part 
of the business community (Michel and Beuret 2009: 30; Hongfeng 2010). Until the early 1990’s 
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China-Nigeria trade was slow but steady (Cooke 2008: 50). While most of the trade consisted of 
oil related products, for its part China exported goods to Nigeria (Cooke 2008: 50). 
 
China’s contemporary international presence stems from its go global initiative where firms sell 
products in foreign markets; utilise international marketing techniques and ultimately open 
factories in the same international markets (Brautigam 2009: 212). An additional component to 
China’s foreign market entry strategy is the “outside-in” approach. This strategy entails Chinese 
firms entering international marketplaces where Western MNCs are weak and directly 
competing with them by building strong businesses. After Chinese firms gain a foothold in these 
countries the Chinese MNCs enter countries where their Western countries are in strong 
positions (Williamson and Zeng 2008: 96). In terms of Africa, China uses the “outside-in” 
strategy to gain direct access to resources and customers from the African marketplace. Through 
this direct contact the proverbial middleman, in this case the West, is eliminated (Davies 2008: 
151). Another key to Africa-China relations is “China’s Africa Policy” which was drafted by 
Chinese officials 2000 and formally agreed upon by China and over forty African countries at 
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The FOCAC serves as the grounds for 
numerous deals between China and various African countries.  
 
The main objective of the agreement itself was to formally declare a resurgence in Africa-China 
relations; to improve “…cooperation and mutual benefits between China and Africa and more 
importantly to increase their political and economic influence on the global stage” (Du Plessis 
2014: 2017).  Although this policy was established ten years ago, it still serves as the basis for 
contemporary relationships between China’s various relationships with African countries. The 
document includes official policy towards political, economic, cultural and security issues. The 
economic section is the longest portion of the policy document (Broadman 2007: 171-172). 
According to the policy, economic assistance ranges from loans, at low interest rates from 
Chinese banks, to infrastructure development. China fosters political, economic, and cultural 
cooperation with African countries by providing Mandarin language training for African 
government officials and hosting African students in Chinese universities (See Chapter 6 for a 
discussion on Chinese language learning in Nigeria). Providing training and education 
programmes for African government officials and most importantly students, helps to create a 
cadre of future political and business elite who will continue to build Africa-China relations. In 
2012, the FOCAC redrafted its six major points, some of which specifically focused on economic 
development.  
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Co-operate and improve each other’s comparative advantages in key sectors such as trade, 
investments, poverty reduction, infrastructure, capacity building, human resources 
development, agriculture, hi-tech industries and others.  
China seeks to increase co-operation with regional organisations such as the African Union 
(AU), New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development. (NEPAD) (Du Plessis 2014: 
121)  
 
The FOCAC discussions and other meetings between African and Chinese officials set the scene 
for negotiation and deal making on a grand scale. Such arenas represent crucial sites of social, 
political and cultural interaction among political elites, in which the dynamics of negotiation and 
diplomacy unfold. Since the landmark China-Africa Policy white paper China has published 
other white papers which outline Africa-China engagement. Two discuss China’s plans in relation 
to Africa white papers on its foreign aid policy (2014) and the China-Africa Economic and Trade 
Cooperation (2013). The Foreign Aid Policy white paper highlights China’s work in setting up 
the infrastructure in African countries including power grids; fibre cable installations and 
transportation networks (Information Office of The State Council 2014). An overlap between 
the two policy papers focuses on scholarships for young people. In the creation of an “African 
Talents Program” to train 30,000 African personnel in various sectors, offer 18,000 government 
scholarships, and build cultural and vocational skills training facilities in African countries” 
(Information Office of The State Council 2013).  
 
Until the early 1990’s China-Nigeria trade was slow but steady (Cooke 2008: 50). While most of 
the trade consisted of oil related products, for its part China exported goods to Nigeria (ibid). 
Throughout the years China has increased its business relations with Nigeria and subsequently 
increasing numbers of Chinese expatriates have settled in Nigeria. Chinese migrants in Nigeria 
have increased exponentially with a figure of approximately 2,000 Chinese migrants in 2001 and 
50,000 just four years later (Kurlantzick 2007: 104). An example of this is the Nigerian textile 
industry which had a connection with China tracing back to the 1950’s when a Hong Kong based 
firm invested in a Nigerian textile company (Renne 2016). From the 1980’s onwards Nigerian 
textile mills began to close. By the early 2000s the environment was ripe for increased imports 
of textiles to Nigeria due to changing WTO
4
 regulations which allowed for easier textile exports 
and the Nigerian government’s lifting of a ban on imported textiles in 2010. This allowed for an 
influx of textile imports from China. 
                                                             
4 Compared with Manhattan which is 87km² 
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Chinese immigration and investments are made possible through a growing number of policies 
and Memorandums of Understandings (MOUs) between China and Nigeria. MOUs became the 
main method in which Nigeria and China created bilateral trade agreements. MOUs increased 
from 1999 onwards. MOUs signed during the leadership of former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, 1999-2007, were related to the oil sector and were mainly a mix of oil for infrastructure 
or cash deals. To demonstrate their commitment both countries established trade offices, the 
Nigeria Trade Office in China and the China Investment Development and Trade Promotion 
Centre in Nigeria (Egbula and Zheng 2011:4). Landmark MOUs were established in 2005 and 
2006 the two countries signed agreements to foster investment and technical cooperation 
including investment from the Chinese MNC Huawei. This agreement centred on infrastructure 
for a government ministry as well as investment and development in a number of industries such 
as gas and oil, energy, agriculture, manufacturing, tourism and communications (Obiorah 2008: 
276). In 2006 a Chinese firm signed a lucrative contract with the Nigerian government to build a 
railway in Nigeria from south to north, Lagos to Kano (Copson 2007: 57). But this deal along 
with others were scrapped due to a policy shift away from oil for infrastructure or cash deals due 
to “concerns about a lack of transparency” (Egbula and Zheng 2011: 5).  
 
In order to foster trade and business relationships between Nigeria and China, the government 
created the Nigeria-China Trade and Investment Forum (NCTIF) in 2006 (Egbula and Zheng 
2011: 5). The Forum brings together Nigerian and Chinese elites from government and private 
sectors in regular meetings both in China and Nigeria. Since then there have been a number of 
bilateral trade agreements that cover infrastructure; business; education and more. Signees 
include the Nigerian and Chinese governments and Nigerian and Chinese private businesses. 
 
In 2013, during a trip to Beijing, former President Jonathan signed five major bilateral 
agreements with China which covered financial cooperation to develop Nigeria through 
economic channels; a preferred credit agreement to aid in funding the expansion of four Nigerian 
airports; visa exemption for Nigerian diplomats and prevention of theft and import/export of 
cultural artefacts (Iwaloye and Shi 2016:103). In 2016, during a meeting between China’s 
President Xi and Nigeria’s current President Muhammadu Buhari in Beijing, the two leaders 
witnessed the signing of a number of new MOUs covering trade and investment; aviation; and 
scientific technology. The goal was to further strengthen bilateral trade between China and 
Nigeria in various sectors. Buhari’s visit included a speech to the NCTIF where he discussed the 
trade imbalance between the two countries.  
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Although the Nigerian and Chinese business communities have recorded tremendous successes in 
bilateral trade, there is a large trade imbalance in favour of China as Chinese exports represent some 
80 per cent of the total bilateral trade volumes. This gap needs to be reduced. Therefore, I would like 
to challenge the business communities in both countries to work together to reduce the trade 
imbalance. You must also imbibe the spirit of having a mutually beneficial relationship in your 
business transactions. (President Buhari 2016)  
 
During the visit other trade agreements were signed between private sector leaders and Chinese 
officials from the government and private sector. A major agreement was signed between one of 
China’s state owned banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Akiko Dangote, a 
Nigerian entrepreneur who was ranked as Africa’s richest man. The agreement is for the bank 
to provide a $2 billion loan to Dangote’s company to build two cement plants (ThisDayLive 
2016). The Nigerian-Chinese meetings also resulted in a $6 billion loan offer from the Chinese 
government to the Nigerian government to help with Nigerian infrastructure. As with most 
Chinese loans, the loans will more than likely be subject to low interest rates and little to no 
conditions. The government’s public relations campaign which uses MOUs and other 
agreements will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
China’s increasing presence across Africa has not gone unnoticed by Western government 
officials who tend to voice concerns and negative views towards Africa-China relationships. Cao 
documents Western politicians like David Cameron and Hillary Clinton who warn of the dangers 
of African-China relations. Cameron spoke of his concerns over “‘Beijing’s leading role in the 
new ‘scramble for Africa’”; while Clinton spoke of “the threat of ‘neocolonialism’ at the hands 
of external actors-implying China” (Cao 2013: 61). Chinese funded projects are often described 
as being tied to Chinese employment with no room for African workers. In his book The Looting 
Machine, Burgis discusses Chinese construction projects in Angola dominated by Chinese 
labourers (Burgis 2015: 23).  China’s use of soft power has been critiqued as a means to further 
internal economic goals as potential threat to the US. The argument is that China could gain a 
large hold of oil and other resources through relationships with Africa and other oil producing 
areas (Kurlantzick 2007).  
 
An outspoken proponent of China-Africa relations is Li Rugou the Chairman and president of 
China’s Exim Bank; the export and import bank that provides the loans for a number of business 
and development deals across Africa. Li has publicly stated that the reasons for the West 
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concerns over Africa-China relations are due to a shift in the status quo. “The real purpose of 
these Western criticisms is to restrict Africa’s growth from playing a dominant role” (Corkin 
2014:  56). Another argument in favour of Africa-China relations focuses on the various areas of 
engagement that can lead to growth. 
 
Although Nigeria and China have historically been allies, the increasing Chinese presence in 
Nigeria has faced some criticism. Areas of concern has been Chinatown in Lagos and the use of 
Chinese labour. While the government and business elite establish agreements that allow for 
Chinese businesses to enter Nigeria, the government public discourse campaign works to gain 
the acceptance and hope for Chinese businesses. This will be further discussed in Chapter 2: 
Selling the Chinese Dream to the Nation: Public Discourse and Narratives in Action.   
 
Chinese sellers in Chinatown have been cited for taking domestic (Nigerian) clothing patterns, 
copying them in China and then importing them to Nigeria. Additionally, Chinatown was 
temporarily closed while sellers were under investigation for using the marketplace as the centre 
of operations for ‘textile smuggling textile counterfeiting and for the stocking of low quality and 
cheap Chinese textiles’ (Akinrinade and Ogen 2008: 167). The issue was brought to the Nigerian 
senate and Chinese diplomats quickly stepped in with talks and meetings to persuade Nigerian 
officials to reopen Chinatown, which they did. Why did the Nigerian government acquiesce and 
reopen Chinatown in less than a week? According to Akinrinade and Ogen, Nigerian elites 
believed they would lose out by enforcing regulations against Chinese vendors so they worked 
on quickly resolving the issue. This swift resolution highlighted the “extent of incorporation of 
the Nigerian ruling class of into the orbit of the prevailing global economic arrangement” 
(Akinrinade and Ogen 2008: 168). This ruling class includes Nigerian business people. 
 
Support from local distributors and consumers also seems to have played a role in the survival of the 
“China Town” in Lagos. For example, a Nigerian who has been closely involved with the management 
of the complex reports that it had become a popular source of goods for “market women” from across 
Lagos and beyond and that when it was closed down by the Nigeria Customs Service in 2005, the 
city’s influential market women’s association called on the governor of Lagos State to see to its 
reopening. (Anonymous 12 2010)  (Lampert and Mohan 2014: 23) 
 
In Chapter 5- Doing Business with China: The Entrepreneurial Spirit of Nigeria, I discuss 
business people’s perspectives on the quality of goods they purchase from China. Another area 
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of concern are the working conditions for Nigerians working in Chinese firms. In 2002, an 
estimated 45 to 250 Nigerian employees died in a Chinese factory fire (Maja-Pearce 2014). 
“Survivors said that many of the workers had been locked inside overnight- apparently a regular 
practice. They painted a grim picture of violence and sexual exploitation in the factory, problems 
that have been echoed elsewhere” (Maja-Pearce 2014). As recently as the autumn of 2014, a 
Chinese firm, Linda Manufacturing, operating in Lagos was shut down after employees protested 
the death of a colleague (Omilani 2014; Sessou 2014). In 2008 after labour complaints from 
employees, the firm began to hire casual employees and reduce unionized labour (Workers’ 
Alternative 2008). The death of an employee whose illness and ensuing death were covered up 
by the firm’s Nigerian and Chinese management led to the firm’s closure in 2014. (Agboola 
2014). It was unclear if the firm would permanently remain closed. Throughout the newspaper 
reports on the employee’s death, only Nigerian representatives spoke to the media. 
 
Of particular importance in this thesis is how the government seeks to assuage the public’s fears 
by aligning the public’s aspirations for a better future with China. Given historical and 
contemporary context of Africa-China relations and Nigeria-China relations, I now set out to 
present my theoretical analysis of the key literature related to the areas I discuss in this thesis: 
Nigerian-Chinese relations and elite social relations. 
 
Towards an Anthropology of Elite African-Chinese Relations 
The debate surrounding Africa-China relations is highly polarized. Depending on the radically 
divergent viewpoints of scholars, the contemporary relationship between Africa and China 
represents a number of things: a resumption of an old comrade in arms relationship; a new 
colonial paradigm with the coloniser coming from South to South; an equitable partnership 
which can improve the lives of hundreds of millions; or a relationship that can potentially 
eliminate Western strongholds in Africa (Rotberg 2008; Zhu 2010; van Dijk 2009; Alden 2008; 
Carmody 2011). The great debate over China’s intentions in Africa is divided into two major 
camps, one that asserts China’s interest in Africa as predatory and another stating that it is for the 
mutual good of Africa and China. These arguments commonly place Africa between China and 
the US who act as rival suitors for the attention and affections of Africa (Burgis 2015).   
 
Collier argued that China’s lack of interference in foreign government affairs could neutralize the 
positive benefits of China’s economic deals to secure natural resources in Africa. In fact he asserts 
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that “the Chinese are making it worse, for they are none too sensitive when it comes to matters 
of governance” (Collier 2008: 86). Carmody and Taylor compared China to the US and found 
that the US uses “coercion informed by consent to achieve neoliberal normalization” (Carmody 
and Taylor 2009: 17) while China’s utilises what the pair terms, “flexigemony.” Fleixgemony is a 
“combination of economic, political and military levers in flexible strategic combinations to 
ensure continued raw material supplies” (Carmody and Taylor 2009: 2, 5) that changes from 
country to country depending on the historical and geographical terrain.  Their major argument 
is that Chinese policy is not consistent and depends on opportunism. They used the example of 
Sudan and Zambia where China carried out two different approaches. 
 
In Sudan, China helped with peace negotiations and remained neutral. In Zambia where there 
was an increase in complaints over Chinese traders displacing local traders and concerns over 
poor working conditions in Chinese owned mines, Michael Sata, a presidential candidate 
included anti-Chinese sentiments in his campaign. In response to Sata’s public dissention, Li 
Baodong, then China’s ambassador to Zambia threatened to cut all diplomatic ties to Zambia if 
Sata won. Despite Sata’s win diplomatic ties were not cut and China’s President Hu created a 
new loan package for Zambia. (Carmody and Taylor 2009:12). Zambians ignored China’s threat 
to cut diplomatic ties and China’s policy on non-interference was ignored in Zambian example. 
Carmody and Taylor argue that China’s use of flexigemony is predicated on economics and 
politics which leaves China liable to change its policies whenever it suits them instead of 
uniformly applying them. This flexibility has the potential to create harmful repercussions for 
African countries if Chinas aligns with autocratic or dictatorial governments. 
 
Agubamah voiced a number of concerns related to the Nigerian-Chinese trade. Overall he 
viewed the relationship as “lopsided” as opposed which is in opposition to what he views as the 
packaged tale of a ‘win-win’ relationship as sold by Nigerian and Chinese government officials. 
This lop-sidedness stems from Nigeria’s overreliance on oil as the key export and a growing trade 
imbalance between the two countries. In 2014, China’s exports to Nigeria were $3 billion while 
Nigeria’s exports to China were $1 billion (Agubamah 2014: 67). Agubamah also cautioned 
against Nigeria become a “dumping ground” for cheap Chines products including textiles. 
Another issue for Agubamah is labour, both Chinese and Nigerian labour. His concern was that 
Chinese employees displace Nigerian workers on Chinese led projects in Nigeria. Additionally, 
when Nigerians are employed, he asserts that they are mistreated. He compared Chinese actions 
to that of the British in a new form of “Sino-imperialism”:  
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With the trend of relationship between the two countries at present, we can confidently say that China 
is rather a significant contributor to Nigeria’s deindustrialization and underdevelopment. 
(Agubamah 2014: 68) 
 
Henderson et al’s review also argued that Chinese labour displaces local workers in other parts 
of Africa. Their research into Chinese firms across Africa revealed that apart from the mining 
industry most Chinese firms hired Chinese employees. Firms that hired Africa employees, such 
as Zambian mines and Tanzanian textile mills, utilised casual labour practices. (Henderson et al 
2013: 142-1243). These findings align with other research which concluded that Chinese 
investments in Africa can lead to employment for both African and Chinese workers; but with 
Chinese workers gaining the majority of jobs and higher level positions opportunities (Mung 
2008; Park 2009). Lumumba-Kasongo argued that although China provides a number of loans 
to African countries with no visible strings or conditions, unlike Western countries, there seems 
to be an inherent condition that also favours China.  
What is clear, is that almost all the aid packages greatly works to China’s advantage. Almost all of them 
stipulate that Chinese goods and services be purchased as part of the infrastructure building. For 
instance, it is estimated that 69% of Chinese aid to African countries is spent on Chinese equipment . 
(Lumumba-Kasongo 2011: 256) 
 
These arguments are countered by scholars that view Africa and China as mutually benefitting 
from an increase in relations. Fijalkowski asserts that  
In its political relations, China’s diplomacy stress the notion of solidarity and South -South 
cooperation, and the fact that China has never sought to subjugate, colonise or enslave Africa. Chinese 
discourse also emphasises the notion of respect for African countries embodied in its support for non-
interference and respect for sovereignty. (Fijalkowski 2011: 230) 
 
Wang and Zou, for example, argued that China is not trying to create new “spheres of influence” 
that lead to colonization and in fact the claims of neo-colonialism which come from the US and 
other Western powers are due to fear of displacement. (Wang and Zou 2014: 1131). The pair 
state that “Much of these criticisms of China’s Africa diplomacy come from Western countries.” 
(Wang and Zou 2014: 1128). The pair attempts to assuage concerns of Chinese employees 
displacing African workers and complaints over China increasing sales of arms to African 
counties. Instead they state that China’s interest in Africa goes beyond economic interests and 
are a part of China’s global strategy. “In a nutshell, the expansion of China’s diplomatic horizon 
in a large measure is a symptom of China’s transformation from a regional power to a global 
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power” (Wang and Zou 2014: 1115). This strategy includes a variety of positive points for Africa-
China relationship including debt cancellation, peace keeping, and health care initiatives. Zhou 
compared Chinese business and government policies to that of Western counterparts and argued 
that Chinese styles are more conducive to African counterparts for a number of reasons. Three 
major reasons are the work ethic of Chinese employees and managers; a mutual history of 
“colonial aggression” at the hands of the West; and China’s non-interference policy that allows 
African governments to conduct business without fear of Chinese oversight. (Zhou 2014: 1036). 
These sentiments are echoed by Sautman and Yan, who argued that when compared to the West, 
Africans generally view China more favourably. The pair compared a number of issues including 
Western countries use of aid which is tied to structural adjustment programmes and protectionist 
treaties (Sautman and Yan 2007). Sautman and Yan also argued that China provides loans 
provides more freely. 
 
Economist, Dambisa Moyo, advocated for African-Chinese economic relationships. She argued 
against aid, particularly Western aid which she linked to African corruption. Instead she strongly 
advocated for further African-Chinese trade and Chinese FDI in China. Her response to 
criticism from the West of the potential for China to become a neo-colonial presence in Africa, 
Moyo stated: 
Despite all the scaremongering, China’s motives for investing in Africa are actually quite pure. To 
satisfy China’s population and prevent a crisis of legitimacy for their rule, leaders in Beijing need to 
keep economic growth rates high and continue to bring hundreds of millions of people out of 
poverty. (Moyo 2012).  
 
Moyo also argued that concerns over Chinese employees displacing African counterparts are 
misplaced (Moyo 2012). She used the example of Zambai where “the ratio of African to Chinese 
workers has exceeded 13:1” (Moyo 2012). Daniel and Maiwada encouraged Nigeria to take 
advantage of its relationship with China and learn from China’s agricultural developments 
because “China has much to offer Nigeria in terms of lessons learnt from its own success in 
agricultural growth, alleviating poverty, and achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
in its eradication of extreme poverty and hunger” (278). Nascimento et al encourages African 
countries to court both the US and China and focus on economic activity.  
What the burgeoning Chinese and American interest in Africa show is overwhelmingly positive: It 
moves the prevailing view of Africa from a mindset where engagement is driven by aid and 
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humanitarian instinct to one of partnership and commercial opportunity. (Nascimento et al 2013: 
130). 
 
The polarized nature of the debate and its focus on analysis from the macro level has failed to 
produce a more nuanced understanding of the social aspects of African-Chinese relations. Both 
sides neglect to analyse the inter-personal relationships between African and Chinese actors. 
These macro level critiques also miss opportunities to examine the numerous players that 
contribute to African-Chinese relationships. Additionally, much of the debate is framed from the 
vantage point of how Chinese people treat Africans in comparison to Westerners. While there 
is an increase in research that examines African perspectives (Harneit-Sievers 2010; Kopiński 
and Polus 2011; Mohan and Lampert 2013; Corkin 2013), what is missing from most of these 
debates are the roles and positions of Africans, in shaping and negotiating African-Chinese 
relationships, more specifically, Nigerian-Chinese relationships, which is precisely the goal of an 
anthropological approach.  
 
Of particular interests in terms of my research are the perspectives of those who are able to 
engage with Chinese counterparts more readily, due to access to capital: (financial, social and 
educational) namely, elites; specifically, those outside of the public sector. In this thesis I join 
together the critical areas that influence the Nigerian government’s promotion of Nigerian-
Chinese interactions: big business; entrepreneurship and education. These areas are explored by 
examining the social relations and practices; individual aspirations and constraints at the heart of 
Nigerian-Chinese relations. At the same time, anthropology’s preoccupation with subaltern 
agency has led to a neglect of the ways in which elite actors’ exercise agency over processes of 
transnational business and development. 
 
Anthropology of Elites-Local and Transnational 
For decades, researchers have analysed, debated and retooled what it means to be an ‘elite’. 
Elites have a sphere of influence and power that workers and community members do not (Shore 
2002: 4; Scott 2008). Additionally, they share the ability and power to “facilitate things” (Scott 
2008: 26). But the category of ‘elites’ is of course contextual. One can be a part of the local elite 
whilst not being a part of the global elite or inhabit both spheres (Scheyvens and Storey 2003: 
183). Smith warns against strictly defining elites and non-elites into disparate links without any 
crossovers. After all in one circumstance a person can be an elite and non-elite in another 
situation (Smith 2006). Rahman Khan describes “elites as those who have vastly disproportionate 
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control over or access to a resource” and are able to convert this access to various forms of capital 
(Khan 2012: 362).   
 
In 1972 Laura Nader called upon anthropologists to “study up” and research elites. Nader’s 
urging was linked to one main point, by focusing on those with less power and access to resources, 
anthropologists were only receiving a small part of a larger picture (Nader 1972). Researching 
elites provided insight to not only the larger picture but also how those with greater access to 
power impacted society at large (ibid). Over four decades later, although more anthropologists 
have headed this call, ethnographies that examine the lives of elites are still in the minority. There 
has been a recent upsurge in the recently the anthropology of elites which has expanded into a 
number of areas including elite schools, mining corporations and financial institution (Ho 2009; 
Courtois 2013; Rajak 2011; Welker et al 2011; Welker 2014). Research has also extended to the 
lives of mobile/expatriate elites; landowners and politicians/diplomats (Birtchnell and Caletrio 
2014; Crewe 2015). But between these ethnographies and Nader’s original call to study elites, 
there was a long span of time where her call went mainly unheeded. That was until 2002 when 
Shore and Nugent published a group of ethnographies that considered elites through an 
anthropological lens. In the book’s introduction, Shore discussed the inherent power relations 
embedded in the concept of elites. 
 
The very idea of ‘elites’ suggests qualities of ‘agency’, exclusivity’, ‘power’ and an apparent separation 
from ‘mass society’-concepts that in different ways, oblige us to consider themes of stratification, 
hierarchy, brokers and casual agents behind events. (Shore 2002:4) 
  
Additionally, the collection provided insight into elites through the analysis of “succession and 
reproduction” of elite networks and the varying forms, from the local to global scale which 
highlighted the range in “elite cultures” which were analysed against the backdrop of historical 
context to understand how these cultures came to be. (Shore 2002:13). While Shore and Nugent 
reinvigorated interest in an anthropological focus on elites, it took over a decade for another 
ethnographic anthology of elites to be written.  
 
The definition of elites I use to shape my research is multi-pronged with four components. Firstly, 
I define elites as members of societies who have greater access to income, opportunities and 
networks. Additionally, I infuse Khan’s definition of the convertibility of capital. For example, 
an elite actor must have capital that can be convertible into another form of capital; social capital 
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that allows them to acquire economic, cultural, or cosmopolitan (Khan 2012). Furthermore, I 
argue that elites are members of society whose actions and decisions can impact society at large 
and that understanding their lives provides insight into the ways that non-elites are denied access 
to acquire various forms of capital. (Nader 1972; Gilbert and Sklair 2017). In the context of the 
elites I studied, they are either currently in powerful positions or aspiring to reach these heights.  
Lastly, elites in Nigerian-Chinese relationships have a global reach which transcends their home 
countries. They are a part of a transnational elite class that is made up heterogeneous groups of 
elites from across the globe. “This class is transnational because it is tied to globalized circuits of 
production, marketing, and finances unbound from particular national territories and identities 
and because its interest lie in global over local or national accumulation” (Robinson 2004: 47). 
Elite Values and Subjectivities: The Cultivation of Aspirations 
Contemporary elites are never static: they are dynasties, in the making, always. ….. As an 
elite wealth manager explained, it’s not just about preparing the money for the children. 
It’s preparing the children for the money. What he meant was that it was essential to 
create the kind of human being who would be capable of handling an inheritance when 
the time came. (Glucksberg 2016: 4) 
Succession is crucial to maintaining elite power. Within dynasties, succession rarely occurs 
without grooming and education. This is applicable to dynasties within societies and 
organizations. Fumanti argued that the contemporary elites he researched in Namibia reflected 
upon the leadership of their elders. Up and coming younger elites skipped past their immediate 
elders, apartheid era elites, and looked to colonial era elites for inspiration. This indicates that 
succession is both simultaneously cultivated and negotiated by the older and younger generations. 
(Fumanti 2016). I explore this in chapter three’s discussion of the third generation in GNIM. 
Throughout my discussion on entrepreneurs and education (Chapters 5 and 6 respectively) I 
seek to understand how elite subjectivities and values influence elite actors and how this impacts 
aspirations and future prospects. Elite values and subjectivities are cultivated in various arenas, 
but educational institutions are the most formative places for instilling these values. An increasing 
number of research focuses on elite education and how elite subjectivities and values are 
cultivated in elite schools.  
 
Drew et al’s research into elite schools’ websites found that schools branded themselves as 
providers of a “happy, good and desirable life…while discursively marginalising and sidelining 
non-privileged subjectivities” (Drew et al 2016:88). Parents see these websites and identify with 
the images that are promoted. These images are something they want their children to be part 
of, in order to expand upon the lifestyle and values that parents have provided for their children. 
26 | P a g e  
 
Courtois argued that private schools marketed themselves not just through the educational capital 
that students could attain, but also through social, cultural and moral capital (Courtois 2013: 176). 
Cultural capital is of high importance and helps students in the becoming of an elite through 
learning a “class habitus” that includes “language, body, hexis, distance world vies, expectations, 
and taste” (Courtois 2013: 176). These characteristics are a part of what constitutes an elite 
person. Weenink proposed that cosmopolitan capital is also an integral value for elites.  
 
Cosmopolitan capital comprises bodily and mental predispositions and competencies (savoir faire) 
which help to engage confidently in such arenas. Moreover, it provides a competitive edge, a head 
start vis-à-vis competitors. (Weenink 2008: 1092) 
Cosmopolitan capital and a global outlook can become a part of young elites perspectives 
through exposure to social networks which include family members who live abroad or through 
an understanding of how their country’s relationship with other countries (Kenway et al. 2016: 
146-168). This capital can also be acquired through interactions with international cultures, both 
domestically or abroad and through the learning of language classes and extracurricular activities. 
However, cosmopolitan capital does not necessarily displace local cultural capital. Research into 
aspirational and cosmopolitan elites, Lysonski and Durvasula found that although Nigerians 
were eager to engage with different cultures outside of Nigeria, they also valued Nigerian 
cultures (Lysonski and Durvasula 2013: 503). In chapter six I discuss Chinese language 
education in Nigerian educational institutions. Of particular focus is a private school and 
exploring how the institution links aspirations and future prospects to Chinese language classes 
as a part of its branding. 
 
In 2013 Salverda and Abbink presented a contemporary analysis of elite ethnographies. The 
collection considered historical and contemporary issues related to elites including the 
recruitment and replacement of elites; new forms of elites including transnational elites and those 
in emerging economies; and the role of elites in “shaping distinctions” within a society (Salverda 
and Abbink 2013: 4). Other elite ethnographies examined the lives of transnational and 
cosmopolitan elites (Hannerz 1996; 2000; 2005). Fechter built upon Hannerz’s research and 
explored the lives of expatriates working in Indonesia. She argues against Hannerz’s application 
of boundaries in the day to day lives of her research participants. Instead she found that instead 
of easily disposable boundaries as Hannerz analysed (Hannerz 2000), expatriates in Indonesia 
attempted to construct and maintain various types of boundaries (Fechter 2007a: 26). This is 
instructive in understanding how transnational elites can simultaneously interact with both local 
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and international communities (Fechter 2007a: 121). In Chapters 3 and 4, I analyse how a 
Chinese firm in Nigeria utilises its relationships with various international communities in Nigeria 
to conduct business.  
 
In 2014 Birtchnell and Caletrío took the concept of transnational elites one step further and 
explored elites on the move, in Elite Mobilities a volume of ethnographic researcher into elites. 
These ethnographies explored elite interactions across the world in various spaces. Birtchnell 
and Caletrío argue that elite interactions do not just take place in private spaces such as 
boardrooms and mansions but in public spaces (Birtchnell and Caletrío 2014: 11). They also 
argue that travel and mobility is essential to the lives of transnational elite. Throughout the thesis, 
we see actors demonstrating this mobility which they harness to take advantage of a variety of 
education and business opportunities. The bureaucratic and excusive process that enables some 
elites to exploit these opportunities and others not to, will be discussed, particularly in chapter 
five’s discussion on entrepreneurship and aspirations.  
 
Anthropology of Business 
Three ethnographic chapters within this thesis explore elite exchanges between Nigerians and 
Chinese within the business world; specifically, the experiences of Nigerian entrepreneurs and 
Nigerian senior management within Great Northern Industrial Manufacturers (GNIM), a family 
owned Chinese MNC headquartered in Lagos. I explore the critical role of social relationships 
in business. These relationships are established and maintained through a number of classically 
anthropological factors which include: kinship, brokerage, performance and rituals. As such, 
business anthropology, particularly family business anthropology informs my analysis of 
Nigerian-Chinese elite interactions. 
 
This thesis explores globalisation and cross-cultural exchanges through Nigerian-Chinese 
relationships in business settings which are influenced by cultural practices within organisations. 
These cultural practices play a large role in the management of GNIM.   
 
Recent anthropological interest in corporate formations (Benson and Kirsch 2014; Cefkin 2010; 
Shever 2012; Rajak 2011; Welker 2014; Peluso and Lucas 2016; 2016a) have directed our 
attention to diverse groups of people within organizations and the implications of their actions. 
The group of people I focus on within GNIM are, Nigerian senior management. I seek to 
understand the ways in which global corporate operations and patterns of investment are socially 
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constituted through senior management’s relationships with members of their elite network. 
GNIM and the entrepreneurial ventures discussed in chapter five all began as small enterprises 
with an individual at the helm and some level of family support. The influence of kinship is a 
theme that emerges in the analysis of Nigerian-Chinese elite relationships therefore I have drawn 
upon the anthropology of family business in building my anthropological theories and analysis.  
 
In 1992, Marcus and Hall published one of the first anthropological explorations into family 
business which analysed various American business dynasties in a number of essays. The Chinese 
owned firm I researched is a family owned firm; succession and kinship play a key role in the 
firm’s operations. The early 2000’s saw advocacy for using an anthropological lens to study family 
business as well as the first major ethnography of a family firm. Chua et al argued for the use of 
kinship studies in the analysis of family business. “By switching its attention to kinship, the field 
[business studies] would benefit from the extensive anthropological literature on the basis, 
benefits, costs, and dynamics of kinship that family business researchers would not have to 
recreate” (Chua et al 2003: 335). 
 
 At the same time Alex Stewart, an anthropologist, advocated for the use of kinship studies to 
analyse family business in order to provide insight into a variety of areas including kinship logic 
as a primary role over business logic; nepotism; network ties and mobilization of employees 
[family members] (Stewart 2003:).  I explore these issues in my study of the Chinese family firm 
operating in Lagos. I sought to understand how flexible kinship logic is used to simultaneously 
include and exclude actors from the firm’s senior management level and its extensive social 
network. Yanagisako’s 2002 ethnography into Italian family owned silk firms was the first 
ethnography to lay bare the complex relationships within a family firm. Yanagisako explored a 
number of issues including the tensions of succession and a number of issues: “gender and the 
inclusion of daughters, as family members rethink and reconsider sentiment and strategies of 
capital accumulation, firm reproduction, and family continuity” (Yanagisako 2002:35). I draw 
upon Yanagisako’s research particularly the exploration of dynastic issues between second and 
third generation family members within the Chinese firm. In the same year de Lima explored 
the world of elite family businesses in Portugal. Similarly to Yanagisako de Lima also discussed 
issues of succession but in relation to Portugal’s 1974 revolution. deLima found that: 
The informal processes with which elites organize their lives reveal, however, that family and kinship 
continue to play an important role in capitalist societies being as they are connected to the 
development and maintenance of other forms of power. (de Lima 2002: 95) 
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deLima’s research highlights the overlap between two key areas I focus on in this research, elites 
and the use of kinship in the business world. In the early 2010’s there was a new wave of family 
firm ethnographies which deeply questioned the historical separation of capitalism/business and 
kinship and the low number of ethnographies that examine the links between kinship and 
business (McKinnon 2013; Yanagisako 2013; Shever 2013; Bear 2013). Yanagisako traced 
critiques on capitalism back to Weber who separated family enterprises from enterprises in 
general (Yanagisako 2013; McKinnon and Cannell 2013: 17). Yanagisako posited that one of the 
reasons kinship has been dislodged from analysis of globalisation and capitalism is due to “an 
evolutionary model of modernity that posits a steady, global march away from the fetters of family 
and kinship bonds” (Yanagisako 2013: 64). This is particularly peculiar given that 70-95% of 
businesses around the world, which account for over 70% of global GDP, are family owned 
businesses (Family Firm Institute; PricewatehouseCooper 2014). I find Yanagisako’s argument 
particularly useful in my analysis of the Chinese family firm. It has operated in Nigeria for nearly 
half a century and relied upon decidedly non-capitalistic factors to establish maintain and expand 
its business operations. These factors include social relations; social and cultural work that 
involves kinship; performance; ceremony and ritual.   
 
Yanagisako also argued that although globalisation can mean new partnerships like the joint 
ventures between Italian family and Chinese companies, kinship logic influenced business 
decisions (Yanagisako 2013). In the example of the Chinese firm in Lagos, we find an 
organization with headquarters in Lagos and partnerships with a variety of international business 
partners yet kinship practices are a strong component in the firm’s relationships with these 
business partners and other members of its social network. In the same volume, Shever discusses 
familial connections in a newly privatised oil company in Argentina. Although employees were 
not blood family, they drew up on kinship ties in order to gain and maintain employment (Shever 
2013). In chapter three I discuss the liminal position of senior Nigerian management within 
GNIM who are treated as family but do not receive all the rights as family.  
 
 
Methodology 
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My fieldwork took place from February 2011 to April 2012. Most of my research was conducted 
in Lagos state with visits to neighbouring Ogun state. I also travelled to Abuja for a Nigerian 
economic and business conference.   
 
Tracing the connections between Chinese and Nigerian elites involved researching a variety of 
people across multiple sites. Conducting multi-sited ethnography requires a level of openness 
and responsiveness to the field. While I did not have the difficulties of crossing country borders 
I faced the complexities of researching a range of actors. Researching multiple groups requires 
“… a clear theoretical orientation and [a more deliberate] strategic site selection than work in a 
single site” (Fitzgerald 2006: 3).  I placed an emphasis on designing an ethnography that followed 
the key areas in which the Nigerian government promotes Nigerian-Chinese interaction.  
 
Access: Exclusion and Inclusion 
 
To answer my overarching research question of “What is the relationship between Chinese and 
Nigerian elites?” I needed to define elites within the Nigerian context and trace these 
relationships. Before arriving in the field, I determined that the major sites of interaction for 
Chinese and Nigerian elites were within government and business (see discussion of elite 
ethnography in the Anthropology of Elites-Local and Transnational section in this chapter). As 
such I contacted potential Chinese and Nigerian research participants from business and 
government sectors including members of Chinese firms, Nigerian brokers, as well as Chinese 
and Nigerian government officials. Some responded while others did not.  
 
Compared to non-elites, access to elites is regarded as particularly difficult because they, by their 
nature, ‘establish barriers that set their members apart from the rest of society’ (Hertz & Imber, 1993, 
p. 3). The process can therefore be far more time-consuming and costly than making contact with 
non-elites.’ (Welch et al, 2002: 615) 
 
This difficult became more apparent after my arrival in Nigeria when I continued to try to make 
contacts. The process took months of using every conceivable way I could think of to establish 
contacts and to set up meetings. I spoke with a member of the Chinese consulate in Lagos who 
initially seemed interested in meeting but subsequently ignored all my emails and calls. The 
barriers were greater than initially imagined.  
 
Before arriving in Nigeria I corresponded with a mid-level Chinese employee at a large Chinese 
technology firm who expressed an interest in participating in the research and providing me 
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access to others in the firm. Our correspondences were in Chinese and were positive but after 
meeting in person he declined to participate. Other potential research participants with Chinese 
government and business communities either only briefly met with me or denied access all 
together. On multiple occasions, I received introductions or was sent to an office and asked to 
use a broker’s name as if it was a virtual passcode or shibboleth. Alas, doors did not open and I 
was not allowed access. I faced the same issue when connecting with Nigerian officials. While 
attending a business conference in Abuja held by The Economist, I met a Nigerian government 
official related to Chinese affairs in Lagos. Although she eagerly expressed interest in participating 
in the research and helping me access other research participants, my calls and emails were 
ignored.  
The challenge of studying up is that the people you want and need to speak with are in positions of 
power to exclude you or to confine your access to people, information and place. Participant 
observation takes on new levels of difficulty when you study up. (Smart and Smart 2012: 282). 
 
When faced with these barriers to research I began to reassess my original research questions 
and brainstorm how I could conduct research despite facing issues of access. While the field 
does in a sense help shape our decisions as ethnographers, it is ultimately up to us to decide what 
avenues to follow and which to abandon. As Fairhead declared, “When ‘following the story’, 
multi-sited ethnographers are not roaming at will but are following very particular paths whose 
salience has been exposed within the different theoretical traditions and insights that 
anthropologists have discerned” (Fairhead 2012: 145).  
 
I decided to tackle the issues of government and Chinese access with two different solutions, 
starting with government access. Despite not being permitted to access political circles, I was 
determined to find a way to analyse government’s role in Nigerian-Chinese relations. I decided 
to analyse the political discourse presented to the public by the Nigerian government through a 
public relations campaign. By following the virtual fieldsite of political discourse through media 
and press releases, I was able analyse the government’s presentation of Nigerian-Chinese 
relations to the public. This discourse provided insight into the government’s policies and 
initiatives that allowed Nigerian-Chinese interactions to take place. Researching public discourse 
provided a powerful lens to analyse how Nigerian-Chinese relationship are packaged and 
promoted to the public. Public discourse focused on key areas where Nigerian and Chinese 
counterparts interacted and thus, areas where the government sought to encourage participation. 
These sectors included my initial choice of business, but it also led me into an unplanned sector, 
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education. This helped focus my fieldsites on three primary locations which were the three key 
sectors of Nigerian-Chinese interactions: big business, entrepreneurship, and education.  
 
Accessing government officials and Chinese firms mirrored the inherent challenge of attempting 
to conduct research in elite circles. Although I initially considered this issue as one linked to 
gatekeeping, I quickly realized it was a matter of brokerage which meant utilising relationships to 
help with introductions and accessing research participants. Entering most of my research sites 
required a broker who could vouch for credibility. After a few months of making little headway 
into accessing Chinese firms, I decided to draw upon the help of my own networks. A few familial 
connections had access to employees within Chinese firms in Lagos and Delta states.  Most of 
the firms were small and did not have Nigerian management. I found a good fit with Great 
Northern Industrial Manufacturers (GNIM) a large Chinese owned firm that employed a few 
Nigerians in the ranks of upper management. The firm is discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 
4. Gaining access to a firm of its magnitude was only made possible through brokerage and the 
firm’s trust in my professional integrity which was an extension of the trust they placed in the 
broker who was a part of both GNIM’s and my social networks. Due to this broker’s relationship 
to the firm, he was also included in the research. (See discussion on Oba (King) Oduwale in 
Chapter 4). 
 
Making connections with entrepreneurs and educational institutions proved much easier, but 
they also involved the use of brokerage. I met entrepreneurs through individual or organizational 
brokers. While attending a conference on foreign direct investment, I met a variety of Nigerian 
business people; one of whom introduced me to a Nigerian entrepreneur who conducted 
business with Chinese counterparts. Through that entrepreneur, I met another entrepreneur and 
from there it snowballed and I met other entrepreneurs. I also met entrepreneurs through social 
connections and via organizational brokers. I gained access to Chinese language teaching 
institutions through the head of the Confucius Institute at the University of Lagos. Once I was 
granted access to visit classes at the university, I parlayed this into access to schools.  
 
Almost all the research participants I worked with were directly or indirectly introduced to me 
via a broker. The avenue in which I accessed elite research participants, parallels the difficulties 
Nigerians face when attempting to engage in Nigerian-Chinese elite exchanges. Facing challenges 
to access elites provided insight into the critical nature of social relationships and brokerage in 
the formation of Nigerian-Chinese relationships.  
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Location-Field Sites  
I conducted my research in Lagos and Ogun states. Both states are located in Southwest Nigeria. 
Ogun State borders a few states including Lagos State. Lagos State is the birthplace of several 
Nigerian presidents and artists while Ogun State boasts more universities than any other state. 
Both states are the home of a growing number Chinese firms operating in Nigeria. Most of my 
time in Lagos State was spent in Lagos city and Lekki. As the commercial capital of Nigeria and 
the most populous city in Nigeria, Lagos city was the perfect place to conduct research. As of 
2014, Lagos city was estimated to be the home of 21 million people (Lagos State Government 
2014; Kaplan 2014). Lagos city consists of mainland Lagos and three islands-Ikoyi, Lagos, and 
Victoria.  Lekki is an up and coming part of Lagos State that is the home of new housing 
developments and the Lekki Free Trade Zone which was discussed at the opening of this chapter. 
My parents are from Nigeria and much of my family still lives there. As such I was familiar with 
the some of the country through my upbringing and previous trips. Despite this familiarity, much 
of my previous time in Nigeria was spent outside of Lagos city. Although I previously visited 
Lagos city, conducting research in Lagos State required adapting to the Lagosian landscape.  
 
Many foreign firms and expatriate residences are located on the islands. However, GNIM 
headquarters is located on mainland Lagos. Educational institutes were spread throughout 
mainland, while entrepreneurs were spread throughout Lagos city and Lekki. Travelling from 
one part of mainland Lagos can take over three hours during morning and evening commutes. 
Depending on traffic, travelling from mainland to one of the islands can take twice as long. 
Balancing the schedules of busy research participants along with traffic considerations was a 
challenge. Most of the time I resided with family on the mainland near GNIM. From there I 
travelled throughout mainland and the islands. When I met with research participants located 
on Lekki Islands or Ogun State, I usually spent time with family in those areas.   
 
Business participants generally had constricted schedules with little leeway so there was 
considerable focus on engaging in their activities as far as permitted and conducting ‘ethnography 
by appointment’, basically doing research when my research participants could allocate time in 
their schedules (Kemmitt 2008). Sometimes our meetings were scheduled a few weeks in 
advance, other times I would receive a call the day before an entrepreneur was available.  
 
The fieldsites I spent time in are categorized according to the three key pillars: 
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Big Business & Brokerage 
I regularly visited Great Northern Industrial Manufacturers (GNIM), a Chinese corporation. My 
research took place at the firm’s Lagos headquarters and some of its subsidiaries in Lagos and 
neighbouring Ogun State. I interviewed all four of the Nigerian members of GNIM’s upper 
management and one of the Chinese directors along with formal interviews with one king and a 
joint informal meeting with the king and his colleague, another king.  I also spoke with other 
members of the firm including Chinese employees, the wives of top managers, and a consultant 
from North America. My time was also spent observing operations and interactions at various 
subsidiaries and participated in social events.  
 
Entrepreneurs 
Research into Nigerian entrepreneurs took place throughout Lagos city in a wide variety of places 
including offices; restaurants and on the road. I also attended an industry event with one of the 
entrepreneurs. I interviewed nine entrepreneurs and focused on five of them in this chapter and 
referred to one in the education chapter. I also conducted participant observation as their 
schedules permitted and conducted fieldwork on the go by observing and interacting with 
entrepreneurs on social media as they used various platforms to promote their businesses.  
 
Education 
My research primarily took place at educational institutes. I interviewed eleven research 
participants who ranged from educational institution administrators to Chinese language teachers and 
adult students.  I also conducted participant observation in primary and secondary classrooms as 
well as university classrooms. Because of my previous experience as a Chinese student and ability 
to speak Chinese, I was able to help students in class and participate as a student and teaching 
assistant.  
 
Throughout my time in the field I attended several events which included the Nigeria Summit in 
Abuja hosted by The Economist; an expatriate charity fair in Lagos; a Chinese language 
competition for Lagos students and Chinese national holiday celebrations hosted by GNIM. I 
also visited the offices of the Lekki Free Trade Zone partners in Lagos city and the zone itself in 
Lekki.   
 
Ethics in Elite Encounters 
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Confidentiality and consent were important factors in conducting ethical research. All my research 
participants gave their informed consent to engage in research. I also gave them opportunities to 
speak with me away from work if they had any concerns of other people in their organizations taking 
note of their participation. My original research proposal that was accepted by the University of 
Sussex’s ethics board did not include children. Therefore, when I extended my research to 
educational institutions I observed classes, but limited my research participants to educators and 
university level students.  
When conducting ethnography, general practice is to anonymize the names of research participants 
and other identifying features such as the names of organizations they are related to. Woods argues 
that there are three challenges to anonymizing:  
….elite subjects are by definition drawn from a relatively small group of individuals; elite subjects are 
often interviewed because of the position that they hold, and the reporting and analysis of their 
comments cannot be easily divorced from their office or organization; and some (though not all) elite 
subjects are public figures. (Woods 2012: 4) 
 
I did not anonymize the public figures discussed in the government discourse article because the 
bilateral agreements and policies discussed within the chapter are all presented to the public 
through press releases and other media. Conversely, I anonymised most names and organizations 
that I discussed in the other chapters, particularly people I interviewed and attributed quotes and 
data to. Despite my efforts, some of the research participants and organizations are easy to 
determine due to their prominence in Nigerian society. 
Researching elites has different challenges than research with non-elite actors. The typical 
dynamics where the researcher has more power than the research participant is not present. 
Instead the roles can be more balanced or even reversed with the researcher is in a less powerful 
position (Busby 2011:11). This power can be linked to economic, social, or political capital. 
Regarding this shift in power, Gilbert poses the following question: “When can – or should – 
ethnography produce critique, confrontation, or collaboration? Or does the hospitality that 
ethnography depends on make working for political change impossible?” (Gilbert 2016). 
I wrestled with feelings of obligation due to the hospitality of my research participants. This was 
compounded by including research participants who were introduced to me via brokers which 
included familial connections. As both a researcher and lecturer in business ethics, my 
commitment ultimately rests with conducting, analysing, and presenting research in an ethical 
manner.  
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Throughout my time in the field I found that access had “to be both scrutinized for the way it 
transforms the researcher and continuously negotiated throughout the time of fieldwork” (Hirsch 
and Gellner 2001: 5). My position in relation to research participants was constantly changing 
and how I was introduced to and viewed by people changed, depending on the fieldsite. 
Additionally, as a first-generation African-American with links to Nigeria my familiarity with 
Nigerian cultures was useful when dealing with Nigerian research participants. Despite my strong 
American accent, Nigerian research participants generally viewed me as a Nigerian due to my 
familial links to Nigeria. Although Lagos citizens include a mixture of the over 250 ethnic groups 
within Nigeria, majority of Lagos inhabitants are Yoruba. Although most of my family is of a 
different ethnic group, some of the family members I lived with in Lagos city are Yoruba. 
Furthermore, my connections with other ethnic groups and knowledge of these cultures 
furthered my acceptance with various research participants. 
My experiences as a tutor/teacher and student, helped me relate to educators and students. As a 
doctoral researcher with an MBA and experience working in business, entrepreneurs and 
research participants related to GNIM, felt comfortable discussing business concepts with me. 
Some research participants, particularly those within education, viewed my position a researcher 
in the department of a British university, as a source of credibility. Adult students connected to 
me as a contemporary who also spoke Chinese and had Nigerian ancestry. Even previous 
experiences interviewing people for a university newspaper and radio station came in handy when 
conducting interviews. 
When interacting with elites in general, some researchers suggest approaching them from the 
position of the foreign, humble and unknowledgeable ethnographer who asks complimentary 
questions in order to gain their trust (Scheyvens and Storey 2003: 186).  Others have followed 
the path of an insider by drawing on similarities with elite research participants. Mikecz stressed 
the importance of a researcher’s positionality in gaining access to interviews by utilizing, “the 
researcher’s ‘track record’ of interviews [which] serves as proof of trustworthiness” (Mikecz 2012: 
490). Coupling my Nigerian heritage with what is generally considered a fairly upper-middle class 
background, along with my experience living as an expat in three countries, I was usually accepted 
as ‘one of us’ throughout the various groups I studied. I was also able to demonstrate my 
knowledge of unstated rules such as respect for elders and hierarchy, which was particularly 
useful when observing and interacting with research participants.  
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Nonetheless, I was not privy to top level meetings at any organization where my research took 
place meetings or even allowed to work within any organization. I was an outsider with limited 
insider privileges which allowed me to speak to people, observe daily interactions, and to attend 
events. In this role, I drew upon a wide variety of experiences I had in business, education, and 
other arenas. These experiences made it easier for me to gauge how to position myself in relation 
to research participants, and once again underline the key methodological imperatives that came 
to define my fieldwork: adaptability, flexibility, and reflexivity. 
Overview of the Thesis  
This thesis examines ethnographically the relationships between Nigerian and Chinese elite and 
aspirational actors in strategic areas of interaction. The first chapter of this thesis has illustrated 
the current promises and tensions related to Nigerian-Chinese relationships. Through a historical 
and contemporary overview of the relationship, I have highlighted the extent to which scholarly 
debates are divided and rarely provide insight into the agency and lives of Nigerians, negotiating 
and interacting with Chinese. In the next chapter, I examine how the dream and promise of 
Nigerian-Chinese relations are constructed and deployed. 
 
Chapter 2- Chapter II- Selling the Chinese Dream to the Nation: Public Discourse and Narratives 
in Action, the virtual field site of public discourse. Public discourse and narratives are a 
fundamental part of government and business policy making. These campaigns are created and 
implemented in order to gain support. In the case of the Nigerian government and business elite, 
they seek to gain public support for their partnership with China. I argue that while the 
government can make deals with Chinese counterparts without the public’s consent, history has 
taught the government that acquiescence from the public will help the formation and 
implementation of these alliances go smoothly. The chapter reviews the history of public 
relations, which is a cornerstone in shaping public discourse, and dissects how the Nigerian 
government and business elite publicly present agreements between Nigerian and Chinese. Of 
particular importance is the use of language and style of presentation which are designed to 
highlight the benefits of these agreements for Nigerians. Agreements which cover the areas 
discussed within the thesis include entrepreneurship, education, and Chinese firms.  
 
After exploring public discourse and narratives I turn to Chinese big business in Nigeria through 
Chapter 3-The Family Firm, which delves into the world of Great Northern Industrial 
Manufacturers (GNIM), a Chinese firm headquartered in Lagos. The family owned firm has 
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operated in Nigeria for over forty years and utilises kinship in its daily operations. Of particular 
interest are the rarefied Nigerian employees who are able to rise to upper management within 
the firm. The chapter focuses on their experiences in GNIM as well as the firm’s extension of 
kinship to lower ranking employees and other people within its network. Along with kinship, 
GNIM utilises ceremony, ritual, and performance to affirm its social and economic relationships.  
I argue that that although GNIM’s use of kinship logic helps the firm conduct business in Nigeria, 
there are conflicting issues of mistrust and paternalism that the GNIM contends with regularly. 
 
Chapter 4-“Our Friend for Eternity”: Brokerage, Guanxi, and Corporate Gift Giving explores 
the various forms of social work that GNIM relies upon in order to operate. Social work is related 
to brokerage; guanxi and corporate gifts. These areas of social work are complex and sometimes 
linked with corruption. I posit that the typical explorations of corruption conducted by such 
organisations as Transparency International and the World Bank do not allow for the 
complexities that make up social work. This chapter examines the historical and current usage 
of brokerage along with guanxi-Chinese form of relationship building along with corporate giving. 
Ethnographic evidence from my fieldwork provides insight into local usage and understandings 
of these forms of social work.  
 
In Chapter 5-The Entrepreneurial Spirit of Nigeria?, I move away from GNIM and into the 
world of Nigerian entrepreneurs who engage in business with Chinese counterparts. Nigerian 
entrepreneurship is one of the heralded areas that government officials contend will benefit from 
Nigerian-Chinese relations Historically Nigerian has had a high percentage of small business 
owners. In more recent years, the government has encouraged its citizens to start businesses as a 
way to help the country develop economically. 
 
I argue that although entrepreneurship is portrayed as the great hope of poverty alleviation, 
opportunities for upward mobility are greater for those who already have greater access to capital. 
These are advantages to capital. The chapter explores the stories of these entrepreneurs in 
relation to social relationships through their interactions with Chinese partners beginning from 
the initiation of contact; business negotiations and as business is conducted.  
 
Chapter 6-Ni Hao Naija: Elite Futures and Chinese Education in Nigeria examines the last pillar 
that potentially has the most implications for Nigeria’s future: education. The promise of 
Nigerian-Chinese relationships is particularly focused on aspirations and advancement in society 
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through education. The chapter examines the perceived benefits of education in Nigerian society 
along with the introduction of Mandarin Chinese language in Lagosian private and public 
schools. Performance and ceremony also play a part in instilling children with promise of 
Nigerian-Chinese relations. Ethnographic fieldwork into school and a university classes provide 
insight into the experiences of students and insight into what types of students are attempting to 
take on the promise of Nigerian-Chinese relations. 
 
Chapter 7-Conclusion is where I review the main findings of each chapter. I then explore the 
themes that emerge throughout this thesis: exclusivity; brokerage; ritual, ceremony and 
performance. 
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Chapter II- Selling the Chinese Dream to the Nation: Public 
Discourse and Narratives in Action  
China takes from us primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of 
colonialism. China is no longer a fellow underdeveloped economy. China is the second biggest economy 
in the world, an economic giant capable of the same forms of exploitation as the West. China is a major 
contributor to the de-industrialisation of Africa and thus African underdevelopment. ….Africa must seize 
the moment and move manufacturing of goods consumed in Africa out of China to the African 
continent ... I cannot recommend a divorce. However, a review of the exploitative elements in this marital 
contract is long overdue. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (Chima 2013) 
 
In 2013, when Sanusi Lamido Sanusi wrote an article for the London Financial Times critiquing 
Nigerian-Chinese relationships, he sparked a small diplomatic storm. At the time of his editorial 
Sanusi was the head of the Central Bank of Nigeria. Sanusi urged Nigerians to view China without 
rose-tinted glasses and think of China as competition instead of a historical ally. Additionally, he 
cautioned against repeating old colonial patterns of exploitation. Not only were the comments 
critical but coming from a high level government official, the comments had the potential to 
unsettle popular support of Nigerian-Chinese affairs. While Sanusi was the highest level member 
of the government to publicly question emerging relationships at various levels of Nigerian society 
(not only in the elite echelons of power), other Nigerians also began to re-evaluate the increasing 
intimacy between Nigeria and China. Their concerns crystalized around high profile transactions 
that involved selling off national resources to Chinese firms and the apparent gains these deals 
netted for Nigerian elite; low quality Chinese products flooding the Nigerian market and a general 
distrust of China’s motives in Nigeria.  
  
Chinese officials did not let Sanusi’s comments go unchecked. Less than a month later President 
Xi responded to Sanusi indirectly at a public meeting with a small group of African Heads of 
State
5
: 
At present, the international situation is undergoing profound and complex changes. China-Africa 
relations are facing not only unprecedented opportunities, but also the tests of many new situations and 
new problems. No matter how the international situation changes, China will firmly adhere to the policy 
of staying friendly to Africa, always be a reliable friend and sincere partner of African countries, and strive 
to make greater contributions to peace and development in Africa…The Chinese government will take 
active measures to encourage Chinese enterprises to expand investment in Africa and continue to ask the 
Chinese enterprises to actively fulfil their social responsibilities.  
(Akanbi and Oyedele 2013) 
 
While Xi’s statement briefly alluded to the challenges of Africa-China relationships, he mainly 
focused on friendship, reliability and sincerity. Official statements like Xi’s often serve as public 
relations statements that focus on the positive actions of initiatives and relationships through the 
                                                             
5 Leaders of ten countries attended; Nigeria was not one of them. 
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use of language steeped in camaraderie and trust. What this and other rebuttals to critiques have 
in common is an enticing story of development and mutual respect where both Nigerian and 
Chinese citizens benefit from their countries’ relationship. How do Nigerian government officials 
and business elites construct and deploy this narrative of mutuality? How are public discourse 
and narratives shaped and delivered to the public?  Who is the target audience for these 
messages?  
 
Critical social science literature tends to be concerned with issues that pertain to the growing 
Nigerian-Chinese narrative, for example state power and how it is enacted and the production of 
policy as the key site of discourse. However, this focus overlooks the so-called “culture-work” of 
public discourse, which is as critical to government as it is to business (L'Etang 2012: 167). The 
Nigerian government’s public discourse campaign seeks to reinvigorate the Nigerian dream with 
narratives of the great development and modernity to come through Nigerian-Chinese 
relationships. This grand narrative is popularized through the inscription of individual aspirations 
which are linked to China through business and education opportunities.   
 
I originally planned to research governments’ roles in Nigerian-Chinese relationships by directly 
observing and interviewing Nigerian and Chinese officials. (See Chapter 1-Methodology section) 
Despite initial promises, my attempts to research Nigerian and Chinese officials did not result in 
meetings or opportunities for research. Although I attempted to pursue other avenues, I did not 
successfully gain access to any government officials. Through observations of the representation 
of Nigerian-Chinese relations in the media and conversations with other research participants, I 
developed another approach to analyzing the government. This analysis focused on public 
discourse and the Nigerian government’s creation of a narrative that seeks to link Nigerian-
Chinese relations with Nigerians’ aspirations for upward mobility and elite statuses.  
 
This chapter seeks to examine the public discourse campaign employed by elites, particularly 
those in government and business, to refute concerns over Nigerian-Chinese relationships. This 
campaign is utilised in a number of critical areas which the government uses to promote China 
as the new key player in Nigeria’s economic growth. These key pillars: big business; 
entrepreneurship and education will be explored in detail throughout the ethnographic chapters. 
I argue that the Nigerian government has created a multi-faceted campaign in order to gain the 
public’s acceptance and desire for Nigerian-Chinese relationships. This campaign includes state 
level diplomatic meetings; state to state policies that benefit government officials; cultural 
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performances and rituals and bilateral trade agreements. This chapter is divided into four main 
sections, beginning by charting an anthropology of public relations. I then explore the kinds of 
emerging critiques that the public relation’s campaign attempts to forestall and navigate. These 
critiques harken back to memories of Nigeria’s previous relationships with foreign investors. As 
such I include a case study of the Niger-Delta conflict to illustrate what can happen if the public 
does not support a relationship between Nigeria and foreign investors. This is followed by an 
examination of the components of public relations as an elite political process. The fourth section 
discusses the key pillars of the public discourse campaign in depth. 
 
 
Towards an Anthropology of Public Relations 
 
Public relations are an oft neglected area of research in anthropology due arguably, to its 
association with elite projects and the related neglect until recently of elite corporate ventures.  
Nonetheless one of the main proponents for bringing and anthropological approach to public 
relations, Jacquie L’Etang, has explored the links between public relations and public diplomacy. 
She argued that both public relations and public diplomacy centre on building and managing 
relationships (L’Etang 2009). She also argued that public relations is often used in an intercultural 
context to help bring diverse groups together and it is also used to help promote changes within 
a culture (L’Etang 2012: 167). As we will examine later, the promotion of Nigerian-Chinese 
exchanges centres around creating and maintaining relationships both on state to state and 
individual levels. Before delving into this, the history I will review the history of public relations.  
 
Two recognized fathers of public relations, Edward Bernays from the United States and Lucien 
Matrat from France, provide insights into public relations which highlights the links between 
public relations and public discourse as well as public relations and the private sector. Bernays 
was hired by President Woodrow Wilson to create propaganda in order to gain the American 
public’s support for Word War I. Bernays based his public relations theories upon the belief 
that organisations, including businesses and governments, could not meet their goals without 
public support (New York Times 2013). 
Any person or organization depends ultimately on public approval, and is therefore faced with the 
problem of engineering the public's consent to a program or goal. We expect our elected government 
officials to try to engineer our consent—through the network of communications open to them—for 
the measures they propose. We reject government authoritarianism or regimentation, but we are 
willing to take action suggested to us by the written or spoken word. The engineering of consent is the 
very essence of the democratic process, the freedom to persuade and suggest. (Bernays 2-3: 1947) 
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Starting in the 1920’s Bernays laid out his philosophy on what would come to be known as public 
relations. He argued that democratic processes allowed for government officials to attempt to 
persuade citizens into supporting government actions. Persuasion came in the form of public 
relations campaigns. The basic tenet of public relations rests upon creating a campaign which 
includes events that draw the public’s attention to an organisation. Attention is then sustained 
and converted to support and a clamouring for the organisation’s actions.  
 
The press is a key tool in the campaign for public support because it is used as a medium through 
which to publicise messages. According to Bernays:  
Words, sounds, and pictures accomplish little unless they are the tools of a soundly thought-out plan 
and carefully organized methods…. When the public is convinced of the soundness of an idea, it will 
proceed to action. People translate an idea into action suggested by the idea itself, whether it is 
ideological, political, or social….. In a democracy they can be accomplished principally by the 
engineering of consent. (Bernays 10: 1947) 
 
This “engineering of consent” is done by an elite group, which running counter to the claims that 
public relations is in fact integral to the democratic process (Ewan 1996).  According to Bernays, 
elites like himself were educated an analytical enough to understand what was beneficial for the 
public. In an interview with Bernays in the late 20
th
 century, the author Stuart Ewen, stated that: 
Throughout our conversation, Bernays conveyed his hallucination of democracy: a highly educated 
class of opinion-moulding tacticians are continuously at work, analysing the social terrain and adjusting 
the mental scenery from which the public mind, with its limited intellect, derives its opinions. (Ewen 
1996: 10) 
 
Conversely, Matrat viewed the American style of public relations as overrun with propaganda 
and unethical (Xifra 2012: 565). The ‘European’ method of public relations was strictly applied 
to organisations that autonomously managed through the use of self-designated objectives (Xifra 
2012: 570). This form of public relations is traced back to the beginning of the interwar years in 
the 1930’s, with the majority of Matrat’s research conducted during post WWII economic 
redevelopment. Matrat and a small group of colleagues developed their ideas while he worked 
in the public relations department of a French multinational (Xifra 2012: 570). Empirical 
observations from the workplace shaped Matrat’s believe that anthropology and public relations 
were intrinsically linked and that public relations was based around trust and respect for people. 
In 1965 Matrat drafted an international code of ethics for public relations practitioners which 
were later adopted by the International Public Relations Association. The code included direct 
references to United Nation’s human rights based principles.  
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Finally, the code asks professionals to refrain from “subordinating the truth,” circulating information 
that is not based on “ascertainable facts,” taking any action that is “unethical or dishonest or capable 
of impairing human dignity and integrity,” and using exploitive techniques “to create subconscious 
motivations which the individual cannot control of his/her own free will and so cannot be accountable 
for the action taken of them. (Xifra 2012: 569) 
 
Despite their divergent ideas, both schools of public relations are instructive in providing a 
framework from which to analyse the Nigerian government’s utilization of public discourse and 
narratives that are used to promote Nigerian-Chinese alliances. At the heart of Bernay’s 
philosophy is elite managed public relations. In Nigeria, the elites (government and business) are 
at the helm of the promotion of Nigerian-Chinese alliance. Matrat’s views on human rights based 
public relations serve as a basis to examine the tensions between elite desire to gain support and 
the manner in which this support is cultivated.  
 
The Role of the Nigerian Media within the Public Discourse Equation 
 
Historically the relationship between the Nigerian press and government has been a mixture of 
contention, puppeteering and grudging tolerance. During colonialism, the Nigerian press was a 
huge proponent of independence and self-rule (Uko 2004:10). In the early 1900’s Lord Lugard, 
the British governor-general, fought the press’s critique of British rule through a law that allowed 
him to “seize the printing presses, confiscate newspapers” and fine publishers (Uko 2004: 13). 
Journalists were arrested and put on trial for breaking press related laws. But instead of being 
scared, journalists were emboldened to continue writing stories that challenged colonial power. 
In response, strict laws were repealed and freedom of the press increased. In 1960’s post-colonial 
Nigeria the first republic passed legislation which effectively blocked the press from reporting 
information and from even publishing newspapers in certain areas. Fears of legal retaliation kept 
the press in fear of publishing stories that placed government officials in a negative light. (Uche 
1990: 123). The government that arose from the military coup in 1966 created legislation to 
overturn bans on newspapers. Nonetheless, these rules were re-established in the next military 
coup of 1967.  
 
Conversely, journalists have also been accused of being government puppets who used their 
medium to do the government’s bidding. It has been argued that journalists capitulated to 
government pressures and were bribed to write false stories that did not tell readers about 
government officials’ misrule. During the civil war, an international journalist noted that the main 
two sides of the conflict coerced the press into supporting them.  
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The press on both sides of the line came out of the war of words badly, succumbing with hardly a 
token resistance to the pressures exerted on it by military governments…the press lost its nerve and 
censored itself into a state of grovelling sycophancy. (Uche 1990: 130) 
 
From the second military coup to the 2000’s, which saw another republic and a variety of military 
coups and finally democratic rule, journalists were faced with various decrees that hampered the 
freedom of the press. Throughout the years, these laws and government’s general disdain for the 
press resulted in the closure of various newspapers as well as the arrests, trials and imprisonment 
of journalists.  
A number of high profile cases arose in which journalists were arrested for trying to provide the 
public with accurate information of government actions, including corruption. As recently as 
2006, two journalists were arrested and charged with sedition after one wrote a story that 
questioned the age and safety of the presidential jet. The other journalist discussed the story on 
television and both men were charged with “bring[ing] into hatred or contempt or excite[ing] 
disaffection against the person of the president” (BBC 2006). Nonetheless the Nigerian media 
has been praised for being instrumental in publicising and galvanising civil society to fight the 
atrocities that took place under the Abacha regime, the last military regime in Nigeria (Ngara and 
Esebonu 2012: 191). While there are newspapers and stories that simply take government press 
releases and quote them verbatim, there is also a significant strand of media that follows the 
tradition of press from previous eras in presenting news with accuracy and critical analysis.  
 
Given the government’s history with the media, the Nigerian government’s use of the media to 
help shape a compelling narrative about Nigeria-China relations is fraught with tension. While 
some media reports are simply verbatim quotes taken from press releases, other reports question 
the benefits of Nigeria’s increasingly close relations with China. This growing voice of discontent 
challenges the carefully crafted narrative of affinity and friendship. 
 
Public Vocalisation of Discontent 
 
In Nigeria, public critique of Nigerian-Chinese relationship captures a gradual shift from a 
triumphant narrative of post-colonial South-South mutual partnership spearheading a new era of 
Nigerian development and dominance to creeping concern that the alliance is not nearly as 
beneficial as advertised. Concerns have come from a number of sectors, ranging from 
government officials to private parties.  
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In an editorial, a former Delta State Commissioner for Finance, Chief Bernard Okumagba urged 
Nigerians to examine the impacts of Chinese-Nigerian relationships on the Nigerian economy: 
The position essentially is that China is naturally in competition with any African country that is at the 
industrial take-off point because China exports manufactured goods for our primary exports. These 
concerns, mixed with fears of competition in the recent years, have triggered the debate over the 
dangers of the nature of Africa’s partnership with China. Nigeria’s trade with China is not much 
different from the general African scenario. Nigeria was China’s third largest trade partner in Africa 
as at 2013, helped largely by new contracts in transport infrastructure and oil concessions… China is 
exporting manufactured goods to Nigeria, largely because they are cheaply produced and fill a gap for 
our economy, which has a higher cost structure on account of infrastructure gaps. But there are 
growing fears that the Chinese trade invasion may cause damage to our struggling nascent industrial 
sector. (Okumagba 2014) 
 
Okumagba challenged historical ties and the widely touted idea that China is an ally. Referring 
to China as simultaneously a competitor and trading partner, he imparts an ambivalence towards 
the Nigerian-Chinese relationship. China’s dualistic position hinges on the trade both countries 
are engaged in: China’s exportation of cheap manufactured goods to Nigeria and extraction and 
importation of Nigeria’s natural resources. This relationship is at the heart of Okumagba, Sanusi 
and other’s critiques. Although Okumagba ended his editorial by calling on Nigerians to focus 
on making the Nigerian-Chinese relationship beneficial for Nigeria and to learn lessons from 
China’s economic growth, his editorial raised fundamental questions about how or whether this 
would be possible. As critique, such as Okumagba’s grows both within media and amongst some 
political figures like Sansui, we see the context in which the government’s carefully crafted and 
compelling narrative of a very human and even affectionate relationship between the two 
countries is all important.   
 
Bashir Yuguda, a high-ranking government minister of the National Planning Commission 
released a press statement where he called on the Chinese government “to take proactive 
measures towards discouraging the production of substandard products imported into the 
country” (NPCR 2014). The press release stemmed from a meeting Yuguda had with the 
Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria, Gu Xiaojie. Yuguda also stated: 
 
…that Chinese companies and entrepreneurs are actively engaged in different sectors of the Nigerian 
economy, especially in agriculture and infrastructure development such as power, railways and road 
construction. He revealed that there is still room for greater collaboration; explaining that both 
countries did recently signed many agreements towards deepening their ties” ““On our own part, we 
have been striving to ensure that Nigerian businessmen do not go to China to demand for substandard 
products. We also try to discourage them by ensuring that as much as possible such products do not 
cross our borders. We want China to also be able to control things from their end because we believe 
that there should be a minimum standard for all countries. There is no doubt that fake products have 
a potential of hurting both economies…. (NPCR 2014) 
 
47 | P a g e  
 
Yaguda used an official press release both to critique and praise Chinese counterparts. His 
criticism focused on the issue of low quality products, which is a complaint that Nigerians across 
the class spectrum have raised for years. The issue is presented as the fault of Nigerian business 
traders rather than their Chinese suppliers. The quality of Chinese goods is disputed daily 
throughout Nigerian society. This discussion takes place at markets, retail stores, restaurants and 
other public spaces. Popular opinion is that when purchasing known Chinese goods, the price 
might be cheap but the product will not last as long as products made in other countries.  In 
response to these complaints, Yaguda promised that the Chinese government would work on 
defining a minimum quality standard for its goods. Additionally, Ambassador Gu responded at 
the same meeting by pledging that his government would increase its vigilance against sub-
standard products and referred to bilateral agreements that regulated against these products 
(NPCR 2014). 
  
There is a pattern among the critiques of Sanusi, Yaguda, Okumagba and others regarding  
Nigerian-Chinese relations. Each critique makes a direct or implicit warning to Nigerians to avoid 
acting naively or unduly focusing on individual self-interest when interacting with Chinese 
counterparts. Nonetheless Nigerians are also urged to think of the nation as a whole and increase 
interactions with Chinese counterparts in order to learn from them. Chidi Amuta, a well-known 
journalist urged Nigerians:  
…to take long-term strategic view of China’s coming if we have any degree of national self-interest left. 
At this point in time, the best attitude is one of great strategic caution and informed engagement. If 
we are a serious nation with an eye on the future of our children instead of our present greed, we need 
to have put in place a team of people who have a capability for strategic thinking to fashion out a China 
policy. (Amuta 2011) 
 
In this vein Amuta called for further training of Nigerians by Chinese companies and the 
introduction of Chinese language courses into the Nigerian curriculum in order to increase the 
competitiveness of Nigeria’s next generation in the global marketplace. An emphasis is placed 
on technology transfer and education, with the hope of creating a new generation of aspirant 
entrepreneurs better placed to exploit the possibilities and opportunities offered by China. 
Apprehension over the failure to create widespread hope and popular buy-in to believe they too 
will share in the boons of investment is ever present.  
 
The grim and intractable conflicts in the Niger-Delta stands as a constant reminder and warning 
of the imperative to court and command the popular consent for foreign investment and the 
danger of the failure to secure that social license and popular buy-in to the government 
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investment agenda. It is against this backdrop that the government’s public discourse campaign, 
the construction of a national narrative of Nigerian-Chinese exchanges, must be understood. 
Years of increased support for various Niger-Delta forms of resistance against Shell and other 
foreign owned firms have shown the Nigerian government just how disruptive opposition can be 
to foreign, investment and government policies. The public discourse campaign aims to forestall, 
mitigate or deflect such potential contestations of Chinese business. Chinese owned firms are the 
latest in a long line of foreign firms to take an interest in Nigerian resources. Like their 
predecessors, Chinese firms have faced opposition in the form of complaints, protests, 
kidnapping, sabotage, mineral siphoning and killing (Watts and Kashi 2008). A huge source of 
discontent has been over the destruction of oil rich lands throughout the Niger-Delta, particularly 
the lands belonging to the Ogoni people. Since the 1950’s, when oil was discovered, Shell has 
extracted and polluted once pristine farm land throughout the Niger-Delta. By the 1990’s 
complaints and protests had risen to an all-time high and received international attention. 
Community members including the activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa were killed due to their 
continued protests and campaigns against Shell’s abuse of their land (Zalik 2004; Idemudia 
2011).  
 
As recently as August 2015, in a campaign to clean up corruption and rectify past harms, the 
newly elected president of Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari fast-tracked plans to clean up the Ogoni 
region of the Niger-Delta. A report from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
found that it would take upwards of thirty years to clean the land (Vidal 2011), which includes 
water pollution at levels 900 times higher than the accepted World Health Organization 
standards (Esaen 2014). A consortium of members including Shell, the Nigerian government, 
the UN, and other oil companies are tasked with managing the fund to clean up the area. While 
Shell originally promised $1billion to fund the project, it subsequently lowered its commitment 
to approximately $330 million (Vidal 2015).  
 
Despite publicly admitting liability for polluting the Ogoni area for nearly half a century, and only 
after the UNEP’s damming report was released, Shell is not paying their share of the required 
money required to clean the area. Instead, the majority of the estimated $1billion dollars needed 
to clean the area will come from Nigerian oil companies, the Nigerian government and other 
sources. Amnesty International and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) expressed deep concerns over Shell’s low contribution to the fund; Shell’s past 
ineffective cleaning methods; adherence to UNEP clean-up deadlines and other related issues 
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(Amnesty International 2014; Izeze 2015). After a visit to the Niger-Delta in the summer of 2015, 
Mark Dummett, a researcher for Amnesty International, stated that “President Buhari’s initiative 
will fail, and the Ogoni people will continue to suffer, as long as Shell fails to make significant 
changes to the way it approaches oil spill clean-up” (Amnesty International 2014).  
 
In response to the announcement of President Buhari’s fast-track clean-up plan, the MOSOP 
stated that: 
We will not be part of the behind the scene fast-track unilateral actions…We can’t be ignored, or 
taken for granted anymore. We will resist any attempt to intimidate or use force against us. The 
essence of the UNEP Ogoniland Report Implementation ought to first acknowledge the existence of 
the Ogoni people, and not discount us. (Izeze 2015) 
 
The scars of Shell’s exploitation of the Niger-Delta’s resources are still inflamed and Nigerians 
are likely to be weary of Chinese extractive firms and Chinese businesses in general. When 
discussing China’s early foray into the Nigerian oil market, Obi proposed that a possible solution 
to opposition would include, “a radical democratisation of oil power and the (re)distribution of 
oil for the benefit of the majority of the people of the Niger-Delta within the context of a 
transformatory democratic, equitable and developmental Nigerian nation-state project” (Obi 
2008: 430). After decades of civil strife, unrest and petro violence in response to foreign extractive 
transnational firms in the Niger-Delta, the Nigerian government appears to be changing tactics 
vis-à-vis Chinese investments, by investing heavily in shaping public discourse. This narrative is 
focused on wining the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Nigerian people or at least manufacturing a level 
of consent and acceptance of Chinese investment and influence. The Nigerian government-led 
campaign begins with state-to-state exchanges and then progresses to policies that are purported 
to help society at large. Let us begin with an examination of state level interactions.  
 
State to State Diplomatic Scene Setting:  
Public Diplomacy & The Art of Persuasion 
  
In 2013, former President Goodluck Jonathan visited Beijing for five days. The following year 
during a four-nation trip through Africa, Premier Li Keqiang visited Nigeria. The two leaders’ 
visits were one in a long line of diplomatic meetings between Nigerian and Chinese officials. State 
visits between the two countries’ officials and citizens took place before a diplomatic relationship 
was formalised in the early 1970’s; visits became more frequent after formalisation. To date, 
former President Obasanjo visited China more than any other Nigerian official. During his 
presidency, Obasanjo visited China four times and he continued to visit China after leaving office. 
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During Obasanjo’s presidency, in the early 2000’s, Chinese relationships with African countries 
were shifting from decades of friendship based on mutual understanding and alliance against the 
West to an economic relationship with trade and development as the focal point. Obasanjo was 
one of the earlier African leaders who welcomed this shift. He “...described Chin[ese] investment 
in Nigeria as part of all the overall reform of the national economy aimed at giving the nation a 
fresh economic lease, as well as benefitting from China’s experience as an emerging super power” 
(Ekedegwa 2010: 112). 
 
Diplomatic visits between the countries usually involved reports and photos but the most recent 
diplomatic visits of President Jonathan and Premier Li were publicised to an unprecedented 
degree. Meetings were surrounded by pageantry, theatre and triumphalism to create a grand 
spectacle of cultural diplomacy and mutual friendship. The visits were reported across the world 
via international media sources including the BBC, Al Jazeera and the Financial Times. Local 
media in China and Nigeria covered both visits in detail while both governments posted 
information about the visits on their respective websites. Reports were complete with pictures 
including that of Chinese children greeting President and First Lady Jonathan as they 
disembarked from the presidential plane. The Premier’s visit to Nigeria included a group photo 
of the two leaders with their wives and a picture of the two leaders hugging. Li’s visit to Nigeria 
was timed to coincide with the World Economic Forum on African which was held in Abuja in 
May of 2014. The conference’s theme, “Forging Inclusive Growth, Creating Jobs” provided both 
Jonathan and Li an opportunity to publicly pronounce mutual esteem and a desire for Nigeria 
and its fellow African counterparts to work with China towards further economic development. 
It is significant that a Chinese leader took centre stage and spoke at a conference devoted to 
African economic development. Li’s presence highlights the importance of the relationship 
between Africa and China as well as the necessity to promote these relationships throughout the 
media.  
 
Li’s speech included the hallmarks of the public relations script employed by Nigerian and 
Chinese representatives: 
The China-Africa relationship has stood the test of the past several decades and continues to grow 
from strength to strength. This is a relationship of steadfast mutual support, common development 
and mutual learning. Our respect for each other, cultural exchanges and sharing of development 
experience is a blessing for our respective development and global prosperity. (Li:  2014) 
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Mirroring Xi’s response to Sanusi’s critique, Li mentioned the historical ties and camaraderie 
between Nigeria and China. Official statements often include this element. Given the conference 
theme, Li also spoke about aggregate ways African-Chinese relations aid in Africa’s economic 
development.  
What we find encouraging is that China-Africa cooperation has and will continue to drive inclusive 
growth among developing countries. Given the fact that China and Africa are at similar development 
stages, they have much to gain from each other's development. Since the beginning of this century, 
China's robust economic growth has brought along massive exports of African goods and provided 
strong support for Africa's rapid growth. The enormous potential in Africa's economy has attracted 
Chinese investment here and provided greater room for China's own economic development. Africa 
needs infrastructure and industrial development, whereas China has the spare financing and 
production capacity in these fields. Each has so much to offer to the other side. I am confident that 
cooperation based on such complementarity and mutual benefit will give an even stronger boost to 
China and Africa's respective development. (Li:  2014) 
 
Li’s speech served as a refutation to criticism by highlighting the mutual gains of African-Chinese 
relationships. Instead of China being portrayed as the exploitative old friend, China is shown as 
the old faithful friend who wants to help not only itself but its African friends. By countering 
arguments against the relationship, Li’s speech had the potential to sway critics and gain 
supporters, particularly those from Nigeria and other African countries.  
 
In former President Jonathan’s welcome speech to conference delegates he thanked Li and 
similarly extolled the relationship between China and Africa as a whole: 
 
I want to thank Premier Li Keqiang for his great speech and use this occasion to welcome him to 
Abuja, on his very first visit to Nigeria. Africans are quite happy with China because you have shown 
commitment in helping Africa in many ways. China and Africa have forged strong ties over the years. 
Ties which are mutually beneficial to us in trade and investments, in agriculture, in education, and in 
cultural exchange.  We hope to continue on this path….. We are learning from the example of other 
countries – such as China – to see what they have done in this regard to create jobs for their citizens 
(Jonathan 2014).  
 
Jonathan’s statement mirrors Li’s in structure and in desired effect: emphasizing the positive 
aspects of the relationship for Africans and Chinese as the cornerstone of African modernity and 
good growth. As we will see throughout this thesis, celebrations, performance, and ritual take 
place through the various levels of the Nigerian-Chinese relationship, including in big business; 
entrepreneurship and education. On the governmental level, speeches and public meetings 
between leaders are just one part of the campaign to market Nigerian-Chinese relations to the 
public. What follows these public performances is the creation of policies and initiatives that 
demonstrate the words and ideas embedded in speeches. Policies that impact diplomats and 
serve as a signal to Nigerian citizens that there is cooperation and respect between Nigeria and 
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China. Additionally, these policies ignite hopes that the basis of this courtship will ripple down 
to the general public. One such key policy is the updated visa policy for Nigerian diplomats.  
 
In 2013, China and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which called for 
the “Mutual Visa Exemption for Holders of Diplomatic and Official Passports” (Bello 2013). 
The agreement and subsequent policy allowed Nigerian officials to visit China without visas and 
vice versa. The then outgoing Chinese ambassador to Nigeria, Deng Boquing, explained the 
Chinese government’s reasons for the initiative. 
 
We all know that [the] visa issue is very important for the purpose of promoting our countries’ 
relations. We have, therefore, decided to offer visa exemption for Nigerian diplomats and senior 
government officials in a first phase. (PremiumTimes 2014) 
 
The visa waiver programme came in effect in February of 2014. By waiving visas for Nigerian 
diplomats, the Chinese government signalled the importance of the Nigerian-Chinese 
relationship to Chinese, Nigerians and international counterparts. A Nigerian editorial focused 
on the international implications: 
 
On the surface, this policy may not be a big deal, given the fact that officials might secure visas at a short 
notice anyway, and, therefore, whether they have visa access or not may not make much of a difference. 
However, such a gesture underscores the trust, confidence and mutual respect, a treasure that sovereign 
nations rarely confer on other nationals. Nigerian senior officials and even well-known figures sometimes 
get frisked embarrassingly at the entry points of western nations, our long standing traditional partners with 
a long history of contacts and relationships. Therefore, China’s decision not to require visas of Nigerian 
officials is a strategic confidence-boosting mechanism that places a premium on trust in our strategic 
partnership….We are aware that currently China offers the most liberal visa regime to Nigerians wishing 
to visit that country. (Peoples Daily 2013) 
 
The visa policy creates the perception that although other countries do not treat Nigerian officials 
and elites with the respect they deserve, China does. Mutual respect and trust are implicitly 
highlighted in this message. The policy also serves as a message to international audiences that if 
other countries want to have a relationship with Nigeria on par with that of China and Nigeria, 
these countries should likewise open their doors and allow free passage to political elite.  
 
Meanwhile Nigerian citizens who want to travel to China continue to find themselves at the mercy 
of opaque, lengthy and prohibitively costly bureaucratic process. (This is discussed in Chapter 5- 
The Entrepreneurial Spirit of Nigeria). Nonetheless this policy aids in forming a positive view of 
the relationships between Nigeria and China by showing respect for government officials who 
represent the general public. The policy also presents a vision of smooth, unconstrained and free 
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movement between these two allies. This MOU is a prime example of the symbolically rich value 
of agreements over and above their economic or logical value for any other than the most elite 
levels of political officials. State level diplomatic meetings and visa policies for government elites 
are the first component of the government’s public discourse campaign. The second component 
directly enlists citizens by highlighting direct benefits of the relationship to the general public, 
firstly through cultural performance and ritual and secondly through potential avenues for 
economic improvement.  
 
Cultural Courtship: ‘Experience China in Nigeria’/ ‘Experience Nigeria in China’ 
In 1999, China’s Ministry of Information launched various “experience” campaigns in European, 
South American and African countries in order to introduce Chinese culture to people 
throughout the world. (Beijing Review 2013a). In 2013 the initiative came to Nigeria as the 
‘Experience China in Nigeria’ campaign. In Nigeria the campaign included the donation of a 
“China Library” with a collection that included Chinese language learning materials and Chinese 
classic novels written in both English and Chinese (Beijing Review 2013). The same year, China 
also opened a Chinese Cultural Centre in Abuja. Edem Duke, the Nigerian Minister of Culture, 
Tourism and National Orientation spoke about the centre not so much as a hub for two-way 
dialogue, but as a “platform” of cultural education and understanding that would enhance and 
reflect China’s growing influence on Nigeria: 
…the establishment of the Chinese Cultural Center will provide the Nigerian people with a new 
platform to understand China, display China’s abundant cultural heritage and tourism resources, and 
convey reliable cultural information. It will attract the Nigerian public’s attention to Chinese culture 
and raise China’s influence in Nigeria. (Ministry of Culture PRC 2013) 
 
As such, cultural understanding serves as a key mechanism of authentication for Nigerian-
Chinese relations by providing compelling human values to what is so often viewed as a purely 
economic relationship. By instrumentalizing cultural understanding, Nigerian officials are 
attempting to manufacture consent. In order to create cross-cultural understanding Nigeria has 
established programmes to introduce Nigerian cultures to Chinese people. In 2011, a Nigerian 
cultural centre was opened in Beijing and an annual Nigerian Culture Week began the following 
year. These cultural initiatives were promoted in Nigerian and Chinese media (Weili 2013). At 
one of the cultural week events Duke addressed the crowd of Chinese and Nigerian attendees. 
 
Nigeria is the most profitable business destination in Africa. And being a nation of over 445 ethnic 
groups, so are the number of cultural values that Nigeria possesses. Therefore, we need one another; 
we need plenty Chinese investors to come over to explore this vastness, this beauty, these 
opportunities and more. Since we are the largest travelers and spender in Africa, we know how to 
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court friendship using culture, using food, using fashion and other forms of creativity… (The Nation 
2012) 
 
Duke’s statements link cultural exchange with business opportunities through the language of 
courtship. He emphasised Nigeria’s position as an attractive partner and welcomed China’s 
advances. Duke also stressed the reciprocal benefits for both countries, just as Li, Jonathan and 
Xi did in their public speeches.  
 
Time and again the language of courtship is used by both Nigerian and Chinese officials. In a 
meeting between Samuel Ortom, Nigeria’s Minister of State for Industry, Trade and Investment 
and a group of Chinese investors headed by Zhou Dewer, chairman of the Beijing Yeaco 
Investment Consulting Company, both parties spoke of comradery and devotion. Ortom stated 
that “Nigeria is an investment designation because of her landscape, natural and human resources 
as well as population. Our desire is to have enough investors coming into the country to invest 
and produce goods in the country that would offer opportunities for jobs and wealth creation for 
Nigerians” (MITIN 2014). Ortom went on to tell Dewer that “We will stand by you to ensure 
that you do not regret coming to Nigeria. Opportunities abound in all sectors of our economy 
and through Nigeria you can reach other African countries” (MITIN 2014).  Dewer discussed 
the various opportunities within Nigeria including “natural resources and [other] areas for 
investment” and added that his group’s visit to Nigeria was made in order “to contribute towards 
the economic development of Nigeria through investing in the oil and gas sector as well as 
equipment technology, transportation, energy and building” (MITIN 2014).  
 
Dewer and Ortom both spoke to Nigerian audiences with a message of economic development 
for the country as a whole and for individuals who can gain work through these alliances. Ortom 
directly stated that Nigeria is seeking investors who can help provide “jobs and wealth creation 
for Nigerians”. Ortom spoke of contributing to Nigeria’s economic development. The press 
release promoting this meeting was designed to highlight the government’s focus on providing 
economic advancement and alliances with Chinese investors as one method of accomplishing 
this goal. Additionally, Dewer’s comment briefly mentioned Nigeria’s natural resources. Various 
Nigerian-Chinese agreements grant Chinese partners access to natural resources. In order for 
Nigerian citizens to accept what is tantamount to wholesale selling off of public resources, the 
Nigerian government has to demonstrate the benefits for Nigerians. Placing the spotlight on jobs 
and economic development is a way to take the attention away from the issues that could arise if 
the loss of natural resources was discussed in depth. Otom’s message is targeted to any potential 
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international partner who is welcomed in Nigeria as long as they are able to promise what China 
is promising: to aid in Nigeria’s economic development. Although Chinese partners are 
promised fidelity, they are not promised monogamy.  
 
This promise is expressed through a public discourse that is of the language of courtship. A 
persuasive narrative will lead Nigerians to seek interactions with Chinese counterparts, primarily 
through the avenues as laid out in the government’s grand narrative: big business; 
entrepreneurship and educational opportunities. Subsequent chapters of this thesis will explore 
the perspectives of Nigerians who seek to make good on the promise of Nigerian-Chinese 
exchanges as peddled by the government.  I examine more closely the next step in the campaign, 
the production and presentation of economic and educational initiatives that vow a better future 
for Nigerians though access to economic development via business; entrepreneurship and 
educational opportunities.  
 
Big Business, Entrepreneurship and Education: From Diplomatic 
Performance to the Promise of Development 
 
The public discourse campaign hinges on the Nigerian public’s complicity and faith in Nigerian-
Chinese relationships as a positive force that can help shape Nigeria’s future as a country and the 
futures of individuals. Belief that China represents a boon not just for national economic growth, 
but for individual, personal aspiration. Bilateral agreements help move the spectacle and 
pageantry of elite political engagement to narratives of everyday opportunity for better lives 
through big business; entrepreneurship; and education. Public relations help translate these 
bilateral agreements from governmental discourse to public mantras. Okongwu and Mencher 
suggest that: 
 
The mantras of international competitiveness and corporate profitability have been adopted by 
national and regional entities as well as by transitional corporations and they have penetrated the 
discourse of economic, political, and social discussions at all levels where they are used in an uncritical 
manner leading to the disempowerment of vast numbers of people. (2000: 110) 
 
In the case of Nigeria these mantras and business discourse are presented through bilateral 
agreements that promise to benefit and empower citizens. If Nigerians claim these mantras as 
their own and advocate for increased relations without critical assessment and apprehension as 
to whether or not these policies truly benefit the average citizen, the government’s’ narrative will 
have been successful.  
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A key tool in persuading citizen to buy into Nigerian-Chinese alliances, are bilateral agreements 
which are presented to the public through MOUs. Over the past decade, through the 
proliferation of MOU’s between Nigeria and China, we can chart the evolving narrative of this 
relationship as told through official agreements. 
…..The Government of the two nations [China and Nigeria] initiates and implements programmes 
and projects that enhance and strengthen the existing ties, which also impact positively on the lives of 
the people of the two countries. Nigeria has concluded a total of 400 (four hundred) Bilateral/ Joint 
Commission Agreements in various sectors of the economy and has Joint Commissions with eighty-
five countries. (Foreign Relations 2014) 
 
These agreements are marketed as positively impacting “the lives of the people” of both 
countries, especially the agreements which focus on the key pillars of the Nigerian government’s 
narrative: big business; entrepreneurship and education. The key pillars have the potential to 
transform the lives of Nigerian citizens and are promoted as such. Since the 1990’s there have 
been thousands of agreements and MOUs signed by Nigerian and international counterparts. 
MOUs signees are wide-ranging and include representatives from banks; federal ministries; state 
and local governments as well as large and small private companies. MOUs between China and 
Nigeria have led to agreements on Trade, Investment Promotion and Protection; Tax; Consular 
Affairs; Tourism Co-operation and South-South Co-operation and reduction of fake products 
exported to Nigeria from China (Egbula and Zheng 2011: 4). MOUs have also focused on 
petroleum, power, telecommunications, education, health, manufacturing and infrastructure 
(Egbula and Zheng 2011: 4). They are as much about constructing and reinforcing a narrative 
about their performative value-as the actual content of individual MOUs.  
 
It has been estimated that less than 5% of MOUs move beyond the planning stages (Brautigam: 
2011). “The lesson appears to be that while there is clearly a significant Chinese appetite to 
finance Nigerian infrastructure and significant Nigerian demand for this finance, the mere signing 
of prestigious-looking MOUs by Chinese and Nigerian government officials in no way guarantees 
that the proposed loans will actually materialise” (M t h e m b u - S a l t e r 2009: 24). Despite 
the low number of MOUs and agreements that move past the initial planning stages, there is a 
ceremonial significance to signings. Agreement signings are used as public relations events which 
are heavily publicised in the media and touted as a symbol of strong Nigerian-Chinese relations. 
It can be argued that in the campaign for Nigerians ‘hearts and minds’, signing of MOUs are 
more important than the implementation of projects because of the performative nature of 
publicly signing MOUs; interviewing signees and garnering media coverage highlighting the 
purported positive benefits. 
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Technological Vistas Abound: Big Business and Infrastructure Development 
In the World Economic Forum-Abuja speech, President Li unveiled a new plan for African 
development via Chinese partnership. The collaboration promised a vista full of modern 
technology readily available to all Africans. In Nigeria this would take the shape of a high-speed 
railway that would connect to a proposed continent wide high-speed railway, linked through each 
country’s capital. Nigeria would also benefit via a regional expressway built throughout West 
Africa. Another component of the plan was to improve technology and transportation. Before 
this plan was unveiled other agreements were also signed. Two China Exim Bank funded 
programmes for a light rail system/ICT infrastructure programme in Abuja and cassava research. 
These programmes are related to big business, the first pillar of the campaign for Nigerian-
Chinese alliances. The campaign seeks to capitalise on citizens “dreamed-of or anticipated 
future” aspirations (Cross 2014: 8). China as sold by the Nigerian elite, promises a sparkling 
future full of technology, economic and education opportunities either directly through Chinese 
firms or through entrepreneurship linked to Chinese partnerships.  
 
While light rail/ICT and cassava research projects seem disparate, they were both funded by 
China’s Exim Bank and represent grand spectacles of modernity where Chinese innovation and 
know-how are in full display. Additionally, the two initiatives promise technological innovations 
that will improve the lives of Nigerians. In 2012, a press release and multiple news reports 
announced a loan for $600 million to fund an ICT infrastructure programme along with the light 
rail system in Abuja. The signing of the MOUs was a high profile and public affair with Nigeria’s 
internationally recognized Minister of Finance Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and China’s Exim Bank’s 
Managing Director Sun Ping signing on behalf of their respective institutions. During the signing 
of the ICT/light rail agreement Okonjo-Iweala stated: 
When completed, the project is expected to significantly improve the lives of Nigerians, especially 
those in the lower socio-economic groups who have to travel long distances from their homes on the 
outskirts to their places of work or business in the city centre…The light rail in Abuja will improve 
transportation for all residents, especially the working class…The [ICT] backbone will help to improve 
service delivery in areas like education and health while empowering the youth with better connectivity 
to the rest of the world. The four new airport terminals will create jobs and ensure that Nigerian 
passengers enjoy services and convenience. (Francis 2012) 
 
Okonjo-Iweala statement was an explicit appeal to Nigerians. The message is that ICT 
infrastructure and the Abuja light rail system can improve the lives of all Nigerians irrespective 
of their social class. This is a direct appeal to people’s hopes and aspirations. Okonjo-Iweala also 
specifically mentioned young people. With a 50% youth unemployment rate, Nigeria is 
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desperately seeking solutions (Gabriel 2015). Alliances with China have the potential to help 
Nigerian youth through improved technology and educational opportunities brought by China. 
Focusing on this potential helps to build support for the projects amongst youth and their 
families. Along with physical infrastructure development, these agreements also promise the 
building of relationship infrastructure which we will be discussed in the education section of this 
chapter and the ethnography as whole.  
 
For years Nigerians have discussed ways to use the plentiful cassava beyond simple consumption. 
The challenge of developing cassava products prompted the Nigerian government to create a 
Cassava Bread Development Fund. Exim’s loan went towards the purchase of eighteen factory 
scale cassava flour processing machinery (Ewepu 2013). Additionally, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development secured a deal to export $272 million worth of cassava trips to China. 
During a press conference Minister Akinwumi Andesine announced the deal.  
My interest as a minister of agriculture is to protect Nigerian farmers and provide them with markets 
to sell their commodities. We are rapidly modernising the agricultural sector to ensure that we match 
our production rating with our processing rating… (Osagie 2013) 
 
Cassava is proving to be a popular international item. According to the Minister of Agriculture 
and Rural Development Aknwumi Adesina, “If we move that [cassava chip exports] to Europe, 
we can earn 1.3 billion dollars, if we supply China, we can earn $803 million. So as the minister 
of agriculture, I have great interest in seeing how we can penetrate that market” 
(BusinessDayOnline 2014). Adesina’s message was directed toward farmers and business 
people. Cassava development is promoted as a double economic win for both farmers and 
business people. While farmers are sold the idea that they can expand their market to sell 
cassava, business people are sold the idea that technology can provide methods for them to create 
products that have an additional value beyond basic cassava. This is another appeal to the wider 
spectrum of Nigerians. Additionally Adesina is exploring markets other markets outside of 
China. 
 
What is missing from such press conferences, releases and media reports, is a deeper analysis of 
the actual benefits to Chinese partners and the real and potential drawbacks to Nigerian society. 
Exim is China’s state owned export-import bank whose main objectives include helping Chinese 
firms develop “….comparative advantages in their offshore project contracting and outbound 
investment, and promot[ing] international economic cooperation and trade” (China EXIM 
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2015). Exim provides loans for numerous projects across Africa. Usually, one of the 
requirements for Exim loans is that a Chinese firm is a part of the project. Given Exim’s 
objectives, the ICT, light rail and cassava projects will include Chinese businesses. Exim is not 
just loaning the money to Nigeria to help, Chinese businesses are also gaining by expanding their 
business operations to Nigeria. In turn, Nigerians are encouraged to seek work with Chinese 
firms Nigerian national unions have lobbied for the employment of Nigerians in permanent jobs 
at Chinese ventures, as opposed to the casual work sometimes provided (Okereocha 2014). This 
brings into question which, Nigerians benefit from these alliances? 
 
Charles, one of the entrepreneurs discussed in Chapter 5- The Entrepreneurial Spirit of Nigeria, 
attempted to create an alliance with Chinese partners in a number of industries including cassava 
production. They hosted potential Chinese partners and brought them to the Nigerian site; 
introduced them to Nigerian business people and government officials; had meetings and 
banquets. Despite spending effort, time and money, the meetings did not result in a concrete 
plan to develop cassava products. Additionally, while both the Ministers Adesina and Okonjo-
Iweala highlighted statements primarily focused on the Nigerian gains with these projects, they 
did not discuss the potential drawbacks such as if certain Nigerians would benefit more than 
others. Potential costs for riding the light rail were not even discussed. The projects are presented 
with general details in a favourable manner that leaves many questions unanswered. What results 
is a highly constructed and selective image of Nigerian-Chinese partnerships. 
 
Another example of this is the jewel in the Nigerian-Chinese crown, the Lekki Free Trade Zone 
(LekkiFTZ) (See Chapter 1-Introduction). When the LekkiFTZ was first proposed it was 
presented as a unique South-South collaboration with Nigerian and Chinese interests at the helm. 
Other international interests were also welcomed because the zone was going to be an 
international exemplar of a futuristic enclave. The LekkiFTZ is not the first free trade zone in 
Nigeria but it is the first to promote itself as a free trade zone that encompasses everything 
including the future itself. This future promised its inhabitants a self-sufficient zone where one 
could live, work and socialise. This included state of the art housing, communities, schools, 
businesses, restaurants, entertainment and an international airport. This literally meant 
inhabitants could live in Nigeria without stepping outside of the LekkiFTZ. Currently the average 
price for newly built homes in the Lekki area cost between £48,000 and £3 million. How much 
will homes in the future town of LekkiFTZ cost? Surely these new homes will be even more 
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expensive than older homes. Current home prices are already only affordable for a small 
percentage of the Nigerian population.  
 
Selling the Dream-Entrepreneurship  
In 2011, an official report from the Ministry of Information showcased the launch of a two-week 
training programme for Nigerian entrepreneurs. The programme focused on export promotion 
and was a joint effort between The Nigerian Export Promotion Council in Partnership with 
University of Abuja and B&B Limited, a private consulting firm. A variety of speakers 
participated including Nigeria’s Minister of Commerce, a representative of the UN’s Institute for 
Training and Research and China’s Commercial Counsellor, Rong Yangson. Yangson spoke 
about the rapid increase in bilateral trade between China and Nigeria. Meanwhile Professor M. 
A. Daniyan, a Principal Consultant with B&B Limited, spoke of the imperative to educate 
Nigerian business people on trade regulations and ways to compete internationally. “According 
to Daniyan, the programme aimed to not only to provide the necessary knowledge for “Nigerian 
Exporting Stakeholders”, but, crucially, to “[stimulate] interest in the non-oil export sector of the 
Nigerian economy” (FMI 2011). Although the training programme did not receive funding from 
Chinese partners, it was created in response to the increase in trade between China and Nigeria. 
The inclusion of a Chinese government official at the event added credibility to the programme 
from the Chinese community.  
 
The major message underlying the introduction of the programme was clear: at the vanguard of 
Nigerian-Chinese relations would be an army of Nigerian entrepreneurs in the making (and in 
the waiting), who must be equipped to serve as both the catalysts and beneficiaries of Nigerian 
economic growth. At the same time, an inherent message to Nigerian entrepreneurs is that 
without them, the relationship itself between the two countries cannot grow and that it is up to 
them to be successful. Yet this extension of support to aspirant entrepreneurs carries with it its 
own expectation of reciprocity. Support to small and medium sized business and the broader 
advocacy of a national dream of individual entrepreneurialism is in itself a component of the 
government’s narrative; an attempt to garner popular support by creating the sense, if not the 
reality, of a populist economic agenda in which the Nigerian citizenry can equally share in the 
gains of Chinese investment and trade. This draws attention to the ideological power of the raft 
of Nigerian policy targeted at promoting entrepreneurship as the cornerstone of Nigerian-
Chinese trading relations. As such, the training programme, was just one of a number of emerging 
programmes created to lessen the effects of disenfranchisement among Nigerians. These 
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programmes focus on showing ordinary Nigerians they too can have a piece of the economic 
action being created through Nigerian-Chinese relationships. 
 
In a similar vein, the special advisory office to the president initiated a training programme for 
youth. This programme was linked to one of the office’s mandates to build “a stronger 
partnership with China in the area of entrepreneurship and skill acquisition to help in the 
implementation of its economic development drive for the actualisation of the country’s push to 
become one of the major economic forces in 2020” (Akosile 2010). This section of the mandate 
is ideologically in step with the language used by Nigerian and Chinese representatives. 
Partnership between the two countries is interlinked with mutual economic development. What 
is different about this programme and the two week training is the shift in emphasis towards 
entrepreneurship over and above job creation. Alongside the message that Chinese firms 
operating in Nigeria provide jobs opportunities, is the louder exhortation for Nigerians to build 
their own entrepreneurial ventures that benefit from Nigerian-Chinese collaboration; in short, 
that Nigerian can be the authors of their own future. A key focus on this agenda, as with the new 
orthodoxy of entrepreneurial development across the continent more broadly, is youth (Dolan 
and Rajak 2015).  With youth bearing the brunt of high unemployment rates in Nigeria (The 
Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics estimates youth unemployment is 50% while the Central 
Bank of Nigeria estimates youth unemployment in is 80%) the promise of a new order of 
entrepreneurial opportunity generated through Chinese investment and engagement beckons a 
large segment of society (Adekunle 2013; Gaskia 2014; Nnodim 2014).   
 
A prime example of this shift from technical training and job creation to the promotion of 
entrepreneurship is a partnership between the Nigeria-China Business Council (NCBA) and 
Dongfeng Special Vehicle (Shiyan). NCBA is an organisation that acts as a broker for Nigeria-
Chinese business relationships (See Chapter 5-The Entrepreneurial Spirit of Nigeria) and 
Donfeng is a Chinese car company.  In 2012 NCBA signed an MOU with Dongfeng to provide 
vocational training and other skills to Nigerian youth. The agreement endeavoured to “enable 
Nigerian youths to have adequate and specialized training from the company in China which will 
facilitate technology transfer to Nigeria” (FMI 2012). Under rules of the agreement, the NCBA 
chooses candidates to send to China for training. However, after successfully completing training, 
participants had to return to Nigeria and start their own businesses. Although the NCBA and 
Donfeng were the MOU’s primary signatories, Nigerian local and state governments planned to 
work with the NCBA to help fund the participants’ flights to China and other related expenses 
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(FMI 2012). This MOU is an example of multi-actor agreements, between government, non-
governmental and corporate parties. These parties have converged around this campaign which 
is, ostensibly targeted at democratising the market of Chinese investment and trade, through the 
development of small and medium-sized enterprise. NCBA leveraged its reputation as a 
brokerage organisation by lending its name to the MOU while the Chinese firm now has 
connections to established (many private sector members of the NCBA are entrepreneurs) and 
future entrepreneurs.  
 
Twinned with agreements which promote entrepreneurship to Nigeria’s aspirant youth, is a focus 
on education which is the last pillar in the government’s narrative. As I go on to explore in the 
next section, a raft of recent policy and MOUs concerned with education collectively conjure an 
imagined future for students and school children which looks to China, as they might once have 
done to US or Europe, as the focus of cosmopolitan modernity and opportunity.  As I return to 
explore in Chapter 6-Ni Hao Naija), as key elements in the production of a dominant public 
discourse on the relationship between Nigeria and China, the vision of education projected 
through these MOUs has a great power to animate popular aspirations and expectations among 
the broad base of upper middle class Lagosians: from educators promising to equip pupils with 
the tools to or a successful future to programmes, to school-children themselves learning 
mandarin in primary schools, to eager Nigerian students studying abroad in China. 
 
Building the Future: Creating a New Generation in Waiting 
Over 1,000 Nigerians students are currently enrolled in Chinese higher education institutions 
(Abubakar 2013). While most students are self-funded, some have received highly coveted 
scholarships. This funding is provided to Nigerian graduate and postgraduate students by both 
the Nigerian and Chinese governments. The Bilateral Education Agreement (BEA) Awards 
provides the most scholarships. BEA scholarships allow students to study in a number of 
countries including: Russia, China, Morocco, Turkey, Algeria, Serbia, Japan, Ukraine, Cuba and 
Macedonia. China, Romania, and Cuba are the only three countries that have reciprocal 
agreements for students to study in Nigeria. Tuition and accommodation are paid for by the host 
country, while the Nigerian government pays a monthly stipend and other incidentals. The 
scholarships last for the duration of students’ degree programmes, with the first year spent 
studying the host country language since classes are taught in the host country’s official language.  
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Since 2000, an estimated 600 Nigerian students have received BEA scholarships (FMI 2010). In 
2014, thirteen Nigerian doctoral and master’s students received BEA scholarships to study in 
China. The scholarships ranged from four to nine years. A 2014 press release announced the 
2014/2015 BEA cohort to China.  
The [current] Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Education, Dr. MacJohn Nwaobiala 
congratulated the awardees for the rare opportunity and enjoined them to make Nigeria proud. ‘The 
People’s Republic of China is one of the countries that grants scholarships to Nigerians annually in 
spite of the global economic problems and the onus is on you, scholars to appreciate them by making 
the best use of this rare opportunity.’ Nwaobiala thanked the People’s Republic of China on behalf 
of the Government of Nigeria, for the kind gesture and consistency in offering scholarship to Nigerians 
under the BEA; noting that this contributes immensely to Nigeria’s manpower development. While 
advising the awardees to always obey the laws of the host country, he enjoined them to remain focused 
and ‘keep in mind the aim of being in that country’. (FRN 2014) 
 
The press release promotes the benefits of the BEA by explaining that students have this ‘rare 
opportunity’ despite a shaky economic environment. Students are also reminded that they 
represent Nigeria and receive the scholarship for specific purposes which they should not 
squander. China is commended for offering ‘the kind gesture’ of scholarships. The Permanent 
Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Education, Professor Oladapo Afolabi, described “the 
[BEA] partnership as a great source of strength for accelerating development of the Nigerian 
education sector” (FMI 2010). BEA scholarships are promoted as a way for Nigerian students to 
gain an international education and provide leverage when looking for work in an increasingly 
competitive market. Young people and their families can view the BEA as an option to broaden 
their horizons and improve their future economic opportunities. 
 
In addition to press releases, the BEA is advertised online in various blogs, nation-wide 
newspapers and on an official government website. The official government website features 
profiles of past recipients of the BEA award. One example is that of Mukhtar Habib, a student 
who received a scholarship to study in China. Habib’s profile highlighted his best paper award at 
a Chinese geological association. The profile also features pictures of Habib alongside high 
ranking Chinese members of the geological association and the Nigerian ambassador to China. 
Habib serves as an exemplar of how much Nigerian students can achieve by studying in China; 
not only can they excel, but they can also interact with influential people.  
 
Studying abroad differentiates students from cohorts who stay in Nigeria to study. Another 
initiative that allows Nigerian youth to study in China is through a government sponsored 
acrobatics initiative. Both the Chinese and Nigerian governments provide scholarships for young 
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people to study acrobatics in China. CCTV English
6
 interviewed a Nigerian teenager while she 
studied at a Chinese sponsored acrobatics programme. The student, Tammy Aiya, described her 
experience as follows:  
It’s a rare opportunity. And I grabbed it, and I am going to use it well… I am here in China right now, 
studying acrobatics. It’s a good opportunity to learn something different, to learn different culture and 
to learn a different language. (CCTV 2014) 
 
While Tammy’s interview focused on the more immediate benefits of studying in China, Ms. Li, 
the head of the school’s foreign student department discussed future prospects for international 
students studying acrobatics:   
Many former African students at the school have gone on to become star circus performers in their 
home countries….."It has been a successful move to promote our traditional art for foreign friends," 
he [Li] says. "Now our project has become a famous one in African countries, attracting friends and 
families to come back.” A former student who trained at the school in 2003 went on to become the 
coach of Tanzania's national circus and later sent his 15-year-old daughter to the school. And a former 
student from Ethiopia sent his younger sister for training even though she did not receive sponsorship, 
says Li. "Many of them can earn a salary of more than 300,000 yuan [£31,000] every year. It can be a 
changing point in their lives…" (Zheng 2013) 
 
Stories of travelling to China and learning a skill that can help a young person make a good living 
are tantalizing. China’s participation in the BEA and acrobatics scholarship programmes provides 
another image of China. This image portrays China as a country that is interested in training 
Nigerians who will return to their country and work in a capacity that utilises the language or skills 
they learned in China. Similarly to entrepreneurs, students are rendered as both the beneficiaries 
and catalyst of future economic development in Nigeria. The education chapter (Chapter 6-Ni 
Hao Naija) discusses the stories of two Nigerian students who received scholarships to study in 
China one through the BEA and the other through an acrobatics scholarship. 
 
Other educational programmes for young people have focused on educating students living in 
Nigeria. Two of these programmes were created under the umbrella of the Nigerian 
government’s Growing Women and Girls in Nigeria (GWIN) initiative.  Both of the 
programmes, Digital Girls and 1,000 Girls ICT Training, focus on providing technological 
training to young women. Additionally, both programmes triangularize the professed benefits of 
                                                             
6 CCTV English is a Chinese state run news station that is shown across the world. 
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Nigerian-Chinese alliances for Nigerians: employment [via big business], entrepreneurship and 
education. 
 
Like most countries around the world, there is a significant disparity between men and women’s 
access to technology. With ICT contributing to an increasingly higher percentage of GDP each 
year, the Nigerian government is interested in attracting more women to the sector. Both 
programmes strive to “demystify” technology and encourage young women to consider future 
careers in the ICT industry (Darabidan 2015). Digital Girls, is a secondary school programme 
that trains girls in a wide range of ICT modules including: web development; coding; mobile app 
development; PC hardware; operating systems; game development; and film making. Although 
the programme is solely funded by the Nigerian government, the goal of the programme is to 
prepare young women for jobs with IT firms in Nigeria. An increasing number of IT firms are 
owned by internationally headquartered multi-national firms, including those founded in China. 
After completion of the programme, participants receive certificates and prizes. Completing such 
a high profile programme can provide young women access to high tech and high paying jobs. 
 
The second programme, 1,000 Girls is a joint initiative between The Ministry of Communication 
Technology and Huawei. Huawei is a multinational Chinese IT firm. The aim of the 1,000 Girls 
initiative is to reduce the digital divide between men and women, thus improving women’s future 
employability skills. The initiative began in 2014 and was promoted throughout the media in 
news articles, blogs, social media as well as press releases and reports from Huawei and the 
Ministry. In a report highlighting its international efforts to bridge the digital divide, Huawei noted 
that it invested “US$1.3 million which was matched by the Nigerian government with US$1 
million” (Huawei 2014: 5). Newspaper articles on the initiative included specific details including 
the costs for Huawei and The Ministry; benefits to the public and plans to increase the range of 
the programme. The Minister of Communication Technology, Omobola Johnson’s, inspiration 
for the initiative was discussed in detail. 
Mrs. Omobola Johnson is passionate about developing technology skills among women. She is 
worried that Nigerian females are not exposed to technology training like their male counterparts. 
The ratio of male to female studying and practicing engineering and other technology related courses 
in the country is widening daily. (This Day: 2014) 
 
Johnson’s description aims to speak right to the heart of young women and parents alike. Johnson 
is presented as passionate about lessening the technological gap between men and women; 
something that could impact young women’s futures for the better. The 1,000 Girls programme 
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trains 1,000 young women of university age in groups of fifty. Each cohort receives training in a 
range of technological areas including telecommunication and transmission networks. The initial 
training takes place over a three day period at the Oriental Hotel, a Chinese owned hotel in 
Lagos (see Chapter 3-The Family Firm). Each participant receives a stipend of ₦10,000 (£35) for 
daily transportation and food. At the end of the year’s training, the top 200 students receive 
additional training and “the attainment of certification as [a] Huawei Certified Datacom Associate 
(HCDA). The top achievers with the HCDA certification, will have priority access to Huawei 
Human resources pool and will stand the chance to be employed by Huawei…" (This Day: 2014).  
 
From this group of 200 young women, the top twenty students are selected for further training in 
China. Huawei’s West African region Vice-President Hover Gao was interviewed and his 
statements revealed the benefits of the initiative for both the participants and the firm. “All the 
participants will be recommended by Huawei to Huawei Channel partners such as operators, 
ICT solutions providers and ICT departments in enterprises…” (This Day: 2014). These 
initiatives help Huawei directly train and gain access to a pool of qualified employees. Huawei’s 
investment in the programme is an investment into the firm’s future as much as it is an investment 
into Nigeria’s future. Huawei’s investment aids in cultivating a strong workforce and it gains access 
to the best employees before competitors. Minister Johnson planned to expand the 1,000 Girls 
programme to partnerships with other ICT firms such as Cisco, an American headquartered IT 
equipment multi-national and MTN, a South African headquartered mobile telecommunication 
multi-national. (Iftikhar 2015). One of the 1,000 Girls participants was interviewed and her 
glowing quote was featured in an article about the programme  
…the training is a step in the right direction. It has really exposed me to the basic knowledge on 
telecommunication, GSM, computer appreciation. The training has made me to be digitally included. 
I thank the Federal Government and Huawei for this opportunity. I urge every Nigerian girl to be part 
of digital inclusion in the knowledge economy. It is a way to leverage on the opportunities in ICTs. 
(Vanguard 2014) 
 
Testimonies are a key component of the public relation campaign. When a participant discusses 
how the initiatives such as the 1,000 Girls and the BEA scholarships have changed her life, a 
young person, parent or teacher reads the testimony and envisions a similar transformation 
occurring for themselves or a young person in their life. Participants’ quotes present a particularly 
enticing vision of modernity and a testimony from an ordinary Nigerian helps other Nigerians 
connect their aspirations to the initiative and thus Nigerian-Chinese relations.  
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The government promotion of these initiatives helps to garner public support and interest. 
Parents and students will demand to participate in the programmes and seek to work in Huawei 
and other Chinese firms. Public support is key in the development and growth of Nigeria-Chinese 
relations in various sectors. Support leads to less conflict and more citizens seeking the purported 
benefits of engaging with Chinese counterparts.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter laid out the multi-tiered public discourse narrative that the Nigerian government 
has constructed in order to gain its citizens’ support for an increasing Chinese presence in 
Nigeria. The campaign begins with the public display of state level interactions and rests upon 
key areas that are used as focal points to promote the idea that aspirational Nigerians can 
transform their lives through interactions with China. These areas are big business; 
entrepreneurship and education. The campaign masterfully takes Nigerian’s aspirations and 
turns around to sell these same aspirations in a package of Nigerian-Chinese relationships as the 
vehicle to make citizens’ dreams come true. The campaign raises a number of questions: Is this 
future available for any Nigerian who wants to partake? Are these programmes inclusive or 
exclusive? Do they end up replicating current patterns of benefits for elites with rare slices of 
inclusion for the majority? These questions will be answered throughout the thesis.  
 
The following ethnographic chapters provide insight into how Nigerians, particularly aspirational 
and elite Nigerians, are responding to the promises of what a future intertwined with China can 
bring. Each ethnographic chapter focuses one of the key areas for Nigerian engagement. I begin 
with big business, which is covered in two chapters that take us inside Great Northern Industrial 
Manufacturer’s (GNIM), a Chinese firm headquartered in Lagos. There I explore the role of 
Nigerian senior management and GNIM’s operations in Nigeria including its use of kinship and 
brokerage to establish and maintain relationships.  
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Chapter III-The Family Firm 
Security guards admitted passengers of luxury chauffeured in Land Rovers, Fords and Toyota 
Land Cruisers through the factory gates at the Lagos headquarters of Great Northern Industrial 
Manufacturer (GNIM). Cars drove up to a loading bay which had been transformed from its 
workplace function into a party space. The effect was startling: the industrial materials were 
replaced with a lavish faux wooden veranda; a stage appeared covered in Chinese New Year 
decorations; a large flatscreen television with a karaoke system was mounted; and sumptuously 
laid dining tables surrounded numerous food booths. As guests stepped out of their cars they 
were ushered into a VIP section while others sat at tables throughout the bay. Attendees included 
GNIM’s owners and managers; the firm’s business associates; members of the Lagosian Chinese 
community as well as family members and guests of each group. Business associates were a 
mixture of people who provided goods and services to GNIM and members of foreign consulates 
(Chinese and Germans). The group included various nationalities including Chinese, German, 
Nigerian, Latin American, and South-East Asian.  
 
As guests arrived at the party they were given a raffle ticket along with a book of vouchers to 
exchange for food at various booths stationed throughout the loading bay. While food was served 
two cultural presentations began. The first presentation was a kongfu performance given by a 
Chinese kongfu and language teacher at the Lagos Confucius Institute (See Chapter 6- Ni Hao 
Naija: Elite Futures & Chinese Language Education in Nigeria). The second was a cultural 
performance from a Nigerian dance and musical troupe. While the audience was enthusiastic 
about the kongfu performance it was the Nigerian troupe that drew guests to gather around the 
stage and take pictures. Guests used the latest tablets and smart phones to record the 
performance along with the rest of the day’s proceedings.  
 
These performances were followed by the bestowing of awards for food booths and the dispersal 
of raffle prizes for guests. All of the booths competed against each other for awards that ranged 
from most popular to best decorated. Awards and raffle prizes were handed out by the MCs 
along with distinguished guests: representatives from the Chinese and German consulates as well 
high ranking GNIM officials and their wives. During the award presentations, a nephew of the 
GNIM’s directors along with his new wife came up to the stage to hand out prizes and certificates. 
Earlier in the event the newlyweds were publicly acknowledged and it was explicitly mentioned 
that they were in Nigeria for their honeymoon. The nephew is a part of the third generation of 
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GNIM but most of his work takes place in Hong Kong. By stating that the couple was in Nigeria 
for their honeymoon, the firm’s top management sought to demonstrate to their guests that 
despite living in Hong Kong, the couple was invested in the future of GNIM. As the prizes for 
food booths were given out, representatives from each booth came to the stage to receive their 
certificates. The Nigerian booth was awarded twice for its cuisine and Eniafe, the Nigerian wife 
of one of GNIM’s directors, took both opportunities to wish the company “…continued success”. 
The German booth received a few awards due to its popularity with party goers. 
 
There was a heavy emphasis on food, awards and gifts. Food booths served copious amount of 
food, some of which held special meanings in commemoration of the New Year: Chinese 
chicken dishes; noodles; soups; suckling roast pig; desserts and drinks. Additionally, the German 
booth served alcohol and bratwurst and the Nigerian booth served traditional soup/stews, rice 
and fried bean fritters. Most booths were run by Chinese employees with a few Nigerian 
employees and represented different subsidiaries within the organisation. The Nigerian booth 
was coordinated by Alhaji, the only Nigerian chairman of GNIM, and Eniafe. Eniafe ran the 
booth with the help of a few Nigerian women. The German booth was operated by diplomats 
from the German consulate and their spouses. The abundance of food served as a way to 
secure… “relationships; its giving expresses tenderness, unites groups and, and serves as an 
appeasement gesture to potential enemies” (Eible-Eibesfeldt quoted in Deal and Key 1998: 145). 
Furthermore, by providing such a sumptuous banquet, GNIM demonstrated its success as a 
company. As Deal and Key stated: 
A bountiful table is a symbol of wealth. Food contributes to ceremoniousness in many ways-its volume, 
order of presentation, difficulty of procurement and preparation, economy or extravagance, degree 
of seasoning. (Deal and Key 1998: 145) 
 
As was manifest that day, this is as true for companies as it is for domestic hosts. The loading bay 
symbolically becomes the hearth where the company directors and their wives host the booths 
which provides food to their guests. Indeed, from food and hospitality to ceremonial awards and 
cultural performance, the reciprocal role of ritual gift exchange runs through the event and 
underscores the central place of social and familial/virtual kin relations in the firm’s operations. 
The firm’s bountiful display did not end with food; there were also numerous raffle prizes that 
ranged from iPhones and Android phones to blenders and kettles to flat screen and televisions 
to small refrigerators and microwaves. There was a performative nature to the party, which began 
close to the scheduled time of twelve noon and ended un-organically when the MCs announced 
the event had come to an end a few hours later. While there were a few stragglers, most people 
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left almost immediately. Deal and Key discuss “orchestrating the event” and liken occasions to 
theatre complete with scripts, props and actors. (Deal and Key 1998: 140). GNIM’s Chinese 
New Year celebration is a highly choreographed from the opening dragon dance to the final 
closing announcement.  
 
What GNIM is signalling is not just that the firm is a major, very profitable and successful 
company, but that GNIM is at the same time a family firm which uses the same rituals of feasting 
and generous hosting to celebrate Chinese New Year as a family. Beneath the celebratory surface 
of happy families and enjoyment are the micro-politics of Nigerian-Chinese relations within a 
Chinese firm located in Nigeria. Critical elements of this relationship are race, kinship, networks 
and power. The extremely complex politics of a Chinese owned family firm plays out through 
the organization, but particularly through the experiences of Nigerian upper management. 
Nigerians represent the majority of GNIM’s employees but they are a minority within the firm’s 
management. 
 
In the previous chapter I presented the government’s grand narrative for Nigerian-Chinese 
interactions. This narrative promotes big business as the first avenue for Nigerians to achieve 
their aspirations. In this chapter I seek to analyse the promise of big business ethnographically. 
GNIM is a prime example of Chinese big business with headquarters in Lagos and its various 
subsidiaries located throughout Nigeria. Whereas an increasing number of Chinese firms have 
recently entered Nigeria, GNIM is not one of them. The firm has operated in Nigeria for over 
forty years and has continued to expand with a third generation of the family preparing to take 
over the reins of the firm. What role have Nigerians played in GNIM’s success? How do 
Nigerians benefit from working for the firm? How has GNIM been successful in Nigeria? What 
tools does it rely upon to ensure its success? I argue that GNIM utilises social relations, 
performance, ritual, ceremony, gift giving and kinship to ensure its operations in Nigeria. The 
tableau of the Chinese New Year party on the grounds of GNIM’s encapsulates the intersection 
(and at times tension) between kinship relations of a family firm and the increasingly international 
outlook of younger managers that are at the heart of GNIM’s elite exchanges.  
 
 
 
Flexible Kinship-Inclusion & Exclusion 
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Family Tree 
Many of the early Chinese firms in Africa were created by immigrants from Hong Kong. Great 
Northern Industrial Manufacturers (GNIM) was one of them. The firm was founded in Lagos in 
the late 1960’s by ‘Papa’ Yang, along with his sons and two nephews. What began as a small 
business that produced and sold ceramic tiles has developed into a multi-industry manufacturing 
and service corporation. There are over twelve subsidiaries under the GNIM umbrella of 
businesses including: ceramic tiles, metal nails, roofing sheets, steel pipes, residential and 
industrial wood products, and more recently a power plant and a luxury hotel. GNIM also has a 
farm designated for internal use. Except for a tile company, the rest of the businesses have always 
been privately held. As a result, the firm is not required to publicly report financial details such 
as annual revenue. Matti, a member of the third generation of GNIM, describes annual turnover 
as “significant but confidential”.  
 
GNIM factories and businesses are located primarily in South-Eastern Nigeria. It also has an 
office in Hong Kong and is exploring the possibility of expanding to other African countries. All 
finished goods from each factory are transported to headquarters by land and distributed for 
wholesale purchase. Although transportation in Nigeria is challenging due to poor infrastructure, 
GNIM management insists upon this method in order to maintain direct control of product 
distribution. The headquarters in Lagos, in addition to being the administrative command centre 
of GNIM, also houses the sales office as well as the company’s production line for rolled steel. 
Wholesale customers come in person to the headquarters to purchase goods. These transactions 
are frequently still paid for in cash. GNIM’s headquarters covers a city block from front to back. 
The complex also includes the residences for Chinese employees and two clinics: one for 
Nigerian employees and one for Chinese employees that are staffed by Nigerian and Chinese 
health care professionals, respectively. All expatriates who work at the headquarters live within 
the compound including the top directors. The boundaries of domestic spaces for expatriate 
employees and managers are tightly connected to the managerial headquarters. Expatriate 
employees who work on other sites live at their worksites but regularly visit the company 
headquarters for special occasions and thus establish and maintain the company’s centralized 
social configuration which seeks to cultivate a strong sense of cohesion across the firm’s various 
sites. 
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GNIM is described throughout media and public discussions as a ‘Chinese company’. Examining 
the firm in historical and political contexts provides insight into the complexities associated with 
this identity. Papa Yang came from Hong Kong to Nigeria in the 1960’s. At the time, Hong Kong 
was still under British rule and Nigeria had recently gained independence from British rule. 
China was yet to begin formal diplomatic relations with Nigeria until the 1970’s. The common 
ties of British rule meant that it was not uncommon for citizens of Hong Kong to move to former 
or current British colonies, including Nigeria. Some of these business men first moved from 
mainland China after the civil war, primarily from Shanghai to Hong Kong. They set up 
businesses in Hong Kong and then moved abroad (Chen et al 2016:3; Liu 2017).   
Nigeria became the home to Hong Kong expatriates who set up businesses in various industries 
including textiles and steel mills (Broggi 2016:130). Two major advantages of setting up a business 
in a current or former British territory was that these businesses received less trade barriers than 
they did at home and “… it was easier for the colonial government and British banks to obtain 
information about local conditions” (Hong Kong Memory 2012). Armed with this information 
gained through a social network in government and banking, business people like Yang came to 
Nigeria.  
GNIM’s approach to navigating changing political tides by working with ‘Any Government in 
Power’ (AGIP) (discussed in this chapter) has helped the firm to maintain and expand its business 
in Nigeria for nearly half a century. During this time, Hong Kong also went through political 
changes, primarily the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule in 1997. As of 2010, one of GNIM’s 
directors, a member of the Yang family, served on the board of the West Africa Council for the 
Promotion of China's Peaceful Reunification (WAPCPR). The council’s philosophy is that 
China is one unit made up of mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. (Xinhua 2004). To 
have a member of its board serve on the council highlights GNIM’s deep connection to the 
Chinese community in Nigeria and abroad.  
As I will discuss later in chapter four (“Our Friend for Eternity”: Guanxi, Brokers and Corporate 
Gift-Giving), GNIM utilizes several social networks including Nigerian, Chinese, and German 
business partners.  I argue that while GNIM’s identity as a Chinese firm is strong and deeply 
rooted in its relationships with the both Chinese community and government in Nigeria, the firm 
also has other another important facet to its identity. The firm is headquartered in Nigeria and is 
staffed by mostly Nigerian employees. Although most Nigerian employees are not in leadership 
or managerial positions, the firm must think of their needs and the labour regulations which are 
mandated by the Nigerian government. The firm operates in the Nigerian business environment 
and as such must remain adaptable to this environment. GNIM is a Chinese firm, but it is also a 
Nigerian company and it is through the lens of this dual-identity that I examine the role of 
Nigerian upper management in GNIM as well as the role of brokerage in its operations.  
Today Papa Yang is in his nineties. He has retired and moved back home to Hong Kong. GNIM 
is now led by three Chinese directors and one Nigerian director: Yang’s son Eric; two nephews 
Antonio and Stephen; and Alhaji Lateef. None of the Chinese directors are referred to by their 
Chinese names, but instead use anglicized first names and most employees refer to them as ‘Mr’ 
in addition to their anglicized first name. As Papa Yang’s son, Eric owns more shares than his 
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cousins Stephen and Antonio. He also serves as the firm’s managing director and frequently 
travels back and forth between Hong Kong and Nigeria. Eric is often interviewed on behalf of 
the firm. Antonio arrived in Nigeria in his teens and spends most of his time in Nigeria. Stephen 
who is the eldest of the three cousins is in his seventies and is extremely popular amongst the 
organisation’s employees. He spends most of the year in Nigeria and travels the country visiting 
the organizations various subsidiaries. The Nigerian chairman Alhaji Lateef, has been with the 
firm for over forty years and worked his way up from mid-level management.  
 
GNIM’s second generation has begun to focus on succession and training an emerging third 
generation to take over the family firm. One of Eric’s children Evan, works for the firm in Nigeria. 
Stephen has four children. Mattias (also known as Matti), one of Stephen’s children also works 
in Nigeria. Antonio has no children. The firm has an office in Hong Kong where other members 
of the family work.  As discussed earlier, GNIM has a complex set of social practices that it uses 
to operate in Nigeria. Broadly speaking, GNIM is structured according to a centralized vertical 
hierarchy with second generation directors and third generation management at the top.  
 
Although some firms bring a cadre of Chinese employees over to Nigeria and only hire a small 
number of local workers, an increasing number of Chinese firms operating across Africa hire a 
majority of their employees from host countries, including Nigeria. The majority of the 
employees within Chinese enterprises that Mohan and Lampert studied in Ghana and Nigeria, 
were local workers (2013). “While management positions tend to be dominated by Chinese staff, 
having at least some locals in these roles is often considered useful, particularly in negotiating the 
demands of government agencies and officials and in recruiting, managing, and motivating local 
workers, agents, and subcontractors” (Mohan and Lampert 2013: 105). GNIM follows a similar 
pattern with the majority of the firm’s 1,000 plus employees originating from Nigeria. Nigerian 
employees work in low level positions while the minority number of Chinese employees work in 
some form of management (floor, factory, etc...) or as office workers. Some Nigerians also work 
as team leaders who serve as liaisons between teams of blue collar employees and their Chinese 
managers. This is usually as far as Nigerians can rise in management at GNIM.  
 
There are a few exceptions of executive level Nigerians who work with GNIM such as a quarry 
foreman and external lawyers who are on call for each director. Within the firm there are four 
senior level Nigerian executives: Solomon, Alhaji, Segun and Matti. Matti is a grand-nephew of 
Papa Yang and the son of Stephen and Eniafe. Stephen is the eldest director of GNIM and 
Eniafe is a Nigerian business woman. As such Matti is a part of both the Chinese and Nigerian 
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upper management groups of GNIM. GNIM’s Nigerian upper management, particularly 
Solomon, Alhaji and Segun, negotiate on behalf of the firm with unions, government officials, 
community members and other high level associates. Alhaji has been informally nicknamed ‘the 
Nigerian face’ of GNIM due to his role as GNIM’s chairman in which he brokers on behalf of 
the firm at various senior level meetings. Solomon and Segun’s roles involve interacting with 
external and internal parties on behalf of the firm. Matti is in training to take up a directorship 
when the second generation retires.  
 
The Nigerian Face(s)? 
In the 1970’s when former President Obasanjo was first in power he mandated that all foreign 
firms in Nigeria have at least one Nigerian director as part of the indigenisation process.  
 
The Indigenization Decree, an important element of the national development plan, seeks to arrest 
the exploitation of the Nigerian economy by outside forces. For instance, it excludes foreigners from 
all but the largest wholesale enterprises, and even in these, Nigeria is to control 40 percent of the 
shares. (Jarmon1988: 37) 
 
The decree was meant to reduce the degree of foreign control over the Nigerian economy, 
primarily British, Indian and Lebanese interests, which were dominant in the country at the time. 
There were exceptions for people of Lebanese descent born in Nigeria. They were allowed to 
apply for Nigerian citizenship which entitled Lebanese merchants to operate smaller firms in 
sectors excluded to foreigners. Additionally some Lebanese business people made deals with 
Nigerian business people or government agencies in order to become business partners (Collins 
1980: 146). The decree resulted in a variety of changes to investment and business in Nigeria; 
this included mandating local incorporation of all foreign firms in Nigeria. Additionally, thirty 
three types business were restricted from foreign ownership if they had less than ₦4,000,000 
[£14,916] in capital and turnover exceeding ₦1,000,000 [£3,721]; and all foreign firms were 
mandated to have 40% Nigerian equity (Collins 1980: 141). These regulations were applied to a 
wide range of industries including newspaper publishing; rice milling; blending and bottling of 
alcoholic drinks; meat and fish companies; supermarkets and department stores; and 
manufacturing industries including furniture, matches, paints and cement (Collins 1980: 141). 
The indigenisation process was not an easy one and it consisted of delays from foreign firms. 
Nigerian elites also ensured that their friends either purchased foreign firms outright or purchases 
shares in firms before the general public had access to them. In some cases Nigerian and foreign 
business people worked together to create the appearance that they met the government’s criteria 
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that required 40% of Nigerian interests in firms; when in actuality they did not (Collins 1980: 
153).  
 
The decree mandated that foreign firms have at least one Nigerian director. Some firms began 
to focus on placing Nigerians in various senior management positions, particularly as human 
resources directors, managing directors and board chairpersons. GNIM hired Solomon as the 
human resources manager and Alhaji was promoted to chairman of the board. These are key 
positions of brokerage where the firm is represented by Nigerians to negotiate on its behalf with 
fellow Nigerians. But does Nigerian senior management serve as tokens who are simply put in 
place to abide by government regulations and create the illusion of inclusion? I utilise Murray’s 
research into the use of black empowerment firms to examine this point. In her example, black 
empowerment firms were used to improve economic opportunities for black South African’s 
with the support of white company directors.  
The white directors’ motive for embracing black empowerment is to improve their company’s `white 
only’ corporate image, to improve their distribution networks, to get blacks to control difficult black 
labour, to get blacks to make black redundancies, to gain control of black workers’ pension fund 
monies and to generally improve social stability whilst benefiting the status quo. (Murray 2000: 197) 
 
Nigeria’s indigenisation decree had similar effects on non-Nigerian firms. Companies were 
viewed as having a vested interest in Nigeria through the use of high ranking Nigerian employees. 
These employees interacted with Nigerians outside of the company on their firm’s behalf. 
Additionally, Nigerian directors and managers could discipline the workforce and serve as 
internal brokers to handle challenging situations on behalf of foreign management. It could 
almost be believed that the firm was rooted in Nigeria instead of having foreign links. GNIM’s 
usage of Nigerian top management follows a similar path: the firm has the image of keeping 
Nigerian interests in mind with Nigerians in key positions that provide brokerage links between 
the firm and the government as well as the firm and employees. From this perspective, Nigerian 
upper management are mere instruments that are utilised to provide authenticity to foreign firms. 
I argue that Murray’s research reduces Africans’ roles to tokenism and black washing; and in the 
Nigerian context, a ‘Nigerian-face’. Murray’s research ignores the more complex and significant 
use of kinship and powers dynamics at play within a firm like GNIM. As we will see through the 
following discussion of Nigerian senior level management within GNIM, this not a black and 
white issue.  
 
The Old Guard 
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As the head of GNIM’s human resources department, Solomon handled the hiring and 
employee affairs for all Nigerians throughout the most of the firm’s subsidiaries. His offices were 
at GNIM headquarters where he worked alongside his deputy manager, who was also Nigerian. 
Solomon, his deputy and the rest of the human resources department in Lagos hired Nigerian 
employees while Chinese employees were hired by the Hong Kong office. Solomon’s work 
revolved around understanding, implementing and negotiating issues related to wages, trade 
union regulations and recruitment. Like Alhaji, a large amount of time was spent away from 
headquarters, attending meetings with government officials, unions and other organizations in 
relation to labour regulations. During the fuel subsidy strikes in January of 2012, Solomon and 
his deputy were in contact with trade union officials and oversaw the stoppage of production at 
GNIM’s headquarters when industrial action was unanimously called by trade unions state wide. 
As a country with over three hundred ethnic groups, workplaces in Nigeria are extremely diverse. 
GNIM’s choice of a Nigerian human resources head signalled the firm’s sensitivity towards this 
diversity and other issues within the Nigerian marketplace.  
 
When his brother suggested Alhaji interview for a job at GNIM in 1968, Alhaji was not 
enthusiastic about working for a Chinese firm. “I gave him [Alahaji’s brother] a tough time 
because I didn’t believe in working for a Chinese firm”. Nonetheless after an interview with Papa 
Yang, Alhaji felt comfortable enough to accept GNIM’s job offer. In the early years, Alhaji was 
the only Nigerian in management. Because the company was still young, Alhaji found himself 
doing work well beyond the scope of his role in public relations. “I was doing all the PR [public 
relations] and all…I was the one who went to the airport” to greet Chinese employees as they 
arrived. Alhaji distinctly remembered picking up Matti’s father, Stephen when he first arrived in 
Nigeria over forty years ago. Throughout the years Alhaji held various jobs including public 
relations manager, personnel manager and administrator. Today he serves as the chairman of 
the board. Alhaji’s promotion to his current position came after the indigenization decree was 
created. The terms of the decree did not apply to GNIM vis a vis the goods they manufactured 
or the size of the firm, but like all most firms GNIM had to have a Nigerian on its board of 
directors When the decree was first established, Nigerian directors and chairperson were usually 
drawn from one of three categories: “professional career managers, some of whom had put [in] 
many years” at the same firm; “highly-placed persons who had retired from public service and 
individuals with relatively substantial equity interests in their respective firms" (Adejugbe 1984: 
586). Like most of the Nigerian chairman in foreign firms, Alhaji came from the first category of 
Nigerian employees who “ascended gradually to the top, to be appointed chairman and/or 
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managing director in the wake of the Nigerian indigenization exercise” (Adejugbe 1984: 586). 
Although Alhaji became chairman of GNIM, he acknowledged that he had less say in company 
matters than the other three directors who are blood kin. This places Alhaji in an ambiguous 
position where he fully contributes to the firm yet does not receive the same rights as his fellow 
directors. This uncertainty has continued for decades and relates to the low numbers of Nigerians 
in senior management. 
 
Matti explained that the reason for low numbers of Nigerians in senior management is because 
of fear of theft and misappropriation of money. “Having Nigerians in senior management is a 
trust issue… Give some of these guys power and they’ll embezzle and connive”. While visiting 
GNIM offices I heard stories of when GNIM used to hire Nigerians as mid-level managers. Every 
story painted Nigerian managers as opportunistic people who colluded with Nigerian 
subordinates in order to cheat the company. Even when the stories did not directly involve 
GNIM, they were used as cautionary tales for GNIM senior management to take heed and learn 
from. One such example was a story that both Matti and his father Stephen recounted on separate 
occasions. Once upon a time, another Chinese firm that entered the Nigerian marketplace 
around the same time as GNIM hired a Nigerian employee. The Nigerian employee rose in the 
ranks of the firm, from an assistant “errand boy” to hold a position in senior management. After 
his last promotion it was discovered that the man embezzled enough money “to open up a 
restaurant and buy a car for his girlfriend.” When this story was related to me several years had 
passed but the firm still referred to the “betrayal” and held it up as a reason to not hire more 
Nigerian management. This story and similar stories I heard from various research participants 
paint an essentialised, uncontested picture of Nigerians. This picture characterizes Nigerians as 
corruptible and ready to forfeit loyalty as soon as a profitable situation arises. Alhaji, Solomon 
and Segun have been deemed as the rare few. GNIM upper management, particularly those In 
the Yang family have a Highlander mentality where there can only be a limited number of 
Nigerians allowed to ascend into the firm’s inner circle.   
 
Alhaji is currently in his 70’s yet he still maintains a busy schedule and starts most of the day at 
GNIM headquarters with meetings and breakfast. He also fulfils his obligations as a community 
leader back in his home village. Alhaji’s work in his village and at GNM both involve brokerage 
and mediating between parties. As the first executive level Nigerian employee Alhaji became the 
Nigerian face of the firm and interacted with the government and the public on behalf of GNIM 
and continues to do so. He does this by connecting GNIM with multiple arms of the Nigerian 
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government. Since GNIM’s inception in the late 1960’s there have been numerous regime 
changes (presidential and military dictatorships). In order to continue operating and growing, the 
firm decided to remain neutral and create relationships with whatever government happened to 
be in power. GNIM upper management colloquially referred to this as the ‘Any Government in 
Power’ (AGIP) policy. In this vein directors served on various public and private boards. For 
instance Alhaji serves as a trustee on Ogun State’s State Security Fund board. Ogun state is 
Alhaji’s home state as well as the location of a number of GNIM’s subsidiaries. This is a common 
practice for firms to have their high ranking members serve on the boards of other organizations 
which have some connection or benefit to them (Collins 1980: 154). In the case of GNIM, its 
role as a business leader has given the firm some political entry and access to other organizations 
which in turn helps to serve its business needs.  
 
The link between business and social capital emerges as a central trope in the story of GNIM. 
Alhaji stated that:  
Psychologically speaking [you] lay your cards on the table and tell people what are really your 
problems. And along the way people we come across, people who become our friend for eternity. As 
a result if we are looking for anything we do not struggle. 
 
This highlights the centrality of the firm’s use of guanxi (networks of relationships) and ‘social 
work’ (making connections and maintaining relationships) to its business practice and the mutual 
dependence of moral and economic relations. GNIM’s use of brokerage and its social 
relationships will be discussed in Chapter 4-‘Our Friend for Eternity’. Will the third generation 
of GNIM upper management take on the social practices and management styles exhibited by 
the second generation?  
 
Young Bucks-The Third Generation 
Family firms mobilize family members. But family members surely do not permit their own 
mobilization as purely unproblematic extensions of kinship obligations. Members are not, after all, 
purely kinship beings bereft of tactical intentions of their own. Clearly, not all family members prefer 
to work for the family firm. (Stewart 2003: 389-390) 
 
GNIM’s second generation leadership extends beyond Papa Yang’s children and includes other 
family members. As such, the third generation of the firm’s leadership will follow a similar 
pattern.  Succession within family firms decreases as generations go by, with only 30% of family 
firms continuing after the first generation and only 10-15% continuing between the second and 
third generation (Collins 2012b: 5). GNIM’s second generation directors are keen to ensure that 
the firm survives into the third generation and beyond; consequently, the third generation is being 
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groomed to take over from the second generation. Traditionally one of the major predictors of 
succession is birth and position, but these factors do not always play a role in succession planning. 
Matti and Segun are not the oldest in their respective families, but they are in the first line of 
succession for the third generation. As with other family firms, not all Yang family members 
participate in the business; some family members have worked in the business and stayed and 
others have never worked for the firm. In family businesses, family members can leave by choice 
or through force after conflict (Collins et al. 2012). For example, Matti’s eldest brother previously 
worked with the firm in Nigeria, but he didn’t enjoy working in Nigeria and subsequently moved 
abroad. Matti, who is the youngest of his father’s children, is the only one of his siblings directly 
working with GNIM in Nigeria.  
 
Succession in GNIM is cultivated through a mixture of education, guidance, experiential 
learning, and freedom. I will explore the process of cultivation through the examples of Segun 
and Matti. As the quote above from Stewart asserts, family members are not emotionless pawns 
solely acting on behalf of the family. Even when working on behalf of the firm, family members 
bring their own motivations and ideas to each situation. Successive generations, like the third-
generation members of GNIM, work to build upon the firm’s success while simultaneously 
attempting to change ingrained behaviours and protocols created by previous generations. 
 
At least one of Alhaji’s children was expected to follow in his footsteps and work at GNIM. The 
one child who did so, is his son Segun. At the age of ten Segun moved to the States where he 
lived for over seventeen years with his twin brother and an older brother. After graduating from 
university in the States, where he studied management and marketing, Segun returned to Nigeria. 
Segun described his return as a “culture shock” on two levels: readjusting to Nigeria and working 
within a Chinese firm. He declared “It’s not easy working for a Chinese organisation”. Although 
Alhaji is not a blood member of the Yang family, the family considers him to be kin. Therefore 
kinship is extended to Segun and he has been enfolded into the Yang family. After he moved 
back to Nigeria Segun initially worked as an apprentice with Eric, one of the directors, in 
overseeing all of the firm’s worksites and factories. 
 
His first position was as a trainee manager/director of sorts. His apprenticeship entailed routinely 
travelling to various GNIM subsidiaries, where he learned about how each site functioned from 
top to bottom. Segun stated that “they [the top management] expect you to know everything from 
the littlest detail”. At one point he was asked to figure out why a large piece of construction 
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equipment stopped working. This was not something Segun expected he would need to 
understand as a manager. GNIM’s approach to training new generations is not uncommon.  
 
Family managers may no longer work their way up from the shop floor, but an exposure to varied 
aspects of the business is still seen as having a great value. Many family businesses consciously give 
their family managers a breadth of professional experiences by moving them through a sequence of 
jobs in the organization. (Kenyon-Rouvinez and Aronoff 2005: 25) 
 
Although Segun had experience working in the States; a business degree; and a high level position 
within GNIM, it took time for the second generation to let him work independently. According 
to Segun, “little by little they [directors] trust you to negotiate deals”. In 2008, Segun was given a 
new position as head of public relations for the Eastern Jewel Hotel, GNIM’s luxury hotel. The 
hotel was a perfect place for Segun given his interest and education in management and 
marketing. This position is reminiscent of his father’s early work with GNIM which also included 
public relations duties.  
 
Segun also shared similarities with Solomon. At the time of research, Segun had been promoted 
to work as the hotel’s human resources manager, but his day to day duties went beyond human 
resources. He often acted as a quasi-manager of the entire hotel by solving problems between 
hotel upper management and blue-collar employees. Segun also acted as the intermediary 
between the hotel‘s management and GNIM’s directors. He was later formally promoted to a 
position which formalised all of his duties: co-manager of the Eastern. Segun’s co-manager was 
Alfred, a German employee who started off as the manager for the hotel’s restaurants. Again, it 
is important to note that Solomon was the head of human resources for all other areas of GNIM; 
meaning that all human resources management for GNIM besides the hiring of Chinese 
employees was handled by Nigerian employees. This positioning of Nigerians in human 
resources roles indicates the crucial role top Nigerian employees play as an intermediaries 
between GNIM upper management and Nigerian employees; the Nigerian government and 
other external actors.  
 
As the son of another director, Matti’s story provides an interesting counterpart to Segun’s. 
Matti’s father Stephen, is one of Papa Yang’s nephews and a director; his mother is Eniafe, a 
Nigerian business woman. The pair met over thirty years ago when Eniafe’s mother was a 
distributor for one of GNIM’s product lines. Although she trained as a nurse Eniafe helped her 
mother by coordinating different facets of her business. During one of Eniafe’s buying trips she 
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visited GNIM where she met Stephen. After the pair married Eniafe created her own business, 
which she still owns. Part of her product range includes GNIM goods.  
 
Matti, who is in his early thirties, was born and raised in Nigeria. He moved to Canada for 
university, where he earned bachelor and master’s degrees; then subsequently worked in the 
construction industry in order to gain experience before returning to Nigeria to work for the 
family firm. Although he still owns a home in Canada and travels back and forth a few times a 
year, in 2011 Matti began to spend most of his time back in Nigeria. Similarly to Segun, Matti 
took some time to adjust to working within a Chinese firm in Nigeria. Matti also went through an 
apprenticeship with the firm before carving out his own area of expertise. Mentoring and 
apprenticeships are ways older generations try to guarantee successful continuity between 
generations (Nicholson and Björnberg 2006: 113). Matti’s mentor was his father Stephen. 
Stephen is the director that travels the most around Nigeria. He is well liked by both Chinese 
and Nigerian employees as well as the local traditional leaders who allow GNIM to setup 
operations in their villages and towns (See Chapter 4-‘Our Friend for Eternity’). After completing 
the apprenticeship Matti began to focus on his area of expertise. He described his position and 
those of other members in the third generation like Evan and Segun, as “…flexible…you do your 
own [project] and claim what you want to work on.” Matti’s area of interest is construction and 
sourcing and as such he oversaw sand/quarry developments and granite projects.  
 
Kinship-Boundaries & Limitations 
The inclusion of Alhaji, Solomon and Segun as kin provides the three with some familial 
privileges. They are invited to family events and are treated as members of the firm’s inner circle. 
Concepts of family are “flexible and permeable” and as far back as the 18 th century family 
“included kin, but they were not necessarily exclusively comprised of kin, and there were also 
‘families’ which included no kin at all” (Tadmor 2001: 272).  White argues that in some groups 
kinship is “…not necessarily a correlate of biogenetic or agnatic ties but rather a culturally defined 
domain. What is shared is not blood, but labour and obligation” (White 2000: 125). Carsten 
lobbied for anthropologists to go beyond the narrow confines of traditional kinship research and 
explore ‘relatedness’ (Carsten 2000). Relatedness allows for a much richer and nuanced 
understanding of how people define family and relationships with others.  
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Kinship based on relatedness has been traced back to both Chinese and Nigeria as well as other 
West African countries. Chinese traditional usage of relatedness can occur for a variety of 
reasons. “Chinese valued kin relations so much that they frequently extended them by creating 
fictive kinship bonds, pretending that nonrelatives were kinsmen to expand the circle of trusted 
intimates…..Historical Chinese manhood is inseparable from this dense network of real and 
fictive kinship ties” (Hinsch 2013: 7). Schak describes a form of kinship where men are adopted 
into a family to avoid not having a male heir (Schak 1988: 133). Stafford's research into kinship 
in China focused on relatedness as a complex and inclusive approach to understanding key 
relationships in Chinese society. He argued that solely focusing on traditional anthropological 
conceptions of patrilineal descent ignores equally important roles of “…. ‘the cycle of yang’ (which 
centres mostly on parent-child relationships) and ‘the cycle of laiwang’ (which centres mostly on 
relationships between friends, neighbours and acquaintances). In both cycles, the production of 
relatedness (often through rather everyday and/or domestic transactions) is clearly seen…..” 
(Stafford 2000: 57). 
 
Nigeria and other West African countries also rely on relatedness to expand upon and delineate 
the boundaries between those inside and outside of the family and friends circle. In Nigeria, 
Yoruba culture “….include[s] networks of alliances and fictive kin is a form of social, capital, 
cultural and economic ‘capital’…. They operate the popular kin networks to enhance their ‘access 
to opportunities, information, material resources and social status…’ ” (Agwuele 2009: 60). This 
use of kinship also extends to the other Nigerian ethnic groups.  Meagher’s research highlighted 
Igbo traders’ use of relatedness helps to mitigate the risks of long distance trading by including a 
wide ranging group of people in kinship circle.  (Meagher 2010: 35). GNIM utilises kinship in a 
similar manner. 
Chabal and Daloz’s research linked relatedness and kinship to economic needs. 
The basic reference unit in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, remains family- and kin-based: it is the 
fundamental ‘circle of trust’ within which individuals operate. Political elites seek to establish 
principles of mutual aid, of patron-client reciprocity, based on the model of kin and family relations. 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999:27) 
 
The similarities between Chinese and Nigerian kinship practices allow for GNIM to use 
relatedness in a manner which is familiar to Nigerian management. The firm’s approach to 
kinship extends to relationships created through a mixture of both blood ties and those that are 
based on “labour and obligation” (White 2000: 125) which are utilised to help operate the firm. 
Despite this approach, the opportunities for other Nigerians to become a part of the Yang family 
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are severely limited with few opportunities for Nigerians to become mid-level managers let alone 
become senior managers. Alhaji is acutely aware of his unique position as a Nigerian member of 
the Yang family whose son is a part of the firm’s succession.  
I started with their father; the Yang family and the Lateef [Alhaji’s surname] family have become one. 
If you get to my house [in the village] you see [Papa] Yang’s photo with his wife; we get on well with 
them. We’re [now] passing the management to the third generation.  
 
In 2011 when Daniel, a member of the third generation who works from the Hong Kong office, 
married in Hong Kong. The Yang’s invited Alhaji; some business partners and dignitaries 
including the governor of Alhaji’s home state to the wedding. Alhaji’s visit was the latest in a 
number of visits he made to Hong Kong since becoming a member of the Yang family. While 
Alhaji mostly spoke positively about his relationship with the Yang family, he acknowledged that 
the firm did not hire enough Nigerians in upper management.  
 
“It’s high time we start hiring managers from outside.”  Alhaji  
 
Alhaji, Solomon and Segun all expressed a desire to see more Nigerians in management.  
According to Stewart, when a firm utilises ‘kinship logic’, where the reliance on family hiring 
supersedes market logic this ultimately impacts various areas of the business including 
recruitment and hiring (Stewart 2003: 386). A focus on kinship logic can lead to the reduction 
of“…the ability of non-kin and disadvantaged kin to make optimal use of their talents in the 
internal labour markets” (Stewart 2003: 386). Although most of GNIM’s senior management 
thinks that they are protecting the firm from potential fraud and cheating which they associate 
with Nigerian managers, GNIM risks missing out on talented employees who could positively 
impact the organisation.  
 
Solomon interrogated the stories of mistrust of Nigerians in society at large and questioned 
Chinese business practices. Solomon questioned the ethics and trustworthiness of Chinese 
management in general. “What they practice there [China] they can’t practice here….” As the 
human resources head Solomon’s concern was with labour practices. In his professional capacity 
he heard stories of Chinese organization who sought to ignore Nigerian labour laws and prevent 
Nigerian workers from forming unions. Nigerian labour unions work to ensure that businesses 
meet the minimum wage of the city/state where they operate. The minimum wage for Lagos is 
₦15,000 Naira a month (£50). Some Nigerian and Chinese firms try to avoid paying employees 
minimum wage. Solomon argued that this behaviour made Nigerians mistrust Chinese firms. He 
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also noted that the mistrust was mutual. “Chinese view everything bad [as coming] from the 
Nigerian” side.  
 
The recounting of cautionary tales served to legitimize fears on both sides of the relationships. 
When Solomon spoke of Chinese attempts to break Nigerian laws, he stated concerns I heard 
from other Nigerians. As a high ranking employee of a Chinese firm, Solomon mixed these 
concerns with the positive and negative experiences he had as a senior manager within a Chinese 
firm. This led him to conclude the Chinese presence as necessary and manageable through the 
vigilance of Nigerian governance. Solomon believed that Chinese business interests were helpful 
to the Nigerian economy. “Without the Asians we would [economically] collapse…even with 
corruption the Chinese are necessary business partners. The benefit to working in a Chinese firm 
is job security; with Chinese firms there is continuity.” He stressed the role of Nigerians including 
himself in making sure foreign firms followed labour laws.  
 
Solomon’s statements compared to Alhaji’s sentiments of being a member of the Yang family 
highlight the liminality of Nigerian upper management with GNIM. After years of working for 
the firm, ascending to upper management and being included in the family, the sense of 
otherness still exists. The fears that the three Chinese directors had about hiring more Nigerian 
managers seemed to face no reflective interrogation from the directors themselves. Instead the 
stories are referenced as solid proof for past and future Nigerian behaviour. Despite this, Alhaji, 
Solomon and Segun all voiced the need for more Nigerians in higher positions within the firm.  
 
I now move from the discussion of kinship and succession to an analysis of GNIM’s social 
relations with internal and external actors. I argue that the firm utilises social capital and 
paternalism in order to navigate the Nigerian marketplace. 
 
Networks-Using & Building Social Capital 
The Sagamu industrial complex, located in Ogun state, is less than an hour and a half away from 
GNIM headquarters. The land for the industrial complex was acquired in the early 2000’s. 
Around that time former President Obasanjo took a tour of OmoIgbara, GNIM’s wood factory 
located in Ogun state. Obasanjo was impressed with the factory and suggested that the then 
governor of Ogun state, Olusegun Osoba, provide land for GNIM to expand into another 
business. Matti stressed that GNIM “still bought it [the land]” but through Osoba’s help the firm 
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was able to secure the land for purchase. Osoba’s successors have been less welcoming to some 
new Chinese firms which have had their land seized by the government. A Chinese firm’s land 
that was located near the Sagamu complex was seized despite fencing off the property and 
planning to build on the land. Property values increased not long after GNIM acquired its land 
and the area quickly developed.  
 
The Sagamu complex holds a fifty-two megawatts power plant, tile factory, nail factory; a steel 
rolling mill; housing for Chinese employees and a forest which GNIM plans to develop along 
with another steel rolling mill in the future. The firm was also considering whether or not it 
should transfer its pipe factory to Sagamu. GNIM received an Independent Power Producer 
licence to build and run the power plant which it ran using a total of six industrial generators. 
The firm contracted a German purchasing house to buy the generators and computer program 
used to control the generators. The power plant was funded in part through a loan of ₦ 1 billion 
[over £3.6 million] from the Central Bank of Nigeria’s Bank of Industry Intervention Fund for 
Power Firms (Alli 2013). In order to help stimulate the economy, the intervention fund is given 
to businesses in various sectors. Loans are repaid at low single digit interest rates. According to a 
survey of Nigerian business people, the fund was difficult to attain due to a number of issues such 
as a “cumbersome application process, not meeting requirements and financial constraints”, and 
not even knowing that the fund existed (Oniyitan 2012). This is where Alhaji’s aforementioned 
statement re-emerges.  
Psychologically speaking [you] lay your cards on the table and tell people what are really your 
problems. And along the way people we come across, people who become our friend for eternity. As 
a result if we are looking for anything we do not struggle. 
 
A firm like GNIM with its size, years in business and connections, would be in a far better 
position than smaller businesses to hear about the fund through its network; understand how to 
navigate the bureaucratic application process; and present a viable plan.  
 
The Sagamu industrial complex is surrounded by residential developments whose residential 
organisations negotiated with GNIM to provide infrastructure for the area. The firm considers 
such projects to be a form of community relations. On the surface, the firm’s response to its 
Sagamu neighbours is reminiscent of when it entered Cross Rivers State. In the 1990’s GNIM 
opened a logging firm in a rainforest in Cross Rivers State. The logging operations spanned over 
200 square miles and included a plant on the bank of a river (Oates1999: 171; Madeley 1999: 
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79).  In negotiations with local villages GNIM offered “to build clinics and schools, provide 
college scholarships and support football teams” (Oates 171).  Despite agreements with some 
local villages and local and international NGO’s, some community groups heavily opposed the 
logging operations due to environmental damage. GNIM was also faced with accusations of 
bribery and other misconduct. (Oates1999: 171; Madeley 1999: 79; Earth Island Journal). In 
2004 after years of campaigns against GNIM’s logging operations, the governor of Cross Rivers 
States ordered GNIM to close its operations. Conversely, GNIM’s interactions with its Sagamu 
neighbours are embedded in brokerage. In order to gain tacit approval for the project, GNIM 
utilised brokerage in its interaction with the community. I return to this discussion in the next 
chapter which explores GNIM’s complex use of brokerage. 
 
As a firm operating in Nigeria for nearly fifty years, GNIM has developed connections to various 
communities within the country these are primarily Nigerian, Chinese and German communities 
but they also work with other counterparts as needed. These communities are wide-ranging but 
usually involve business and government actors. For instance the firm has an interest in the Africa 
Finance Corporation, a private bank which focuses on economic development of Africa through 
business. GNIM is one of the shareholders along with the Central Bank of Nigeria; top pan-
African banks and other organisations. Eric and Antonio, two of GNIM’s the three Yang family 
directors, serve on the board of directors.  
 
Additionally, the firm conducts business with companies from other countries like the German 
firm that helped to acquire the generators and computers for the power plant. GNIM is also a 
highly respected member of the Chinese community in Lagos. in the Chinese community. In 
2012, The Eastern served as the venue for a Lagosian Chinese community events including a 
reception for the Chinese Consul General and a Chinese Moon (Autumn Festival) celebration. 
Both events were attended by prominent members of the Chinese community in Lagos. 
Additionally, Chinese consulate officials attend GNIM’s annual Chinese New Year party.  
 
GNIM also participates in Nigerian events in Lagos and Ogun states. In the autumn of every year 
a delegation of GNIM employees attends one of the largest festivals in West Africa, the Ojude-
Oba festival in Ogun State. As a member of the larger expatriate community GNIM operates a 
charity food booth at an exclusive festival that celebrates Lagos’s various expatriate communities. 
Each year the expatriate community of Lagos holds the festival on the grounds of the private 
British International School to support Nigerian charities. Most of the attendees are either 
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expatriates or elite Nigerians. One of the newer community events the firm participates in is the 
China Bridge language competition. (See Chapter 6- Ni Hao Naija: Elite Futures & Chinese 
Language Education in Nigeria). The competition was first held in 2012 and representatives from 
the firm attended and served as judges. GNIM’s success and longevity is due in part to the firm’s 
various community relationships which in turn form a number of social networks. GNIM was 
one of the rare firms that focused on community relations from early on in its operations. This 
is an area that newer Chinese firms initially ignored.  
Outreach to local communities has also shifted. Early Chinese business engagement into Nigeria 
featured limited contact with the local community, with the exception of the customer interface. In 
the new era of Chinese enterprise, trading has been a larger part of the picture with big Chinese retail 
markets increasingly making contact with local African communities. (Utomi 2008: 54).  
 
GNIM’s focus on building social networks is a part of the firm’s complex use of brokerage. 
Chapter four examines GNIM’s brokerage practices.  
 
Paternalistic Management- Managing Trust & Distrust 
The Great Eastern 
GNIM’s foray into the hotel industry was due to a combination of a desire to diversify business 
interests and to avoid land seizure. The firm owned the land where the hotel complex now sits 
since the 1980’s but left it vacant. The land became prime real estate as Lagos continued to 
expand. In the 2000’s, the Lagos state government campaigned to encourage land owners to 
build on vacant property or face seizure. GNIM’s response was to build a luxury hotel, The 
Eastern Jewel, which opened in the early spring of 2009 with an additional building completed 
in 2013. While GNIM’s headquarters are located on mainland Lagos, the hotel is located across 
town on the edge of Victoria Island (VI) near Lekki Peninsula. VI is popular with both wealthy 
Nigerians and expatriates. Across from The Eastern is a popular shopping mall frequented by 
aspiring middle class Nigerians; middle/upper class Nigerians and expatriates. Nearby is the 
British International School where the children of wealthy Nigerians and expatriates attend 
school. The hotel hosts a clientele of upper-middle class and upper class Nigerians as well as 
expatriates. Per night, higher end suites cost $3,500 [£2,050] and above. Some guests have stayed 
for periods spanning one to six months.   
 
The first building of The Eastern is twelve stories and has just over sixty large rooms and 
penthouse suites, while the second building which Matti and other company members call “phase 
two” has standard size hotel rooms. According to Matti, the “motivations for building phase two 
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is that the politicians [and other big men] need rooms for their entourage”. VIPs stay in the first 
building while their entourages stay in the second building. The hotel restaurants serve Chinese, 
Japanese, Nigerian and Western cuisine; fish is imported from Norway and steak is brought from 
South Africa. Eric, one of the four directors, enlisted his wife Sarah, an interior designer, to 
decorate the hotel and design its logo. The décor is a Nigerian-Chinese fusion with Nigerian 
masks decorating doors and Chinese motifs decorating the fixtures on wooden cabinets in 
guestrooms. All of the wooden furniture and wooden components for fixtures, doors and the 
like were made from Nigerian timber. This is a fact that has been discussed in the Nigerian press 
and the firm has been lauded by local politicians for its use of local resources. Again this in 
contrast to the opposition the firm faced with it’s now defunct Cross Rivers timber operations. 
Since that time, the firm has not received such public opposition and appears to focus on 
cultivating relationships that help it maintain and expand its business operations. (See Chapter 4- 
‘Our Friend for Eternity’) 
 
Segun managed the hotel in a paternalistic fashion that was similar to the management style of 
the top directors. Paternalism was present in a variety of ways, starting with how the directors and 
managers are referred to by employees. When people mentioned the founder, they call him 
‘Papa’ Yang. The three Chinese directors were called by their English names which were prefixed 
by ‘Mr.’. Solomon, other managers and office workers throughout the organization were also 
called ‘Mr.’, ‘Ms.’ or ‘Mrs.’ Alhaji’s name is inherently respectful as it is an honorific term, 
according to West African Islamic practice, for someone who has visited Mecca on pilgrimage. 
Nigerian cultures are tied to hierarchy and respect for age and rank. GNIM directors are also 
from a culture which places importance on both of these areas. Therefore paternalism is not 
uncommon or unwelcome from the perspective of some employees. In the case of The Eastern 
which has employees from outside of Nigeria and China, the firm’s paternalistic management 
style has proved challenging. One of Segun’s top priorities was to understand the “different 
backgrounds and different thoughts” of his employee’s and colleagues. He hinted towards issues 
with some European employees who felt “superior” to their colleagues; felt they were not paid 
enough and were unhappy with the work environment due to having little flexibility and strong 
oversight from the directors. 
 
Wright described “paternalistic management [as] a way of controlling employees through the use 
of family imagery, thus providing space for the manger to as ‘caring and protective’ head of the 
industrial or commercial ‘household’” (Wright 2004 :133). GNIM owners provided housing and 
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security for all expatriate workers throughout the firm as well as upper management. At 
headquarters a cook prepared Chinese food for employees. When Chinese employees ventured 
out of GNIM’s gates, they usually travelled in groups and were chauffeured to their destination. 
But GNIM also made provisions for Nigerian employees, particularly senior level management. 
The firm’s headquarters had two clinics, one for Chinese employees and another for Nigerian 
employees. Additionally, Alhaji, Solomon and Segun lived in company housing near 
headquarters. According to Alhaji he and Solomon who are both in their seventies, are “retired 
but not tired”. As the chairman Alhaji still received benefits while Solomon did not. But as a 
working retiree, Solomon was eligible for GNIM’s housing scheme. Under the programme, 
GNIM provided housing to Solomon but upon retirement the firm handed over the title and 
ownership to Solomon. Since Solomon formerly retired but still works for the firm on a contract 
basis, he was eligible for the housing scheme.  
 
Segun complained that he often encountered employees who asked for permission to come to 
work late or to rearrange their schedules due to family obligations. He felt relationships with 
Nigerian employees were different because they asked “to borrow money” and made requests 
that made Segun feel like they wanted him “to be their father”. Unlike their expatriate colleagues 
at the Eastern and other GNIM enterprises, Nigerian employees commuted to work, sometimes 
from great distances. Many of The Eastern’s employees did not live near the hotel and had to 
navigate through Lagos’s notoriously bad traffic. Segun stated that “as a Nigerian I understand 
when my employee is late due to traffic”.  As such he felt that occasional incidents of lateness 
were reasonable and did not merit dismissal.  
 
Segun did acknowledge that if he had to fire employees it would be easy to find replacements. 
After advertising a handful of positions The Eastern received over 1,000 CV’s. By 6am the 
following Saturday morning, 50 jobseekers were camped outside the hotel’s gates waiting for the 
hotel to start accepting CV’s at 7am. Nigeria’s high level of unemployment and 
underemployment (23.9% for all working age adults and 50-80% for youth) mean many people 
including new graduates sought employment (Adekunle 2013; Gaskia 2014). While there is a 
sense that individual blue-collar employees can be easily replaced, these workers as a whole are 
crucial to not only The Eastern’s success but that of GNIM as a whole.  
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Managing Mistrust 
As with other GNIM businesses, the majority of The Eastern’s employees are Nigerian. Chinese 
employees are in positions such as chefs and maintenance workers. There are a few Nigerians 
who work at the reception desk but over 200 Nigerian employees primarily work in service 
positions. Their jobs range from doormen to wait staff to housekeepers. What differentiates the 
hotel from other GNIM subsidiaries is the inclusion of European and South East Asian 
employees. These employees usually work in mid-level or managerial positions in various parts 
of the hotels including: on reception, in administrative/office positions or in the restaurants. 
Despite the challenges of juggling the management of a diverse group of employees whilst 
meeting customers’ needs, Segun believed the biggest issue he faced as a manager was the 
micromanaging style of GNIM’s top three directors. “It [GNIM] is big, big but it is managed like 
a Mom and Pop” business.  
 
Serrat describes micromanaging as “….direct[ing] and control[ling] a person, group, or system 
with excessive or unnecessary oversight or input….By so doing, micromanagers take decisions 
away from those who should be making decisions’ (Serrat 2011:2). Two examples of GNIM’ 
micromanagement style are the mandatory review of reimbursement requests from all employees 
throughout the firm’s subsidiaries by a central office at headquarters and directors’ approval for 
regular orders that managers and high ranking management such as Matti and Segun place. 
Segun’s typical work day started at GNIM’s headquarters in mainland Lagos, which is near his 
home. After a daily meeting Segun e travelled to The Eastern to collect paperwork including 
hotel supply orders and took the paperwork back to GNIM headquarters for a director’s 
approval. The directors mandated that all goods for each business within the organisation 
including the hotel, be distributed from headquarters so during his trips to headquarters Segun 
picked up hotel supplies including perishable goods. The Eastern is 19 miles away from 
headquarters near Victoria Island and Lekki Peninsula. Without traffic the trip can take 25-35 
minutes but with typical busy Lagos traffic it could take upwards of one hour minimum.  
 
Given the inefficiency of this system what is the reason GNIM directors chose to micromanage? 
One major reason is distrust. (Porterfield 2003: 21; Wells 2001: 601) The company has used 
past experiences with theft and disloyalty to guide their management of daily practices. Segun 
explained that: “This organisation has been burnt so much….trust is limited. “I understand 
everything they do but…” Fear of these past occurrences help the directors remain hyper-vigilant 
and this vigilance is maintained through strict protocols. But trust is not just an issue pertaining 
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to Nigerian employees. Matti recalled times when he visited one of worksites in Ogun state only 
to find that the head Chinese manager was not on duty and had overslept. He investigated and 
found that this occurred multiple times. In turn some Nigerian employees learned their 
manager’s pattern and used these opportunities of to delay work and arrive late. Lower level 
employees faced the constrictions of working in a micromanaged system where respect to 
immediate bosses was key but they also enjoyed moments of laxity. While this delay in work was 
an issue for upper management, the situation seemed to benefit both the factory management 
and workers.  
 
Matti’s attempts to correct the situation were met with resistance by both factory management 
and workers. Matti explained that many Chinese managers were from the “country” and lacked 
exposure and interactions with non-Chinese people. Additionally they never worked in such 
positions of power before working for GNIM. Combining these two issues is a way to understand 
the interactions between Chinese managers and their Nigerian subordinates. The Chinese 
managers displayed a mixture of positive and negative paternalism. At the Ogun site, the Chinese 
mangers spoke down to employee but they also colluded with Nigerian employees in order to 
work less. While this collusion resulted in a tentative comradery between managers and 
employees, it also had a negative impact on the firm as whole due to the delays in work.  
 
Additionally, the managers did not view Nigerian subordinates as individuals with something to 
contribute. Instead they viewed them with an air of inferiority. Stories of Chinese employees’ 
misconduct are rarely told and the focus is often placed on Nigerian employees. According to 
Matti, Chinese managers were usually low level employees in the firms they previously worked 
for, or they were country-side workers who never interacted with Africans before coming to 
Nigeria. Alden classified three major categories of Chinese people who go to Africa to work: 
“laid-off workers as a result of the down-sizing of Chinese corporations, persons displaced by 
large infrastructure/dam construction” and migrants “who were ‘already floating’” in China 
(Alden 2007 referenced in Spring and Jiao 2008: 57-58). Hiring a minority of Chinese managers 
to supervise a majority of Nigerian employees helped create a situation of tension and mistrust 
which GNIM upper management sought to manage.  
 
We Are Actually Your Fathers-Paternalistic Management within the Family 
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GNIM’s use of paternalism is not strictly authoritarian but there is a high level of 
micromanagement due to distrust. This paternalism extends to the third generation of 
management. Matti described the firm as informal. For family and those in mid-level managerial 
positions and above there is a degree of informality in terms of the freedom to interact with top 
management. Furthermore, Matti and Segun also have a level of autonomy within the 
micromanaged structure. Nonetheless, there is conflict between the second and third generation. 
This conflict doesn’t exhibit itself in an aggressive manner but in the way Matti and Segun try to 
assert themselves as well as how they discuss management. The third generation asserts itself 
through using different management styles than the second generation and expressing a desire to 
lessen the bureaucracy within GNIM. They talk about ‘management’ as if they are not a part of 
management. While they are younger and not directors, they have an influence on the direction 
of the firm and over the employees. When researching family firm’s Wong found that with 
paternalism came knowing the appropriate time to express opinions.  
In the first place, it [paternalism] demands formal obedience from subordinates. The emphasis is on 
outward deference to one’s superiors in the organization…. Dissenting views and personal opinions 
may be advanced by executives, and are sometimes even demanded of them, but they must be made 
at the appropriate moment so as not publicly to contradict the superiors. (Wong 1988: 135)  
 
As Matti and Segun carved out their own areas of expertise they also attempted to adopt their 
own management styles. This was accepted by the directors but only up to a point. When one of 
Matti’s brothers, who no longer lives in Nigeria, “tried to implement lots of Australian style 
change [s]” to GNIM that he learned while living in Australia, his ideas were not accepted. Matti 
faced similar issues when he tried to implement Canadian style business practices. “They will 
humour you and agree in front of your face, but continue on”. The ‘they’ Matti referred to are 
Chinese and Nigerians, from employees to management in the second generation; essentially, 
most of the firm. The firm’s directors are particularly resistant to new management ideas. This 
was highlighted through the visit of Karl, a white Canadian consultant. Karl and Matti worked 
together in the Canadian construction industry.  
 
Matti brought Karl in on a trial basis to advise the firm in a variety of sectors including farming 
and construction management. Karl faced resistance from both Chinese managers and low level 
Nigerian employees alike. The latter were more cooperative than the Chinese on-site managers. 
“Karl was making enemies left, right and centre. We like what he was doing-making people work 
and making people accountable, but he was butting heads with people.” Although Matti agreed 
with Karl’s ideas he sided with the directors in so far as that Karl’s methods for enacting change 
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were considered too drastic and radical to fit into the GNIM system. Karl’s case highlights the 
tensions that arise in the firm, between the second and third generation and between low-level 
management and blue-collar employees.  
 
Despite the freedom to carve out their own areas of expertise, the third generation faces tension 
between the desire to change and the desire to respect and maintain some facets of GNIM’s 
dominant management style.  Despite a clear distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ when discussing the 
directors and ‘management’, Segun and Matti are not only a part of the firm, but they are being 
groomed to fill their father’s positions. “Family members also internalize familial values, such as 
long-term reciprocity, filial obligation and hard work for one’s family” (Collins 2012: 72). The 
third generation’s commitment to the family business has been engrained in them since 
childhood. Change is inevitable and in some ways desired, but to mitigate change that could ruin 
GNIM’s continuation, the second generation continued to mentor and monitor Segun and Matti.  
 
Conclusion 
In the Nigerian government’s public discourse campaign, Chinese big business promises to serve 
as a path for Nigerians to fulfil their hopes and dreams. Great Northern Industrial Manufacturer 
is an example of Chinese big business. Although the firm is not a huge MNC, its heavy focus on 
Nigeria, throughout a number of industry, highlights the firm’s importance to Nigeria’s economic 
development.  
 
What has emerged from this chapter is the complicated transformation of the grand narrative of 
Nigerian-Chinese relations into reality.  Although the majority of GNIM’s employees are 
Nigerians, only a few are allowed to reach executive level management. However, these rarefied 
few are not just tokens utilised to place a ‘Nigerian-face’ on GNIM. Instead GNIM uses kinship 
through relatedness to indicate those who are allowed within the family fold and senior 
management. Segun’s employment and grooming for succession demonstrates the strong familial 
bond between the Yangs and Lateefs. As a member of the family Alhaji has the rights of 
succession which have in turn been conferred unto Segun. GNIM’s reliance on kinship helps 
the firm maintain and grow its operations. As the firm continues to grow and move into a third 
generation, the family also continues reproduce its elite standing in both Nigerian and Hong 
Kong. The firm also applies paternalistic management styles in order to navigate issues of trust 
and mistrust in its daily operations. Nigerians are able to find success through Chinese big 
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business, but due to negative perceptions of Nigerians, these opportunities are limited to a small 
number. 
 
The next chapter further explores GNIM’s operations and how Nigerians benefit from aligning 
themselves with the firm. GNIM’s use of performance, ritual and ceremonies as demonstrated 
in the chapters opening vignette at the Chinese New Year party, is a part of a complex set of 
brokerage practices. I seek to analyse the firm’s use of brokerage, which includes guanxi and 
corporate gift giving, and the role of Nigerians in brokerage. I argue that brokerage is an essential 
component to GNIM’s maintenance and expansion of its position in the Nigeria. 
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Chapter IV-“Our Friend for Eternity”:  
Guanxi, Brokers and Corporate Gift-Giving 
 
Grand Opening 
The opening of Sagamu, GNIM's industrial complex in Ogun State was heralded as a spectacular 
opportunity for growth in the state and Nigeria as a whole. The complex included what was 
projected to be the largest steel rolling mill in Africa; separate nail and ceramic tile factories; a 
power station and acres of land for further development. GNIM marked the opening by inviting 
dignitaries and media to witness the industrial complex’s grand opening. During the event, 
GNIM’s managing director, Eric Yang stood next to then president Goodluck Jonathan who cut 
the ribbon to symbolize the factory opening and pushed the button to start the steel production 
line. Pictures of the day featured Yang and Jonathan alongside other national and local dignitaries 
like Ibikunle Amosu, a senator for Ogun State. Media from across Nigeria covered the event and 
reported President Jonathan’s commemoration speech. Jonathan told the crowd: 
By constructing this 700,000 metric tonnes per annum cold rolled steel here to 
compliment your existing investments in the country, [GNIM] has demonstrated strong 
belief and confidence in our economy. I thank you for keeping faith with our country 
(2013: Public Affairs).  
 
President Jonathan’s speech highlighted the importance of GNIM to the state and country. Over 
$2 billion [over £1.3 billion] was invested in the project which was estimated to provide over 
5,000 new jobs to Nigerians (Komolafe 2010).  Over £3.6 million pounds was loaned to GNIM 
from the Central Bank of Nigeria’s Bank of Industry Intervention Fund for Power Firms, for the 
power plant (Alli 2013). 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, GNIM is a Chinese owned firm that has operated in Nigeria 
for over 40 years and has its headquarters are in Lagos. While the Sagamu complex was still in 
development stages a new Chinese firm bought land nearby. The government subsequently 
seized the land and resold it for a higher price. Not only did GNIM not encounter this issue, but 
the firm was able to garner support from local and national political connections via brokerage. 
In fact, as Matti, one of the members of GNIM’s third generation explained: it was upon former 
President Obasanjo’s own urging that the previous governor of Ogun State allowed GNIM to 
purchase land for the Sagamu complex. In order to operate and develop its business concerns, 
GNIM utilises both public and private brokerage; the firm also serves as a key point of brokerage 
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for others. Brokerage is an integral component to Nigerian-Chinese relations as a whole in 
helping to create and maintain relationships.  
 
This raises a set of important questions. How has GNIM been able to sustain and grow its 
operations in Nigerian for such a long period in comparison with the reversal of fortunes faced 
by other multinationals? To put it another way, what allows for the apparent smoothness and 
ease with which GNIM has established and maintained such a prominent position in the Nigerian 
economy? More specifically, how does a large Chinese firm like GNIM utilise social connections 
for itself and for others? How is such a high and effective level of political patronage achieved? 
What role do Nigerians play in GNIM’s complex deployment of brokerage practices? Which 
Nigerians benefit from GNIM’s brokerage practices? 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, Nigerian-Chinese business relies upon social relationships. 
This chapter explores how those social relations extend beyond the firm, focusing on the key 
concept of brokerage. Following on from the last chapter, here I use GNIM as a lens though 
which to analyse how social relationships are initiated, cultivated, nurtured and sustained through 
networking, brokerage and indeed gift-giving. Brokerage is at the heart of the formation and 
maintenance of relationships between Nigerian and Chinese counterparts. As the ethnography 
below shows, brokerage is heavily reliant upon social relationships and reciprocity which in turn 
play a crucial role in the various elements that contribute to GNIM’s “social work”. Interrogating 
the critical “social work” of the firm as it were-the business of relationship building-helps in 
further understanding GNIM’s position in Nigeria. Furthermore, while the shifting and varied 
role of brokers is becoming ever more central in mediating both the social life and capital flows 
of Chinese engagement in Nigeria, there is a striking continuity in the forms and practices of 
contemporary brokerage with the rich history of brokerage in Nigeria against which my analysis 
of brokers must be contextualized.  
 
In this chapter I seek to understand GNIM’s set of brokerage practices and the role of Nigerians 
in the implementation and performance of brokerage. The firm’s approach to brokerage 
includes traditional forms of brokerage; gift-giving and guanxi, a multi-layered Chinese approach 
to networking. GNIM’s approach to gift-giving is intimately connected to brokerage. As I will 
discuss later, GNIM strategically uses gifts to broker various needs including access, 
introductions, services and more. I begin this chapter with a historical and contemporary analysis 
of brokerage in Nigeria. This is followed by a discussion of corporate gift-giving and guanxi which 
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are elements of GNIM’s approach to brokerage. Guanxi contributes to GNIM’s practices of 
corporate gift-giving and overall brokerage strategy. I then move on to an ethnographic analysis 
of GNIM’s brokerage, firstly in a discussion of royal brokerage provided to the firm by a king in 
a strategic area of the firm’s investments and operations. GNIM’s daily use of brokerage through 
guanxi and corporate gift-giving are then explored. The chapter ends with an interrogation of 
corruption and the often normative manner in which it obscures discussions in relation to 
brokerage. In this analysis, I question the precise definitions used in international development 
circles and groups like Transparency International. These definitions often lack nuance and 
displace local understandings of corruption and the ways brokerage benefits Nigerians.  This is 
why I find the concept of brokerage a much more productive analytical tool as it enables us to 
apply an ethnographic approach which allows for the examination of the multiple nuanced social 
relations forged and used in the process of enterprise.  
 
Brokerage in Context: Past & Present 
Brokerage can be traced back to pre-colonial times when it was utilised in various parts of Africa 
including Nigeria. Brokers had various duties including putting “…. technical knowledge and 
linguistic skills at the service of inexpert prospective traders and helping traders who needed help 
finding customers in new places” (Jones 1970: 189). Brokers were primarily used for trade and 
government business. In an economic history of 19th century Africa, Zeleza described the 
reliance upon intermediaries by international merchants. In North and West Africa, traders that 
did not have links to local networks or diasporic communities used local brokers 
Using these intermediaries had several advantages, especially in the light of the restriction 
on the foreigners' freedom to move and trade locally. Moreover, the local traders and 
brokers were more likely to be better informed about local consumption trends and 
tastes. (Zeleza 1993: 271; 281). 
 
Additionally, brokers helped with logistics such as accommodations and storage facilities as well 
as finding local sellers for traders to purchase goods from (Zeleza 1993: 281). But colonial times 
brought a different from of brokerage where elite Nigerians with higher levels of education and 
connections acted as intermediaries between Nigerian citizens and British officials. 
Intermediaries worked primarily as interpreters, translators, and clerks. A smaller number served 
as traditional rulers. Brokers of this era were “perceived within a dichotomy of collaboration and 
resistance” (Pratten 2006: 221). Working with colonial forces branded brokers as collaborators 
because they worked with the very forces who subjugated their fellow citizens. Conversely, 
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brokers were also viewed as subversive agents who worked within the colonial system in order to 
weaken it and find ways to help themselves and others. For example in the latter half the 1860’s 
African intermediaries well versed in Western life came to the forefront. These intermediaries 
were a small group of former enslaved Africans and their family members who returned to 
Freetown and Libreville, and worked in positions associated with middle/upper class status 
(Hopkins 1973). “Essentially, their role was that of cultural intermediaries, men who straddled 
the frontier between Europe and Africa, interpreting, in the broadest sense of the word, one to 
the other” (Hopkins 1973). Although these brokers were viewed negatively by both Europeans 
and Africans, Hopkins asserted that they served a necessary role by mediating the flow of cultures 
between Westerners and Africans.  
 
Pre-colonial times in the land we know as contemporary Nigeria was ruled according to ethnic 
groups and corresponding kingdoms. Under British rule, various ethnic groups were placed 
together. Despite colonialism, many traditional kingdoms remained virtually intact.  Those with 
“chiefs who presented themselves as being open to the new were regarded as important partners 
on the supposedly long way to self-government and independence” (Eckert 2006: 259). Chiefs 
were utilised to help with administrative duties such as tax collection and other local government 
affairs (Eckert 2006: 259). Chiefs brokered peace and engaged in daily governance on behalf of 
colonial officials. Today traditional rulers still play an important role in some communities due 
their influence in people’s lives and access to community resources like land. Additionally, rulers 
serve as patrons that helped their people solve a variety of disputes including: land, familial and 
inheritance issues. Rulers also help their subjects find employment and gather money during 
financial difficult periods.  Chinese companies much like colonial era British officials, work with 
traditional leaders because of their standing in community. 
But a major difference between the current era and the earlier one is that while previously 
it was generally clear what the broker was mediating between, the village and the national 
capital, or, more generally, encapsulated political structures, in the contemporary context 
of unbounded fieldsites this is not immediately obvious. (Lindquist 2015:9).  
 
The boundaries between areas for mediation have blurred and brokers are mediating between 
communities and conventional parties such as local and national governments, as well as new 
players such as local and international firms; development agencies; local charities and civil 
societies. According to de Sardan, contemporary brokerage, particularly in the context of 
international development is “any social process that brings localized low-level actors or groups 
into relationship with global structures (the town, the state or the market being the most obvious 
100 | P a g e  
 
of these) requires the service of go-betweens or mediators who occupy a clearly strategic function” 
(de Sardan 2005: 173). While this is a useful definition in the context of this research, situations 
which require brokers do not solely centre on connecting “low-level actors” with “global 
structures”). Therefore, the definition of brokerage used in this chapter, relies upon de Sardan’s 
definition of the facilitation of relationships between two parties but with the caveat that the 
people being discussed have greater power and access to resources than “low-level actors”. In the 
case of GNIM’s use of brokerage, both GNIM and its brokers, like the king who will be discussed 
in this chapter, come from elite circles and hence meet on an equal footing. Additionally, James 
argued that although brokers were maligned for acting with greed and interfacing between 
“powerless people and the externally imposed power of the modern state”, brokers are more 
complex than this commonplace caricature portrays (James 2011: 335). I will explore this in the 
discussion on GNIM’s forms of corporate gift-giving regarding GNIM’s gift exchange with 
communities which host its operations.  
 
The contemporary development landscape in Nigeria includes private business; professional and 
business associations; government ministries; media consultants; and traditional large and small 
donors (Dada and Oyediran 2016: 258; Dibie and Okonkwo 2000). Lindquist discusses the re-
emergence of the broker as a person of interest in anthropological studies in relation to a number 
of areas including development aid industry; transnational activism; tourism; finance and 
transnational migration (Lindquist 2015:9). In the South African case of brokerage, James found 
that “elements of state, market, and patrimonial/patriarchal-style political authority intersect” 
(James 2011:318). This highlights how brokers must have connections to multiple areas and in 
turn, those utilising brokerage services must have access to intermediaries in various arenas. 
Furthermore, the intersections between private and public roles in development continues to be 
blurred due to the interaction between a numbers of actors with national and international links. 
While James and de Sarden have analysed the enterprising nature of brokers and to a lesser 
degree, the institutions who act as key brokers of opportunities and resources in development, 
large MNCs are rarely considered to play a key role in brokerage.  I contribute to the study of 
institutional brokers by examining the way in which an MNC, GNIM, utilises various forms of 
brokerage to expand upon its long standing position in Nigeria. As we will observe, GNIM 
benefits from brokerage conducted on its behalf while it simultaneously acts as a broker for 
others. 
 
101 | P a g e  
 
The role of brokers in the contemporary landscape of development and foreign investment is 
inevitably an entrepreneurial one.  As Boissevain explained, brokers should be seen as acting not 
only in the interest of others but also fundamentally for his/her own benefit (Boissevain 1974 
cited in Bierschenk et al 2002: 12). Boissevain went further in describing brokers as 
entrepreneurs whose power comes not from ownership of capital (property, land, money etc...), 
but from the mobilisation of people who actually own resources (Boissevain 1974 cited in 
Bierschenk et al 2002: 16). As I explore in the ethnography below, this entrepreneurial 
dimension is key to brokerage; this highlights the capacity of successful brokers to seize 
opportunities by staying attuned to others needs and demands. At the same time, alongside this 
social capital and the less tangible resources of opportunism and power, the brokers discussed 
here also have significant levels of financial capital which they leverage in their international role 
and parlay into greater income. As we shall see in the ethnography that follows later in the 
chapter, brokers often occupy a position that balances politics, leadership, business and high or 
prominent social status with significant financial resources (alongside social capital vis a visa 
brokerage).   
 
Boissevain’s definition simultaneously reflects similarities and changes in contemporary 
brokerage from colonial days. Contemporary brokers tend to come from elite positions just as 
colonial brokers who worked in positions of clerks, interpreters and other jobs. Contemporary 
brokers have the capital, whether it be education, financial or social, that are essential to working 
as a broker. But perhaps most importantly, today the dichotomy of collaboration and resistance 
has been transformed into an opaque continuum with collaboration and partnership merging 
together and resistance flowing into self-interest. The brokers and processes of brokerage that 
occupy this chapter are not working on behalf of colonial masters but they are helping to facilitate 
the relationships of a powerful investor, namely GNIM, with parties who do not always have the 
same level of power or interest. Power relations are often cloaked in the language of partnership 
which obscures the level of equality between parties. Partnership is a component of brokerage 
because a broker can connect people of equal footing; also the more powerful party in the 
relationship can attempt to focus on the benefits of working to together for both parties, despite 
the skewed power dynamic. Against this analysis of historical and contemporary brokerage I now 
move on to two unique features of GNIM’s brokerage practices: corporate gift-giving and guanxi. 
GNIM’s incorporation of these two components has helped the firm establish, maintain and 
expand its various operations.  
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The Corporate Gift and Guanxi  
The gift has been debated from various perspectives, from what constitutes a gift to the purpose 
and meaning of gifts. An anthropological analysis of the gift rests on social relations and 
reciprocity. The act of giving a gift serves as a signal to the recipient that the giver wants to initiate 
or maintain a social relationship (Sherry 1983: 158; Bowie 2011: 3). This relationship is 
dependent upon reciprocity in some form. Although gift recipients may have differing levels of 
access to capital (education, social, financial) they have the ability to reciprocate in a way that 
benefits the giver. As Laidlaw asserted in his discussion on gifts, “It seemed to Mauss, and has 
seemed to anthropologists since, that a genuinely free gift-one, as we say, with no strings attached-
would play no part in the creation of social relations, for it would create no obligations or 
connections between persons….” (Laidlaw 2000: 617). Corporate gift-giving follows this pattern; 
organizations give gifts with the aim of enacting a social relationship with the recipient, whether 
the recipient is another organization, group or individual.  
 
Recent anthropological research into the corporate gift has focused on interrogating organizations 
corporate giving practices and the language of corporate social responsibility. (Rajak 2011; Rajak, 
Dolan and Garsten 2011; Kirsch 2014). Organizations are moving away from traditional 
philanthropic patterns of gifting as charity and instead utilise the language of partnership and 
empowerment (Dolan and Rajak 2016: 13). I take this analysis further and argue that the 
corporate gift also serves as a form of brokerage. Corporate gifts are reciprocated in some manner 
and include access to resources [people, land, financing, etc.…]. The reciprocal nature of gifts is 
what transforms the corporate gift into a form of brokerage. Corporate gifts serve as way to initiate 
a relationship between the organization and the recipient. The recipient’s reciprocation through 
access to resources, is an acknowledgement of the social relationship.   
 
Despite reciprocity, this form of brokerage is associated with power dynamics which leave the 
recipients subject to undesired interest from the corporation. In Rajak’s research into Anglo 
American’s corporate social responsibility programmes in South Africa she argued that these 
programmes can create a form of moral authority and dependency through familiar forms of 
brokerage (Rajak 2011).  
 
Schools and HIV/AIDs programmes funded by Anglo American demonstrate their corporate largesse 
but also bind recipients to their givers, fostering relations of patronage and clientalism and giving rise 
to new forms of regulation and surveillance. (Rajak 2011 as referenced in Cross 2014a: 126) 
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Gift recipients, in this case employees are open to the firm’s intrusion into their work and home 
lives. Conversely, recipients can also use power dynamics to their advantage. In Cross’s analysis 
of corporate gifts he asserted that corporate gifts can place both parties into distinct categories 
where employees act from a place of “creative action” and “cultivate a sense of themselves as 
active agents in a wage-labour relationship and strive to constitute a field of exchange with those 
who employ them” (Cross 2014a: 140). Cross’s analysis provides new insight into the potential 
agency of gift recipients as does Gardner’s research into Chevron’s relationship with 
neighbouring communities. Gardner found that gift givers and recipients can come to the 
relationship with different understandings of what each party is obligated to do as well as varying 
interpretations of the meanings of gifts. In the case of Chevron, the firm acted from a neo-liberal, 
self-help and empowerment perspective while the community looked to the corporation to serve 
as patrons who could help provide “…modernization and economic growth and all the good 
things that these might bring” in exchange for the “use of local resources” (Gardner 2015: 512).  
Providing corporate gifts can highlight disparities in power between the giver and recipient or 
bring a sense of empowerment to the recipient. Additionally, corporate gift-giving practices can 
be a part of a long term approach to building social relationships. GNIM’s use of gift-giving as a 
form of brokerage is embedded within guanxi; which helps the firm build and maintain 
relationships between itself and others. This multi-layered approach to brokerage is unique to 
GNIM and has not been reflected in previous literature.  
 
Guanxi is an often misunderstood Chinese terminology for gift-giving related to building and 
sustaining social relationships in familial and business settings. In the business realm, two of the 
most common utilisations of guanxi is to form connections amongst businesses and between 
businesses and governments. Guanxi can be used in order to create trust between parties who 
are working together for the first time. According to Park and Luo, the beauty of guanxi is that it 
is a “valuable entrepreneurial tool to bridge gaps in information and resource flows between 
unlinked firms and between firms and important outside stakeholders” (Park and Luo 2001: 
457). Guanxi can be traced back to Confucianism:  
…in Confucian ideology “using” friends for personal gain is lauded as the path to true friendships. In 
this view, genuine relationships are built through transactions that benefit one individual more than 
the other since this type of interaction puts the first person in debt to the second and sets up the 
rationale for further interactions (Nuijten and Anders 2007: 170).  
 
Although the “using” of friends is reciprocal and each party takes turns helping the other, guanxi 
can be used to reaffirm the hierarchy of patron-client relations. Guanxi was transformed both 
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during the introduction of Communism in the 1940’s and during the reform state from the late 
1970’s onwards. Throughout the years, guanxi spread beyond family networks to help actors gain 
greater access to economic security, particularly through employment and business opportunities 
that could be gained by navigating the complex and sometimes adversarial Chinese “legal and 
financial institutions” (Nuijten and Anders 2007: 174). Barbalet described guanxi as a “practice 
of social exchanges, expressed through reciprocal favour seeking and provision of benefit” 
Barbalet 2015: 1039). Kipnis and Yang had similar descriptions of the actions related to guanxi. 
Yang delineated between guanxi and guanxi practices where guanxi are the intangible social ties 
amongst people while guanxi practices are all the things people do in order cultivate these 
relationships (Yang 1994). Kipnis discussed “practices of guanxi production” which includes 
“social actions….by which people created, manipulated, and at times eradicated human 
relationships” such as hosting and attending events; giving and receiving gifts; providing and 
receiving assistance (Kipnis 2002:22).  
 
Two of the essential components to guanxi is reciprocity and repetition. Relationships are created 
to last for an extended period of time during which the relationship is built and maintained 
through the various “practices of guanxi production” (Kipnis 2002:22). The result of these 
practices can include social capital. According to Bourdieu, gift-giving similar to that of guanxi 
which entails continued exchange of gifts, creates a gift debt which in turn creates a form of social 
capital (Smart 1993: 395). Barbalet and Lin both stressed the importance of guanxi’s ability to be 
converted into social capital through reputation. “Also, the benefits of guanxi relations are not 
only substantive in the form of material gifts, official preferment, or some other instrumental 
advantage but also normative and especially reputational” (Lin, 2001, p.157). The reward for the 
giver “of a guanxi favor is enhancement of their public standing as a person of material means 
and moral capacities” (Barbalet 2015: 1040). This social capital extends beyond the immediate 
relationship of the two parties practicing guanxi and enhances their reputations throughout their 
respective social networks.  
 
Guanxi at its best is a set of social practices conducted under the auspices of facilitating a continual 
and mutually beneficial relationship. At its worst guanxi is associated with bribery, nepotism, 
blackmail and other forms of corruption. Luo argued that the boundary between guanxi and 
corruption is shrinking. “As guanxi is progressively intertwined with corruption, its public 
perception is deemed to change from a tradition-embedded culture to a rent-seeking practice 
involving corruption” (Luo 2008: 189). Luo blames what he terms, “a demoralized society” where 
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Confucian values have been replaced with greed, and the accumulation of power is preferred 
over the exchange of reciprocal favours and sustained relationships (Luo 2008: 189). There have 
been attempts to delineate guanxi from forms of bribery and other definitions of corruption. For 
instance, money can be and considered guanxi or bribery. Bribery occurs when one-time 
payments of money are made without context. Money can be considered guanxi in the pursuit 
of continued relations and in the context of an occasion [birthdays, holidays, weddings, funerals, 
etc…] (Solinger 1984; Smart 1993). What is crucial in the categorization of bribery is the lack of 
a purpose or occasion that associates would usually commemorate together. Additionally, the 
lack of reciprocation which aids in creating a long-term relationship indicates bribery. Reciprocity 
and long-term relationship are at the heart of guanxi.  
 
Nuijten and Anders ethnographic research into guanxi and corruption in China found that local 
definitions of guanxi were theoretically couched in terms of warm connections between actors 
while corruption was associated with highly negative connotations. Despite this, the basis for 
whether behaviour is positive (guanxi) or negative (corruption) was not based on one’s behaviour 
but instead on the one’s intent. (Nuijten and Anders 2007: 169). The growing debate over what 
constitutes corruption and guanxi is linked to perceived gains for the parties involved and the 
impact on society. Additionally, business people themselves make distinctions as well. Keister’s 
research into over forty of China’s largest business groups in the early 2000’s found a less positive 
view of utilising guanxi to conduct illegal ventures. Managers spoke of moving away from reliance 
on social ties to circumvent the law. Instead respondents utilised social networks in order to build 
alliances with strong partners. Keister 2002). Additionally, there are distinctions between guanxi 
and corruption when businesses interact with the government. Dunfee and Warren’s research 
into guanxi differentiates corrupt and non-corrupt relationships between companies and 
government. 
 
A very different use of guanxi is to apply it to overriding government rules and regulations. 
It may be the equivalent to coarse public sector bribery where payments are made to 
avoid environmental or safety regulations. Or it may be used to obtain licenses or capital 
controlled by self-interested government bureaucrats. Because of the significant role that 
government plays in the Chinese economy there are many approvals required and the 
opportunities for extortion are great. …One way to avoid extortion or to cope with 
required permissions is to build up guanxi with the relevant officials who will give special 
treatment to certain firms.  
(Dunfee and Warren 2001: 200) 
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Dunfee and Warren’s explanation is similar to that of Chinese business managers who attempt 
to differentiate guanxi. These business managers view guanxi as positive or negative depending 
on the purpose it is used for. To them, guanxi which helps businesses to bypass laws is negative 
while guanxi that helps parties build relationships and provides small favours is positive. This 
research seems to indicate that for many, as long as there is not outright greed and laws are not 
flouted, guanxi is more likely to be accepted.  
 
Similarly to guanxi and gift giving in China, gift giving in the Nigerian context is a part of social 
relations and can serve as a way to make connections and facilitate relationships. Contemporary 
gift-giving draws upon traditional practices and includes giving gifts on a number of occasions. 
These occasions include “…weddings, naming ceremonies,….traditional festivals,…burial 
ceremonies or the conferment of a chieftaincy title or as a demonstration of love and affection” 
(Bello 2014: 289-290). de Sarden describes gift giving in West Africa as balanced with gift givers 
and recipients ranging from… “ ‘superiors , equals or ‘ inferiors’ ” (de Sardan 1999: 39). Another 
overlap between guanxi and Nigerian gift-giving practices, is that there are local delineations 
between corruption and gift-giving. Bello states that various Nigerian ethnic groups employ 
proverbs that emphasize the cultural understandings of the differences between gift-giving and 
corruption (Bello 2014: 286-287). The boundaries between gift giving and corruption can be 
breached when the gift is given by a person in a position of authority in order to gain access for 
themselves and or members of his or her familial and social network to the detriment of others 
or society at large. (de Sardan 1999: 41-44).  
 
Later in this chapter I discuss GNIM’s use of guanxi which includes providing and receiving help; 
hosting an annual Chinese New Year’s party for members of its social network and giving 
corporate gifts to a variety of people within its social network. Due to the firm’s large social 
network, at any given time GNIM is constantly engaging in guanxi and simultaneously giving and 
receiving help. I first discuss brokerage in action, through the example of royal brokerage 
provided for GNIM. Village elites like chiefs and kings interact with an increasingly large number 
of external groups on behalf of their people; in the hope of gaining external resources that can 
lead to economic development.  
 
Royal Brokerage 
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On a mild Saturday afternoon, a group of men gathered in a private dining room at The Eastern 
hotel. (See Chapter 3-The Family Firm for further discussion).  As waiters served various courses, 
the group spent a few hours having lunch and discussing issues amongst themselves. As one of 
the most sumptuous and expensive hotels in Lagos, the GNIM owned property hosts a range of 
upper-middle class and upper class clients including government officials and royalty.  This group 
of dignitaries were obas/ kabiyesis (kings in the Yoruba language) from neighbouring Ogun State; 
the home of a growing number of GNIM enterprises and other Chinese owned businesses. The 
obas play a crucial role in GNIM’s operations because they serve as brokers between their 
communities and GNIM.  
 
Traditional leaders serve as brokers between their people and external groups, including state 
and national governments; NGO’s; community groups and businesses. However, relationships 
between traditional leaders and external groups do not go uncontested, particularly those in the 
political and business realm. One of the biggest issues the public has with traditional leaders is 
when leaders openly support political candidates instead of remaining neutral and simply 
supporting the democratic process. This was most recently evidenced during the 2015 Nigerian 
elections when state and federal candidates made a point of visiting traditional leaders “to receive 
royal blessings and endorsements” (Akinfenwa 2014), in hopes of gaining votes from the subjects 
of traditional leaders (BluePrint 2014). Additionally, politicians have the power to veto traditional 
leadership nominations, which means that politicians can interject themselves into community 
manners and choose leaders who they believe will be easier to work with.  
 
There has also been criticism in the media and in society that some obas have focused on 
accumulating connections and resources for themselves through bribes and shady business deals 
with multinational firms (Allen 2014: 112; Manby 1999: 107). In order to maintain a more 
transparent atmosphere, many states have created Ministries for Local and Chieftaincy Affairs 
(MLCAs). MLCAs are mandated to conduct local government activities in adherence with 
federal law in an open and accountably manner. Despite these concerns, traditional leadership 
still plays a major role in the lives of many Nigerians. According to Agbese, “These institutions 
[traditional political insitutions/rulership elicit greater confidence and legitimacy in the eyes of 
many Nigerians than the institutions of the modern Nigerian state” (Agbese 2004). As such 
external actors realise the importance of creating relationships with traditional leaders. GNIM 
utilises the brokerage of a group of obas, from The Ijebu Kingdom in Ogun State. 
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The Ijebu Kingdom is one of Nigeria’s various kingdoms. The kingdom has a number of obas 
who rule over specific areas within the kingdom. These obas are overseen by a paramount oba 
who is the leader of the entire Ijebu Kingdom. One of Ijebu’s obas is His Royal Highness 
Tajudeen Oduwole. Like a large number of traditional leaders, Oba Oduwole had a senior level 
professional career before becoming a king. Oduwole attended the University of Lagos for 
undergraduate studies and completed postgraduate studies in the United States. For years 
Oduwole worked as an engineer throughout Nigeria as an employee of the state’s former power 
company, National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). His work also took him abroad including 
time in France. Oduwole rose high within the ranks of NEPA before retiring.  
 
The oba’s title is hereditary and has been in his family for decades. His father held the title as 
did his uncle. According to practice, the oba’s family chooses successors to the crown. The oba 
was chosen and the family notified the government of their choice. After the government agreed, 
Oduwole was crowned in May 2001. The family has chosen one of the oba’s sons has his 
successor. It is more than likely that the oba’s son will continue in his father’s footprints in 
conducting brokering between his community and GNIM.   
 
Over thirty towns and villages are within Oduwole’s kingdom. His work as a king revolves around 
ruling his people which means mediating disputes between community members; liaising 
between the government and his people; and liaising between companies and his people. During 
a visit to his palace, the oba took a break from hours spent receiving subjects who sought his aid 
in solving various issues. He explained that one of his primary goals is to improve the economic 
and social lives of his subjects. In order to accomplish this, Oduwole meets with firms that are 
interested in coming to Ijebu lands to conduct business. Usually, these firms seek Oduwole out.  
When GNIM came to Ijebu lands in the 1990’s it was the firm that sought out the previous oba, 
Oduwole’s uncle. The firm negotiated with the then oba for permission to operate in Ijebu 
realms and to purchase land. The land was freehold land which GNIM purchased from the 
king’s domain and the firm owns the land “for life”. As the next ruler in line, Oduwole met with 
GNIM officials for the first time in 1999.  
 
Oduwole described his work with GNIM as “in the capacity [of] a traditional ruler with the intent 
of having them [these firms] work with my community”. This work primarily focused on creating 
employment opportunities for his people. Oduwole also granted access to community lands to 
GNIM and other firms. Firms either bought free-hold land or owned it jointly with the 
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community; usually with 60% going to the Chinese partner. The majority of ownership goes to 
Chinese firms due to their investment in equipment. As recently as 2014 and 2015, GNIM 
purchased new freehold land from the oba’s realm for the purpose of farming. The oba’s chief 
role during land sales is to negotiate a fair deal for the community. GNIM representatives, the 
oba and one of his chiefs attend negotiations. Citizens are not present but the chief serves a 
witness for the community. According to Oduwole, he tells his people “…that GNIM is 
purchasing the land and this is how much we have agreed [upon]…. And a chief is present at 
signing”. The land sale is announced to the public and the king is responsible for accounting for 
how the money is spent. Although the public is not present, Oduwole stressed his use of 
transparency by having the chief present as a witness and publically sharing information with 
community. Oduwole understood the faith his people placed in him and as such focused on 
being transparent and used this focus to further legitimise his role as king. From GNIM’s 
perspective, working with a trusted leader is the easiest way to enter a community. But just as the 
firm provided infrastructure development for the community neighbouring the Sagamu 
complex), GNIM also provides services for the oba’s community. (See Chapter 3-The Family 
Firm and the GNIM-Out & About section in this chapter for a discussion on Sagamu.) 
The oba worked with various Chinese firms but he enjoyed a close relationship with the second 
generation directors of GNIM. From late 1999 onwards, GNIM paid a yearly tribute to the king 
in the formof ₦50,000 [£200] in addition to electronics such as air conditioners and refrigerators. 
Under the framework of guanxi and gift-giving as well as traditional Ijebu laws, these tribute and 
electronic goods are small tokens that serve to facilitate a larger goal and a long-standing 
relationship. The tribute is a fairly nominal amount even when compared with monthly salaries 
the average GNIM employee receives which is upwards of ₦100,000. Furthermore, before 
becoming a king, the oba worked as an engineer and executive netted him a far higher salary than 
what he receives in tributes from GNIM. I argue that the fact that the tribute is paid is more 
significant than the nominal monetary figure and electronic gifts.  
 
Another particularly instructive point is that early on in his reign, the king visited GNIM’s wood 
factory, located within his domain, to pick up the tribute. In more recent years as the relationship 
between him and the second generation of GNIM developed, Stephen-a member of the second 
generation of GNIM directors- began to visit the oba’s palace to present him with the tribute. 
The oba has become a part of GNIM’s close social network and his importance is demonstrated 
by the visit of a director to personally deliver the tribute. The oba has also received invitations to 
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GNIM social events including the wedding of a third-generation GNIM family member in China. 
The oba accepted these invitations and spoke fondly of his two visits to China.  
 
Ogun State hosts a number of Chinese firms including a pharmaceutical firm; GNIM’s wood 
factory and Sagamu complex and wood factory as well as the Ogun Free Trade Zone. According 
to Oba Oduwole, Ogun State welcomed Chinese firms because “they help feed” people. 
Representatives from these firms were regularly invited to participate in the annual Ojude Oba 
festival. All of the domains within Ijebu join up and the region has one of the largest festivals in 
West Africa, the Ojude Oba. The festival, which is estimated to have been held for over two 
centuries, celebrates the Ijebu kingdom and the paramount oba-who is the king of the entire 
region. Ojude Oba is a mixture of a reunion, cultural celebration; and royal homage. In 2015, 
the festival had over 50,000 attendees who came from across the world and included the 
paramount oba; all of the region’s obas: dignitaries from both the private and public sector; 
community members; Nigerians from across the country and Ijebu expatriates who specifically 
returned for the occasion.   
 
The prestige attached to the Ojude Oba has attracted a number corporate sponsors from a variety 
of sectors including: beverage; telecommunications, banking, construction, government and 
manufacturing. GNIM is one of the festival’s sponsors. Oduwole explained that “they [GNIM] 
don’t give us money, but they give us something in kind-something for the community”. “We 
always remember it’s GNIM that did this”. The firm has provided a range of goods and services 
for Oduwole’s people, including health care; road tarring; and scholarships for primary and 
university students. In his role as a broker, Oduwole’s communicates the needs of the community 
to GNIM and the firm provides gifts for the community with little fanfare. As the oba put it, “All 
these things I’m telling you they will not tell you as a visitor” or even promote throughout the 
community. Instead Oduwole informs community members who in turn spread the information 
throughout the area. GNIM’s seeks to continue a relationship with the community and 
demonstrates its intent through these gifts. The community reciprocates via the oba by selling its 
natural resources-land. GNIM’s guanxi does not stop at services, it also employs local residents. 
 
The oba pursued employment and economic development for his subjects through brokerage 
between Chinese firms like GNIM and the community. In contemporary brokerage, companies 
are increasingly taking on the role of international development organizations. Therefore, instead 
of intermediating between NGOs and the community, the oba brokers between the community 
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and companies. (Knierzinger 2011). His image as a good leader is strengthened every time he is 
able to create an opportunity for economic and social development. Hence, an integral part of 
the brokerage between the oba and Chinese firms like GNIM, is that they provide jobs to 
community members. Whenever there are job openings at GNIM subsidiaries in the area, 
GNIM informs Oduwole and other local obas first. The oba stressed that GNIM looks for 
qualified employees above anything else, including affiliation with the Ijebu region. Therefore, 
the employees at GNIM’s Ijebu sites were a mixture of employees from inside and outside of 
the region.  
 
The firm has provided jobs for Ijebu residents throughout its various locations but Oduwole 
noted that only a few Chinese firms hired Nigerians in high level positions. He lamented that 
most firms wouldn’t “even teach skilled Nigerians to use machines”. To illustrate his point, the 
oba recounted the story of a local Ijebu man who attempted to work with a Chinese 
pharmaceutical firm. The man had recently returned to Nigeria from China and was fluent in 
Chinese. He expressed interest in working at the organization but the local office called its 
headquarters and rejected any further application. From the Nigerian perspective the repatriate 
was a perfect candidate because he was a local man who understood Chinese culture.  Rumours 
soon circulated that the company didn’t hire him because they feared he would sell company 
secrets to Nigerians. This story is reminiscent to those I heard from upper management at 
GNIM. There is a rampant fear among Chinese firms and other expatriate communities that 
Nigerians are corrupt and cautionary tales of Nigerian corruption circulate throughout society 
(Smith 2007). There is a perception that “even one’s most trusted employee could not really be 
trusted” (Smith 2007: 92).  Oba Oduwole worked towards developing and maintaining 
relationships with Chinese management in order to improve his people’s economic 
opportunities, including the chance to work within GNIM. But how this permeated down to the 
upward mobility of his people remained to be seen. 
 
GNIM-Out & About 
Similarly, to businesses operating in China, GNIM’s utilisation of brokerage like guanxi is also 
used to reduce the amount of bureaucracy involved in conducting business in Nigeria. The firm 
was able to secure the land for the Sagamu complex through government connections, starting 
from the head of Nigeria itself, former President Obasanjo. Many firms both domestic and 
international do not have these forms of connections to draw upon.  This help filtered down to 
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local government who allowed the firm to purchase land at a discounted rate. While another 
Chinese firm had its land repossessed, GNIM faced no such issue due to its social connections. 
What has GNIM done to build a relationship with officials? Apart from a short mention of 
“brown envelope” full of money being passed from GNIM officials to government official, as 
Matti briefly mentioned in a discussion on the necessity of meetings with government officials, 
GNIM officials did not speak about payment or financial gifts. This is where the question of 
bribery and corruption enters the picture. The unifying definition of guanxi allows for gifts 
whether they be financial or otherwise, if they are given in pursuit of long-term and reciprocal 
relationships. If these brown envelopes of money are being given as a part of a long-standing 
reciprocal relationship, then under the rules of guanxi, this behaviour could be viewed as 
acceptable. But if these envelopes were given in order to bypass laws and as one-time gifts this 
would be considered as negative guanxi (corruption) as discussed in the analysis of guanxi.  
 
Nigeria has national corruption laws and the nation is subject to a number of international anti-
corruption laws including the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions and the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. Under Nigeria’s Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000, 
government officials cannot accept gifts of any kind for doing their jobs but they “are allowed to 
accept personal gifts or benefits from relatives or personal friends to such extend and on such 
occasions are as recognised by custom” (FCPA Blog 2013). Therefore whether gifts such an 
envelopes full of money are illegal, depends upon the recipient, the purpose and amount. I will 
analyse corruption and its links to brokerage later in the chapter. 
 
GNIM’s annual Chinese new year party described in the previous chapter, is the highlight of a 
corporate calendar filled with events geared at nurturing and celebrating the firms “friends”. The 
party brings together various members of the firm’s social network and serves as a venue for the 
firm to show its largesse which was partially built with the help of the guests. The party has 
similarities to potlaches. 
 
These ceremonies had the duel function of redistributing goods and creating prestige for 
the donor group…..They were also occasions when groups and sub-group renegotiated 
or reaffirmed their status through the act of presentation. (Bowie 2011: 6-7) 
 
GNIM’s presentation of copious amounts of food and gifts not only demonstrates the firm’s 
gratitude and reciprocity for deeds done by members of its social network but it also creates 
113 | P a g e  
 
future obligations for guests to pay the firm back through future help; and thus the circle of 
reciprocity continues. As discussed in chapter three, the gift of the party helps to build guanxi 
between GNIM and its social network. GNIM is able to call upon help as needed. This help can 
include access to land, machinery and more; thus the firm is able to convert its social capital into 
other forms of capital. For example, the firm has collaborated with its German associates in 
purchasing German made equipment for its operations. German associates were able to help 
steer the firm towards quality materials and to navigate the German business market.   
 
GNIM’s work as a broker relies upon the firm’s command of numerous resources. As such the 
firm’s brokerage work is embedded in their broader business activities. For example, GNIM 
serves as leader and figurative home away from home for different segments of the Chinese 
community in Lagos. A number of Lagosian Chinese community events have been held at 
GNIM’s Eastern hotel. Other Chinese firms also use the hotel to host their business events. (See 
Chapter 2- Selling the Chinese Dream to the Nation: Public Discourse and Narratives in Action) 
The firm also acts as a patron to the Chinese government in Nigeria by importing Chinese rice 
and other perishable goods on the consulate’s behalf.  The reciprocal nature of GNIM’s 
relationships with the Chinese community and government are implicit and can span decades. 
Helping fellow Chinese expatriates bolsters GNIM’s standing in the community and the firm is 
able to obtain assistance as needed. For example, GNIM helps members within the firm’s trusted 
network apply for visas. The Chinese consulate helps GNIM by accepting these applications and 
fast-tracking them based on the friendly relationship the consulate and GNIM have developed. 
In turn, when GNIM helps members of its trusted network to apply for visas, GNIM strengthens 
its ties with these network members.  
 
When GNIM’s associates apply for visas, the firm vouches for their reputations and submits the 
applications to the Chinese consulate on their associates’ behalves. This is similar to the services 
provided by Nigerian Friendship Association (NFA) and Nigeria-China Business Council 
(NCBA) but unlike those organisations GNIM does not require a direct membership (See 
Chapter Five-The Entrepreneurial Spirit). Although Barbalet argued that guanxi is 
“nontransitive” I assert that one can use personal guanxi to help another person and in turn build 
more guanxi (Barbalet 2015: 1045). GNIM does this when helping members within its trusted 
social network acquire Chinese visas. As Matti explained, “if we say we know you, that helps” 
with visa applications. The firm is very wary of extending this connection, and only does so with 
people they have an established relationship with. In this scenario, GNIM is simultaneously 
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taping into a cache of guanxi with Chinese officials in Nigeria and building up a cache with the 
member of its network such as a supplier or business contact who seeks help with a Chinese visa. 
In order to become a member of GNIM’s trusted social network, guanxi of some form takes 
place. In the next chapter on Nigerian entrepreneurship, I discuss the issues of visas not as a 
straightforward and mundane administrative process but as a process fundamental to potentiality 
or impossibility of entrepreneurial opportunity with China. Here in its role as a broker we see 
GNIM also playing a key part in mediating the flow of visas to potential beneficiaries and clients. 
This demonstrates that what we often assumed to be purely technical administrative processes 
are part of patron-client relations.   
 
The firm’s brokerage also extends to non-government and business parties. Due to an ethos of 
humility, GNIM does not publicly discuss its community programmes let alone refer to them as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) but there is a concerted effort from the firm to do things 
that benefit the community. I argue that although these programmes have strong CSR 
components they should be seen as a key dimension of the corporate gift and therefore a form 
of brokerage with the community. In Welker’s research into corporate security and community 
relations in Indonesia she found that organisations focused on creating strong relationships with 
communities in order to maintain safety for its operations. (Welker 2009). By gaining community 
support, a corporation is ensured that the community will not interfere with success of its 
operations. 
 
As discussed in chapter three, GNIM’s attempts to garner community support for its logging 
operations in Cross Rivers State were unsuccessful. GNIM appeared to have learned from this 
incident and engaged with its Sagamu neighbours early into the project. The Sagamu industrial 
complex is surrounded by neighbouring residential developments whose residential 
organisations negotiated with GNIM to provide drainage and other infrastructure for the area. 
The firm considers such projects to be a form of community relations. GNIM is not legally 
required to help neighbours but does so in order to have smoother operations and to work with 
the community. Although the firm did not need the permission of its neighbours to build the 
complex, the firm wanted some level of approval or at least, minimal conflict with neighbours. 
Therefore, the corporate gift was moderated between GNIM and the beneficiaries. The 
infrastructure development helped ease the firm’s path into the Sagamu area with little 
opposition. And yet, GNIM could have entered the neighbourhood with or without the consent 
of the neighbours particularly since it had the support of national and local government officials.  
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Nonetheless the Cross Rivers state experience taught the firm to engage with neighbours early 
and to also operate in a manner that would receive little complaints from neighbours. The gift 
creates varying strands of power dynamics between GNIM and its neighbours. Similarly to 
Cross’s assertion that the recipients can “compel” givers to provide a gift, GNIM’s neighbours 
were able to prompt GNIM to improve their neighbourhood (Cross 2014a: 140). The 
neighbours exercised a level of power by seeking a relationship with GNIM. They leveraged 
GNIM’s need to have a peaceful relationship with its neighbours to receive the gift of 
infrastructure. This gift helped broker a peaceful existence between the neighbourhood and 
GNIM. The organisation’s brokerage centres on creating relationships whether they be with 
government officials; business associates; community members or community leaders. As Alhaji, 
the only Nigerian/non-blood relative director of GNIM stated: 
Psychologically speaking [you] lay your cards on the table and tell people what are really your 
problems. And along the way people we come across, people who become our friend for eternity. As 
a result, if we are looking for anything we do not struggle. 
 
GNIM’s goal is to have longstanding friendships in place that will serve to the firm’s benefit. 
These relationships are consistently renewed through brokerage. 
 
Conclusion-Unravelling Brokerage and Corruption    
   
There is a continuum rather than a gulf between bribing someone and thanking someone for services 
rendered. Between obtaining a favour from a friend in the civil service, which favour will be ‘ returned’ 
later on, and slipping a bank note in return for the same favour to a civil servant whom one does not 
know, there is only a difference of form, be it monetary or not, in the exchange. (de Sardan 1999: 
35) 
 
This chapter has explained how a Chinese firm, GNIM, navigates the Nigerian marketplace 
through the use of brokerage. I also highlighted examples of Nigerians who benefit from 
associating with Chinese big business, the king and members of communities that surround 
GNIM operations. The firm’s brokerage includes corporate gift-giving and guanxi and it extends 
to the members of its wide-ranging social network. Underlying this discussion on brokerage is 
the shadow of corruption. Brokerage is often intertwined with corruption because there is a 
perception that brokerage can help to create an atmosphere that is “conducive to” corruption 
(Blundo and de Sardan 2006). Corruption has multiple definitions that include: embezzlement; 
fraud; extortion; abuse of discretion; nepotism; patronage; diversion of public funds for private 
gain and use of corporate funds to bribe public or private official (Sowunmi et al 2010; OECD 
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2013; Kumar and Landy 2009; Transparency International 2015). Eicher cautions against 
confusing corruption with legality; meaning that what is deemed as corrupt in some places is not 
necessarily illegal. “Until recently, it was legal in many countries to use foreign-paid bribes as tax 
deductions. It was legal, but it was arguably unethical and corrupt. Paying a bribe was a crime 
only insomuch if it violated a law in the country in question” (Eicher 2012: 2).  
 
In public political discourse, Nigeria is perceived as facing rampant levels of corruption 
throughout its society. The UK’s former Prime Minister David Cameron’s was caught on video 
referring to Nigeria as “fantastically corrupt” (BBC 2016). Nigeria has been viewed as one of the 
world’s most corrupt nations, with a ranking of 136th out of 167 countries on Transparency 
International’s index of corruption efforts; improving by eight places compared to 2013 score of 
144
th
 (Transparency International 2014; Alade 2013). A 2012 World Bank report estimated that 
“80% of Nigerian businesses offer [ed] bribes to government officials” while more recently the 
Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Nigeria found that 80% of Nigerian 
“corruption-related issues” could be traced back to the oil and gas industry (Ogunde 2012; 
Business News Staff 2015).  
 
Anthropologists have called for research to expand beyond commonplace definitions and delve 
into the lived experiences of those who are impacted by corruption both negatively and positively 
(Harrison 2010; de Sardan 1999; 2005). Harrison argued that the well-established definitions of 
corruption imply "a firm dichotomy between the public/impersonal and the private/personal 
spheres, and the importance of keeping the two separate” (Harrison 2010: 259). Nowhere is this 
more evident than in GNIM where brokerage through festivals, gifts, hosting, parties and more 
are all integral to quotidian aspects of the firm’s operations. These events entwine the public and 
private and enfold members of GNIM’s social network into a kinship circle that interacts in order 
to strengthen and expand GNIM’s operations. The ways corruption takes place in daily life 
highlights the fluidity between both personal and private domains and between privately owned 
corporations and governments.  
 
de Sardan analyses corruption through the framework of the ‘corruption complex’ which 
stretches “beyond corruption in the strict sense of the word, to include nepotism, abuse of power, 
embezzlement and various forms of misappropriation, influence-peddling, prevarication, insider 
trading and abuse of the public purse…” (de Sardan 1999: 27). This definition hints at the fluidity 
of brokerage and corruption and allows for nuanced explorations. In their research into 
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entrepreneurial forms of corruption, Lauchs and Staines argue that brokers are instrumental in 
furthering, negative and positive activity.  
Brokerage is a desirable position in a network as it allows the broker to administer the 
information flow between groups as an ‘opinion leader’. The broker can restrict the flow 
of information to pursue his own advantage…Very importantly in dark networks, the 
broker is able to communicate reputations. (Lauchs and Staines 2012: 113) 
 
This line of argument centres on the role of brokers as integral components in the establishment 
of social relationships. Brokers own self-interests are also a part of the equation. Forms of 
brokerage like clientalism and patronage have been criticised for having higher potentials of 
corruption due to the focus on favouritism. Here I return to two of the questions I sought to 
answer in this chapter: What role do Nigerians play in GNIM’s complex deployment of 
brokerage practices? Which Nigerians benefit from GNIM’s brokerage practices? As I showed 
through the ethnographic discussion of brokerage, leaders like Oba Oduwole serve as brokers 
for GNIM by providing access to land. In turn GNIM provides gifts to for the community and 
some individuals attain jobs at GNIM subsidiaries while others receive scholarships. The oba’s 
brokerage and continued relationship with GNIM’s senior management, reaffirms his role as a 
leader. When the oba negotiates deals with the firm and notifies his people of the gifts GNIM 
has provided the community, the oba demonstrates his worth to the community. This is an 
element of self-interest; in order to maintain his people’s support he must be perceived as a good 
leader who brings economic development to his community. Therefore the oba benefits from 
GNIM’s brokerage practices as do some of his people. As I discussed in chapter three and in 
this chapter, opportunities for Nigerians to work in senior level positions at GNIM are quite 
limited. Consequently the benefits of GNIM’s brokerage practices for Nigerians are also limited. 
  
These last two chapters have discussed big business, the first pillar of the Nigerian government’s 
attempt to shape public discourse and create compelling narratives that positively portray 
Nigerian-Chinese relations. I have explored how Nigerians benefit from aligning themselves with 
GNIM. These chapters also analysed GNIM’s use of kinship, ceremony, performance, ritual 
and brokerage in its quest to maintain and expand its operations in Nigerian. The next chapter 
continues exploring the Nigerian government’s grand narrative through a discussion of 
entrepreneurship and how the promise of business trickles down from the corporate level to 
individuals to animate the ambitions of aspiring entrepreneurs.  
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Chapter V-Doing Business with China: The Entrepreneurial 
Spirit of Nigeria 
Entrepreneurship means Africans no longer have to find a job or be trained to be employees. Instead, it will 
enable our young people to create their own jobs, become employers, and take charge of their futures, instead 
of letting the future happen to them.  
(Tony O. Elumelu 2016, African’s #31st Richest Man  
and Founder of the Tony Elumelu Entrepreneurship Programme) 
 
Young people eagerly awaited a call from the stage to receive certificates verifying their 
admittance into a professional business organization. They had recently completed the National 
Youth Service Corps (NYSC) and while in service they were given the opportunity to take 
examinations for professional organizations. With a few exceptions based on age, all Nigerian 
university graduates are mandated to enrol in the NYSC programme for a year and work for the 
country in a variety of industries. Upon completing the programme graduates are allowed to join 
the Nigerian workforce. One of the objectives of the programme is “that employers are induced 
partly through their experience with members of the service corps to employ more readily and 
on a permanent basis, qualified Nigerians, irrespective of their States of origin”. (NYSC 2013). 
While many graduates looked forward to future employment with organizations they worked for 
during their NYSC terms, the keynote speaker introduced the idea of an alternative future: 
working for themselves as entrepreneurs.  
 
Although this appeared to contradict the final objective of the NYSC programme, that firms who 
utilised NYSC workers should employ them after the programme ended, the speakers point 
reflected two key issues: Nigeria’s unemployment rate and the historical role of entrepreneurship 
in Nigerian society. The estimated rate of country-wide unemployment in Nigeria is 23.9%, but 
the rate for young people is much higher. Youth unemployment is estimated to range between 
50-80% (Adekunle 2013; Gaskia 2014). The Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics estimates 
youth unemployment to be just over 50%, while the Central Bank of Nigeria estimates it at 80%.  
When young people enter the job market they are faced with a high level of competition and 
without connections (or luck) they usually join the ranks of the unemployed. By starting their 
own businesses young people are led to believe that they can avoid this fate. Even before 
graduation, students are not unfamiliar with student enterprises. On the campuses of universities 
across Nigeria, students earn extra money by running small businesses: selling clothes to their 
peers; doing hair; selling cell phone credit; cooking for events and more. Entrepreneurship is 
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lauded not just as a defining feature of the national spirit of industry, but as part of Nigeria’s 
cultural values and seen as the cornerstone of growth and development. 
 
Indeed, entrepreneurship is held out as a key component of Nigeria’s economic rise and power 
as a MINT
7
 country. Entrepreneurship in Nigeria has been promoted for years and it is estimated 
that at some point over 67% of the population has thought of starting his or her own business. 
(Naudé 2011; Rocah 2004). According to the entrepreneurial dream, entrepreneurship can not 
only help the individual (like the young people at the NYSC ceremony), but society at large. With 
growing connections between China and Nigeria, Nigerian entrepreneurs are increasingly looking 
to China as the catalyst for their entrepreneurial ambitions as they seek to forge relationships 
between themselves and Chinese counterparts in order to develop and expand their businesses. 
Entrepreneurship is highlighted as the second pillar in the national narrative of partnership with 
China.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2- Selling the Chinese Dream to the Nation: Public Discourse and 
Narratives in Action, entrepreneurs are sold the dream of Nigerian-Chinese exchanges through 
partnerships with Chinese associates. The Nigerian government creates MOUs that allow for 
Chinese businesses to enter the Nigerian marketplace and these MOUs include mandates for 
Chinese firms to partner with Nigerian entrepreneurs (FRN 2014; Nabine 2009). Additionally, 
Nigerian entrepreneurs are encouraged to take advantage of China’s growing dominance in 
Nigerian and across the world. What role do entrepreneurs play in Nigeria’s economic 
development? What initiatives does the Nigerian government offer to help stimulate 
entrepreneurship? How do Nigerian entrepreneurs establish and maintain relationships with 
Chinese counterparts? What are the benefits and challenges for Nigerian entrepreneurs who 
conduct business with Chinese counterparts? Which entrepreneurs are able to convert the grand 
narrative of partnership with China into reality? 
 
This chapter traces the inspirations/ambitions, successes and challenges of a range of Nigerian 
entrepreneurs seeking to make good on the promise of doing business with China. These actors 
operate businesses in a variety of industries and represent a range of business sizes. Their stories 
illuminate the dynamics, hopes/expectations, possibilities, contradictions and setbacks that are 
associated with the entrepreneurial promise of conducting business with China. I argue that the 
                                                             
7 MINT [Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey] is a group of countries that are predicted to be the latest 
“emerging economic giants” (BBC 2014).   
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entrepreneurs most able to conduct business with China do so by building and drawing upon 
various forms of capital (critical social networks; financial and educational capital; patronage and 
familial relations). In turn these entrepreneurs use this capital to access the Chinese marketplace 
primarily to purchase goods and services that cater to Nigeria’s burgeoning middle class. 
Entrepreneurs are multi-focused, they must pay attention to the day to day operations of their 
businesses while meeting the needs of customers and managing relationships with business 
associates. I begin the chapter by exploring the significance and evolving conceptions of 
entrepreneurship within Nigeria from a historical and contemporary perspective. This is followed 
by an ethnographic exploration of the experiences of Nigerians who conduct business with 
Chinese counterparts. These experiences are presented through an introduction to their 
businesses and discussions of the various issues they face as a group, which includes bureaucratic 
challenges and management of social relations between themselves and Chinese counterparts.  
 
A Nation Full of Entrepreneurs 
Definitions of Entrepreneurship 
I rap and sing, got my short film, graphic artist, agriculturist, limitless gee…this goal getter needs more 
cheddah…….. Invest in your dreams keep up the grind you gon’ shine later. 
"Hustle Over Feelings” by Feko (2015) 
 
Images of Nigerian entrepreneurship are showcased throughout the country, on television; in 
newspapers and books; songs and daily conversation. As a recent song by Nigerian hip-hop artist 
Feko attests, entrepreneurship is a hustle full of numerous ventures which requires dedication 
and the delay of gratification. In 2004, “97% of all business in Lagos State used the umbrella 
‘small business’. The micro and small enterprises sector provides, on average, 50% of Nigeria’s 
employment and 50% of its industrial output” (Osotimehin et al 2012: 179).  In a 2010 country 
wide survey, the National Bureau of Statistics and the Small & Medium Enterprises Development 
Agency of Nigeria found that Nigeria had 17,261,753 micro enterprises; 21,264 small enterprises 
and 1,654 medium enterprises (NBE & SMEDAN 2010: 107). While the majority of Nigerian 
firms are small scale and informal, there is a government push to help businesses develop into 
formal enterprises.   
Entrepreneurship remains the main vehicle of facilitating the “graduation” of informal sector ventures 
with realistic business prospects to better-established and better-endowed enterprises as well as the 
principal means of promoting economic diversification, export to niche markets, future growth, and 
higher living standards. (Luke 1995: 149) 
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Converting an enterprise from the informal sector to the formal sector can be challenging for a 
variety of reasons, including lack of access to financial, educational and social capital needed to 
grow and navigate the increased levels of bureaucracy required to become a part of the formal 
sector. The entrepreneurs discussed within this chapter, are within the lauded small-medium 
enterprises (SME) category. Businesses within this category have assets, excluding land and 
buildings, ranging from ₦5 to ₦200million [£12,000-£1.2million] and hire up to 199 employees 
(Tom et al 2016). The economic benefits of SMEs are praised for increasing employment 
through enterprises that rely upon “labour intensive technologies” and for their role in helping 
to achieve “wider economic and socio-economic objectives, including poverty alleviation” (Cook 
and Nixon 2000).  
 
Definitions of entrepreneurship vary from ‘starting and running informal or micro enterprises’ 
to ‘starting and running a business entrepreneurially (i.e. innovatively, independently, committed, 
seeking growth, adopting strategic business practices)’ (Olomi 2009: 3). Generally entrepreneurs 
are described as embodying a variety of characteristics including motivation, grit, competitive 
spirit, calculation, discipline and a high level of busy savvy. Garba argued that categorizing all 
entrepreneurship as positive can be dangerous and that “the existence of entrepreneurs is not a 
guarantee that everyone is acting productively to advance economic growth” (Garba 2012:167). 
Negative entrepreneurial ventures can bring wealth to the entrepreneur and employees but have 
ill effects on society through subversion of the law. It is suggested that in more politically unstable 
environments, negative entrepreneurial ventures can thrive due to the lack of enforcement of 
laws and potential collusion from government officials. In the context of Nigeria, this 
ethnographic study of entrepreneurship challenges Garba’s argument. Distinct categories of 
positive and negative are displaced by complex and more nuanced categories that suggest that 
the boundaries between negative and positive; informal and formal; illicit and licit are more fluid 
and negotiable than proposed.   
 
Nigeria’s history of entrepreneurship dates back to pre-colonial times. (Hashim and Meagher 
1999; Rotimi and Ogen 2008). “On the eve of independence in 1960, officials estimated that 
there were already more than one and a quarter million [Nigerian owned] enterprises in Nigeria, 
which some social scientists believed was an understatement” (Schatz 1979: 78). Official 
government intervention into business ventures was rare until the late 1950’s when the first 
business incubator was established in Lagos state. Business incubators were created for business 
people to utilize for up to five years in the hopes of promoting “indigenous entrepreneurship by 
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providing entrepreneurs with a superior base of operation in fully built up factory buildings with 
the supporting infrastructural facilities as well as technical/management support services” 
(Adegbite 2001: 160). The majority of the businesses participating in this scheme were not 
successful in the transition from incubator status to independent entrepreneurship. Adegbite 
attributes part of this this failure to poor support and management from the government. 
(Adegbite 2001).  
 
After the Biafran War (1968-1970) the Nigerian government became increasingly involved in 
developing entrepreneurship (Thaddeus 2012: 32). In 1972 the Nigerian government created 
the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree which is colloquially known as the ‘indigenization 
decree’. It was further modified in 1977 and in 1989. (See Chapter 3-The Family Firm for a 
discussion on this decree from the perspective of foreign firms like GNIM.)  The decree’s aim 
was to increase Nigerian business ownership and participation in the business sector which would 
in turn place Nigerians in the economic driver’s seat as opposed to the economy being driven by 
external forces. As Jarmon described it: 
 
With respect to commerce and industry, it is designed to provide Nigerians with opportunities for 
major participation in many fields, such as administration, banking, manufacturing and construction. 
But Nigeria lacks trained manpower and is forced to rely too heavily upon outside experts. 
(Jarmon1988: 37) 
 
Weaknesses of the decree included the fact that it enriched a small percentage of the Nigerian 
population, namely elites, who were in financial or social positions took take advantage of new 
opportunities. The decree also did not include provisions for training entrepreneurs in areas 
where they faced challenges: marketing; technology and organization (Schatz 1979: 81-84). 
Despite the indigenization decree, entrepreneurial ventures stalled due to a lack of resources and 
training. Nigeria’s indigenous decree insured that Nigerian interests were served on some level, 
although these interest were generally limited to Nigerian elites and did little solve larger 
economic issues like reducing poverty. 
 
Research on Ghana’s entrepreneurial class development found that, in order to alleviate poverty, 
from the mid-1980s onwards, governments and donor agencies refocused previous policies and 
invested in small entrepreneurial ventures (Arthur 2005: 428). Nigeria also experienced a similar 
approach. After mandating that Nigeria participate in structural adjustment programmes, the very 
same donors directed their efforts towards stimulating the Nigerian economy through 
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investments into small entrepreneurial ventures. (Thaddeus 2012: 32). By the mid-1990’s, James 
Wolfensohn, then head of the World Bank, began to laud the use of entrepreneurship, which 
he credited with helping millions of people…. “work their way out of poverty with dignity” (Dolan 
and Scott 2009: 205). Additionally, micro-credit programmes were increasingly praised as market 
based tools that help lift women and their families out of poverty (Dolan and Scott 2009: 205). 
Entrepreneurial development focused on SMEs due to the perceived benefits that SMEs have 
on a country’s economy. “SMEs represent a veritable vehicle for the achievement of national 
economic objectives of employment generation and poverty reduction at low investment cost as 
well as the development of entrepreneurial capabilities including indigenous technology” (Ogbo 
and Nwachukwu 2012: 95).  
 
In Nigeria, specific bodies such as the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), National 
Open Apprenticeship Scheme (NOAS) and the Small and Medium Enterprise Development 
Association of Nigeria (SMEDAN) focused on helping entrepreneurs establish businesses (Ogbo 
and Nwachukwu 2012: 95). The NDE provided training through the organization’s 
Entrepreneurship Development Programme (EDPs). EDPs were “designed to expose 
participants to the rudiments of modern business management techniques, as well as motivating 
their latent entrepreneurial talents” (Ogechukwu and Latinwo 2010: 57). In order to receive 
financial assistance participants were mandated to attend EDPs. For example, the Graduate Job 
Creation Loan Scheme provided participants who attended EDPs with loans of “up to ₦35,000 
[£130] repayable over [a] 5 year(s) period with one year moratorium” (Ogechukwu and Latinwo 
2010: 57). While a great deal of focus was placed on young people, there were programmes for 
older citizens such as the “Mature Peoples Scheme” that helped retired and redundant workers 
start new businesses (Ogechukwu and Latinwo 2010: 57). 
 
In the 21
st
 century the ideal of entrepreneurship became further entrenched in Nigerian society 
with the introduction of new training programmes and the inclusion of entrepreneurship studies 
into the country’s higher education curriculum. An example of this, is The Centre for 
Entrepreneurship Development (CED). The CED has a mandate to teach “students of higher 
institutions (especially in science, engineering and technological (SET)) to acquire 
entrepreneurial, innovative, and management skills” so that they “create job opportunities for 
others and….generate wealth” upon graduation (Thaddeus 2012: 32). In 2011, former President 
Jonathan created YouWin, another entrepreneurship programme aimed at young people. The 
programme proved to be quite successful with 24,000 applicants in the first year and 65,000 
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applicants by 2013. Each year 1,200 grants are given and they range from ₦1 to ₦10million 
[£2,800-£28,000] (Federal Ministry of Information 2013). After the first round of YouWin 
received a low number of female applicants, the second competition focused on cultivating 
female entrepreneurship. YouWin is jointly managed by the World Bank, the Pan-Africa 
University in Lagos, and the Plymouth Business School in the UK. (Abdulhamid 2012). In 2014, 
the government created the Nigeria Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP) and National Enterprise 
Development Programme (NEDEP). The initiatives were created to help further develop the 
Nigerian manufacturing sector, specifically local owned firms in the micro, small and medium 
categories. During the launch of the programme, former President Jonathan stated that the NIRP 
“will fast-track industrialization, accelerate inclusive economic growth, job creation, transform 
Nigeria’s business environment and stop the drain on our foreign reserves caused by importing 
what we can produce locally” (SMEDAN).  
 
Entrepreneurship has gradually become the major focal point in the toolkit of Nigerian economic 
development. This intensified focus on entrepreneurship can be attributed to a combination of 
factors including a shift in programme funding from donors, “the increasing rate of 
unemployment, a growing service sector, a reduction in regulatory control, increasing 
privatization/competition, and the introduction of a [new] poverty eradication program in 2001” 
(Thaddeus 2012: 32). Entrepreneurial discourse is consistently linked with the ideal of job 
creation for individual entrepreneurs and with time, job creation for fellow citizens through 
employment. Wider aims of entrepreneurship embrace country-wide development and national 
economic independence (Ovat 2013: 37-39). Entrepreneurship is held up as a golden beacon 
and an effective panacea for Nigeria’s economic and social ills. Ogundele and Abiola advocate 
educating Nigerians throughout society in entrepreneurship. 
 
The widespread level of unemployment in the country could have been minimized if Nigerians of 
varying age groups and backgrounds were exposed to entrepreneurial education, training and 
development across levels…. The evangelistic agenda will not be complete if any segment of the society 
is not catered for. Everybody must be an entrepreneurial crusader from the urban to rural areas. 
(Ogundele and Abiola 2012: 144)  
 
Some researchers argue that entrepreneurship can be born out of necessity by people who cannot 
find work or are employed in jobs that do not pay them enough to sustain themselves (Olomi 
2009: 47). This argument ties into Nigeria’s high level of unemployment rates. On the other hand 
Rosa et al (2006) found that entrepreneurship out of necessity wasn’t the case for the majority of 
entrepreneurs they studied in Uganda and Sri Lanka. Instead they found that entrepreneurs 
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were …”progress and status driven to improve their social and economic standing so that they 
can contribute and enjoy the benefits of development. In doing so they will lessen any state of 
necessity, but this will be a consequence rather than a driver of their entrepreneurship” (Rosa et 
al. 2006: 9-10). Research into South African women entrepreneurs found that despite facing 
economic issues, generally the women “were relatively better educated than the general 
population” and “often possessed more assets, television, telephone, internet access, electricity, 
running water, and so on-than the percentage reported in the wider community” (Dolan and 
Scott 2009: 206-207).  
 
On average, most new businesses in Nigeria fail within the first five years of operations (Ogbo 
and Nwachukwu 2012: 104). Some of these failures are due to the challenges of doing business 
in Nigeria. In a survey of Nigerian SMEs Ogbo and Nwachukwu found that these challenges 
included “lack of easy access to funding/credits”, trade barriers, and “lack of adequate managerial 
and entrepreneurial skills” (Ogbo and Nwachukwu 2012: 99). Other challenges to Nigerian 
entrepreneurs ranged from poor infrastructure to corruption to inconsistent government policies 
and security issues (Ihugba et al. 2013: 28-29). Although some of the previously discussed 
government programmes attempt to combat a number of these challenges, many of these issues 
are deeply entrenched in society and require larger long-term and intensive solutions. But despite 
these issues, Nigerians continue to create businesses.  
 
The spirit of entrepreneurship is filled with aspirations and goals not, just for the individual, but 
for Nigeria as a whole. These hopes and dreams are exactly what the Nigerian-Chinese narrative 
taps into. Nigeria’s future is linked with entrepreneurs as the literal hope of the nation and the 
promise of Nigerian-Chinese relations as a path towards modernity and economic development 
has the potential to compliment Nigerian entrepreneurship. This chapter explores the world of 
entrepreneurs in Nigeria, specifically those that have taken up the government’s promise of 
Nigerian-Chinese relationships. Through this analysis we see that entrepreneurs, particularly 
those with more privileged backgrounds are most successful at engaging in business with Chinese 
counterparts.  
 
Here I follow their struggles and successes as they engage with Chinese business associations in 
an attempt to realize the Nigerian entrepreneurial dream. I have selected five accounts to 
demonstrate the numerous ways Nigerian entrepreneurs connect with China (as buyers; sellers; 
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and partners) and highlight the key themes of aspirations, class, and advantage; social networks; 
trust and mistrust. 
 
Entrepreneurial Aspirations and Hope 
From Company Men to Boss Men 
Dante is an energetic man in his late thirties who spoke about his business and travel experiences 
with enthusiasm. His journey from artist to international entrepreneur is one he was keen to 
share. During university Dante was an art major and along the way he had a few art exhibitions 
and sold some of his abstract art abroad. After observing that graphic artists were in high demand 
Dante studied graphic arts to supplement his income. After university Dante applied aesthetic 
knowledge in the business world where he was hired to work in the corporate gifts department 
of an energy firm. The firm was well known across industries for its corporate gifts [swag] that 
they gave to employees, customers and partners. These gifts were wide ranging from bags to 
customised diaries to engraved items and cufflinks. The energy company bought gifts from a 
variety of European and Middle Eastern countries which provided Dante with a chance to engage 
in business on an international level. Dante termed his time with the large corporation as an 
introduction into the “proper business world” and after a few years he and two business partners 
started their own business. His firm did business with the energy company and other 
organisations. Due to their knowledge and connections via previous employment, the firm 
quickly became “THE source for corporate gifts and branding”. But after a year Dante decided 
it was time to become the sole proprietor of his own business.  
 
The first year out on his own was challenging and there were days where Dante did not have 
enough money to eat up to three meals a day. He eventually borrowed money from a friend to 
buy office equipment and started pitching his services to potential clients he found via his social 
network. As time progressed Dante began to build a clientele and added his previous university 
work, graphic design, to his business offerings. At one point Dante was considered the “image 
maker for GTBank”, one of the largest banks in Nigeria that has branches in other West African 
countries and the UK. He provided his corporate gift and graphic design services to the bank. 
He also has other clients including large corporations in the fast food industry. A major part of 
Dante’s work focuses on helping clients “[who] didn’t know what they want but [know] they want 
something unique.”  
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When Dante travelled to Dubai to purchase products for his business, he found that most of the 
items he bought were from China, Taiwan and Turkey. After a while he concluded that it was 
wiser for him to go directly to the source and travel to China. Dante’s first trip to China was in 
2008 when he attended the Canton Fair which he called “the corporate gift centre of the world”. 
One of Dante’s more recent ventures was to provide larger graphic installations for education 
fairs. Dante’s work for the education fairs comprised of designing the materials for each booth 
including banners and displays; creating business cards and lanyards for attendees; and designing 
billboards advertising the fairs. The fairs are a chance for universities in a number of Western to 
recruit students from developing countries and these events usually fairs have taken place in the 
home countries of students. University representatives collaborate with Dante on installation 
ideas. According to Dante, the “jobs keep getting bigger and we are introducing new concepts 
over the years”. 
 
The Security Business 
In the spring of 2012, the International Fire and Security Exhibition and Conference-West Africa 
(IFSEC) held its second annual conference at the upscale Eko Hotel in Lagos. The hotel was full 
of Nigerian and international patrons. Eko is one of the most expensive and well known hotels 
in Lagos. Although some say it is living on its past laurels and competition like GNIM’s Great 
Eastern and international firms (i.e-Radisson and Sheraton) will outpace it, the Eko still hosts 
events like the security conference. The security industry in Nigeria is growing as Nigerians spend 
more money on safety ranging from personal safety at home and on the road to security for 
businesses and institutions. Itoro, the managing director of an international private security firm 
headquartered in Nigeria, was one of the conference attendees.  
 
As a child, Itoro dreamt of joining the military but his mother did not approve, so he attended 
university and earned a degree in agriculture. When he graduated in the 1990’s, Nigeria was 
under military rule and the only employment Itoro could find was in the security industry. One 
of his first security jobs was as a security guard for a church. Throughout the years, Itoro moved 
from providing personal security to managing an entire security firm. After his experiences 
working for others, Itoro decided to open up his own firm in 2009. He is both the owner and 
managing director of Prestige Security. Itoro operates the firm alongside his wife, a writer, who 
serves as the firm’s executive director of communications. Prestige also operates in other 
countries in Africa, Europe and the Middle East. When this research took place, Prestige had 
over forty contracts for companies, hotels, schools and individuals. The firm provides electronic 
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security systems as a part of its security services. These systems, which are used to secure houses 
and buildings, are purchased from China. For Itoro working with a Chinese partner is essential 
to his business.  
 
The firm offers personal security for clients ranging from individuals to families conducting 
personal business or groups on diplomatic missions. Prestige’s roster includes real estate moguls, 
managing directors and chairmen. Itoro describes some clients as “people you read about every 
week; we’re not talking of small fish”. As such clients are promised top services such as swift 
pickups from airports which are comprised of a swift immigration process and retrieval of luggage 
within fifteen minute. This is compared to the one hour plus it takes the average person to 
navigate immigration and retrieve their luggage.  Prestige’s services extend to offshore oil and gas 
firms where it provides security to clients roundtrip from land to sea. Itoro’s philosophy is that 
the “comfort of the principal [the client] must not be compromised”. The firm’s high level of 
service has led to a positive reputation in the security industry and garnered Itoro opportunities 
to speak at various conferences like a maritime security and piracy conference in Nigeria. 
Additionally his firm helped build a facility for the Nigerian Navy to monitor pirates off the coast 
of Nigeria. Although many of his clients are a part of the upper echelons of Nigerian society, 
Itoro believes that security is an important issue for everyone in Nigeria. As such Prestige 
provides free ‘security clinics’ to teach the public about staying secure and ways to analyse risk in 
a variety of situations. “Security is not only for the good; it’s for the bad [too]. Good people also 
get involved in bad [situations].”  
 
The Beauty Business 
Nigerian women have been involved in some form of entrepreneurship for centuries. Due to a 
lack of encouragement for formal education, women usually engaged in business in the informal 
sector, specifically in markets. By the 1920’s, enterprises led by women “were so profitable that 
the colonial government elected to tax the profit [through a] flat tax” (Anyansi-Archibong 1996: 
500). Decades later in 1984, under Nigerian military rule, the government once again imposed a 
flat tax on women led enterprises (Anyansi-Archibong 1996: 500).  Since then female 
entrepreneurship has become recognized as a driver of economic and social development. To 
this end, various initiatives have been created to encourage women entrepreneurs. Additionally, 
women’s access to education has improved significantly. Nonetheless 80% of women led 
enterprises in Nigeria are micro-enterprises (Okafor and Amalu 2010: 74).  An increasing 
number Nigerian female entrepreneurs have a minimum of secondary level education and as 
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well as university level education (Halkais et al 2011: 221; Mordi et al 2010: 15-16). The 
challenges for female entrepreneurs include balancing family and entrepreneurial 
responsibilities; subjection to sexual harassment and lack of access to financial capital (Mordi et 
al 2010: 15-16; Ukonu and Tafamel, 2011: 236-237). Teniola, known as Teni, is a Nigerian 
female entrepreneur. As the owner of a growing beauty and cosmetics company based in Lagos, 
Teni is a part of the 20% of Nigerian female entrepreneurs who own small to large businesses.  
 
During university Teni started her entrepreneurial ventures by paying attention to trends in 
Nigerian society. She observed that an increasing number of women had their makeup applied 
professionally. Although Teni graduated from university with a degree in social anthropology and 
dreamt of working for the United Nations she always felt an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ lurked inside 
of her. Teni began to experiment with makeup and developed a “flair for cosmetics” which she 
expressed in her work as a makeup artist. After marrying and becoming a mother Teni focused 
on creating a business where she could have enough time for work and family. Out of all of the 
entrepreneurs I spoke with, Teni was the only one that discussed the need to balance work and 
family. Having the support of her husband helped to balance these issues. This support included 
financial support. Most female entrepreneurs rely on personal savings or contributions and loans 
from family and friends due to low access to bank loans (Lincoln 2012).  
 
In 2009, Teni formally established her business. The firm primarily focused on wholesaling 
cosmetics and cosmetic cases to fellow makeup artists. Teni purchased the cosmetic cases from 
manufacturers in China. The professional makeup artists’ industry continues to grow as 
Nigerians, particularly those in the middle class and above, hire makeup artists for dates and 
special events, especially weddings where brides require makeup for both wedding ceremonies-
traditional and religious. These are costly services and makeup artists require equipment which 
withstand heavy use. Makeup artists routinely work with various clients on a weekly and even 
daily basis and they often use the same makeup brushes on numerous clients. While developing 
her business Teni saw not only a need for cosmetics cases that had enough room to carry all the 
tools makeup artists used, but she also saw a need for hygienic makeup tools including a brush 
cleaner. Teni also began incorporated training events into her business. She presented trainings 
in conjunction with international makeup companies and taught makeup artists hygienic makeup 
practice. 
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As the business progressed Teni enrolled in a programme to earn a Certificate in Entrepreneurial 
Management program at the Lagos Business School to gain more business knowledge. “A lot of 
what I’ve learned in the class were from fellow entrepreneurial colleagues.” Her main goals were 
to set herself apart from the competition and create a product which clients valued. She felt the 
course was a key component in helping her meet this goal and to create a business strategy while 
improving her marketing and distribution channels. Teni used social media-primarily Twitter, 
Facebook, BlackBerry Messenger, and WhatsApp to advertise products and upcoming events.  
 
The Mineral Whisperer: Selling to Chinese Clients 
Preston is in his late thirties and the owner of a natural minerals business. Although he sold to 
wholesale clients from Nigeria; Tanzania; the US and Germany, the majority of his clients were 
from China. Despite Preston’s parents’ desire for him to become a doctor it was his long standing 
interest in geology, which he began during his childhood, which led to Preston’s entrepreneurial 
ventures. Preston studied briefly at the University of Lagos but eventually quit due to a lack of 
interest and boredom during continued university strikes. After starting his business he took a 
professional course in Corporate Administration through the Chartered Institute of 
Administration. Entrepreneurship is not uncommon in Preston’s family. Besides his father who 
worked in senior management for two international corporations, his mother owned her own 
business where she sold soft drinks. Additionally, Preston’s sisters work with their husbands on 
individual entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
Preston started his business by selling quartz through Alibaba.com, an online marketplace for 
business to business commerce that is headquartered in China
8
. He also focused on promoting 
his business through social media via Twitter and Facebook. Preston made additional business 
contacts through existing clients or on his own because due to his good deals, “some [customers] 
don’t want to share [him] as a contact”. At the time I conducted my research, Preston had over 
twelve regular Chinese customers; the majority were either jewellery makers or gem dealers. Most 
of his clients went to Nigeria and conducted business face to face. As time went on Preston 
branched out to sell a broad range of minerals due to the variety of gemstones found within 
Nigeria.  
 
                                                             
8 Alibaba.com has offices in various countries including Japan, India, the United Kingdom and United States. A 
large number of the transactions has one party in China as either the buyer or seller.  
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He primarily focuses on sourcing products from mines or markets in the south of Nigeria as well 
as in Jos state in Northern Nigeria. Part of Preston’s business involves directly buying minerals 
from the mines or markets then selling them to Chinese clients. Many mines are jointly owned 
by management and miners, 70% by Nigerian owners and 30% by employees respectively. 
Instead of a salary employees were provided with food and maintenance while the owners 
purchased gems directly from employees. Although Preston sometimes took clients to the gem 
markets, he learned early on that Chinese wholesalers preferred to go directly to the mines and 
buy from the miners, thus eliminating middlemen like himself. While some of his wholesale 
clients attempted to do this, most found it difficult to make direct contact with mine management 
or miners so they often relied upon Preston to acquire minerals and gems for them. 
 
Building Homes for Well to Do Nigerians 
Charles, also known as Pastor Charles, is the CEO of a real estate and construction firm located 
in Lekki, Lagos State. Lekki is one of the largest growing areas in Lagos State and is home to the 
Lekki Free Trade Zone (LekkiFTZ), a Nigerian-Chinese development. (See Chapter 1-
Introduction for a brief discussion on the LFTZ) By the end of construction, investors boasts 
that Lekki FTZ will be a town of “world class” (Nigeria Summit 2011) proportions that has 
business and residential areas as well as an international airport. Even before the LekkiFTZ was 
created, Nigerian entrepreneurs like Charles were drawn to the area. Charles’s business ranges 
from property management to construction of residential developments. He opened his firm in 
2007 after leaving another real estate firm which he cofounded. Charles received much of his 
formal business education through various professional training programmes. Some of these 
programmes have international links, like The Thames Business School of Singapore (TBS) and 
a Global CEO programme that is jointly designed by two internationally ranked business schools- 
IESE Business School in Madrid and Wharton School in Philadelphia. Charles attended the 
TBS satellite programme in Lagos and he travelled to Philadelphia for the Global CEO 
programme.   
 
One of his more recent projects is a private estate geared towards upper middle-class Nigerians 
and was advertised as “designed for high net worth and medium income level residents” 
(Property Index 2013). Further advertising describes the property as providing: 
…the appropriate blending for all aspects of interactive human activities which include residential, 
commercial, educational, institutional, and recreational, inclusive of services…It is a rich package of 
treasured buildings and state-of-the-art infrastructure in a sustainable environment…The general 
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atmosphere guarantees adequate security under a very efficient management system. (Property 
Index 2013) 
 
The firm’s client base are upper-middle class and upper class Nigerians, therefore “the goal of 
the company was not just to build affordable houses for Nigerians, but also to create excellent 
environment that would favourably compete with any in high-brow areas such as Ikoyi or Lekki 
Peninsula.” (This Day Life: 2010).  
 
Upon completion, the private estate will contain a mixture of 2,000 single homes and flats. 
Homes in the development range from ₦12.5-₦29.5 million (£30,000-£72,000). The estate is 
similar to sub-divisions in the United States where home-owners are a part of an association to 
which homeowners pay a mandatory membership fee for the maintenance of community goods. 
In the US these community goods encompass security, recreational areas for residents and road 
maintenance. In Nigeria community goods cover more things including payment for drainage, 
fencing, and lights on the streets of the estate. (Business Day 2011). These extras are provided 
by local governments in the US via taxes but in Nigeria, homeowners are responsible these 
services. A large amount of the construction materials and machinery Charles used in his 
construction sites are purchased from China. His interactions with Chinese counterparts have 
taken place in both Nigeria and China. Alongside other Nigerian dignitaries, Charles helped host 
a Chinese agricultural business delegation who visited his home state of Edo. Additionally, his 
business has expanded to partner with Chinese counterparts on the design of materials. He was 
also in the midst of negotiating a joint construction project with Chinese counterparts for a 
Nigerian government project. 
 
Elitism & Exclusion 
Entrepreneurs can either order items from China sight unseen or go to China to view the items 
and have them sent to Nigeria.  
African entrepreneurs generally buy in bulk, utilizing Chinese-owned cargo companies, and products 
are shipped direct …. with Africans making up the vast majority of clients. The point, though, is that 
it is not simply Chinese traders “flooding” the African market with cheap Chinese goods; African 
actors are actively facilitating the penetration of Africa by Chinese-made products.  
(Taylor and Xiao 2009: 719) 
 
Chinese products are increasingly being brought to Africa by African business people. Initially, 
Chinese products in Nigeria were brought and sold by Chinese merchants at places like 
Chinatown. (See Chapter 1-for a brief discussion on Chinatown). As these goods increased in 
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the marketplace, the number of African merchants selling Chinese good increased. But en 
masse, Chinese goods were of low quality and consumers became increasingly frustrated. From 
the Nigerian consumers perspective, Chinese goods have been dumped into the country under 
the false claims of meeting the needs of “low-income African consumers who do not have the 
purchasing power to acquire better quality goods” (Aderemi 2012: 197). This is an issue for 
entrepreneurs particularly those like Teni and Dante who sell the goods they buy from China 
directly to their clients. Additionally, their clients are upper-middle class and upper class 
Nigerians who have the means to purchase items at higher prices. The question is how will 
entrepreneurs respond to increasing demands for high quality goods? Because of the poor 
reputation of Chinese goods in Nigeria Teni travelled to China to meet manufacturers and 
personally choose high quality products. What Teni discovered when buying Chinese products 
directly from manufacturers was the hierarchy of quality which most Chinese products are 
divided into. These three categories are: “copy; copy-copy and high-copy”. Copy is the lowest 
grade of products; these goods appear to be low in quality and they wear out quickly. Copy-copy 
products are middle range in quality and high-cop products rivals the quality of top brands.  
 
The first wave of Chinese manufactured products sold in Nigeria were often copies or at best 
copies of copies. These were the quality of products sold in Chinatown, but Nigerian consumers 
began seeing an increasing amount of Chinese goods starting in the 1990’s, a decade before the 
opening of Chinatown.  
 
… many imported Chinese goods were often substandard, leading the Standards Organization of 
Nigeria in October 1996 to threaten China that a formal complaint would be lodged within the World 
Trade Organization if the situation was not immediately corrected. The Chinese responded by 
declaring that they had not deliberately engaged in the dumping of inferior goods in Nigeria and that 
it was often Nigerian businessmen of dubious disposition who were ordering products of questionable 
quality. (Utomi 2008: 51)  
 
These fake goods were either “poorly cloned originals of known brands” or even mimics of local 
country brands (Aderemi 2012: 197). In response to the accusations from Chinese officials, 
Nigerian businesses countered by placing the blame on Chinese businesses. Nigerians argued 
that Chinese businesses’ success in Nigeria was partially due to their ability to dump “cheap 
Chinese products onto local markets, stifling the competitiveness of domestic production” 
(Utomi 2008: 54). This argument was in line with research which found that “… the glut of cheap 
consumer goods from China is a problem not only because it brings national industries to their 
knees but because imports are increasingly taking place via Chinese trade networks, to the 
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detriment of local merchants” (Hofmann et al 2007: 85). The blame game between Nigerian and 
Chinese private and public sector representatives has gone on for a number of years. Although 
both sides have contributed to the issue, neither side is willing to concede. (See Chapter 2- Selling 
the Chinese Dream to the Nation: Public Discourse and Narratives in Action for a quote from a 
Nigerian representative regarding the quality of Chinese products entering Nigeria).  
 
While the entrepreneurs discussed in this chapter tend to sell high-copy products, other 
entrepreneurs specifically focus on importing lower quality goods to sell at low prices while 
making money through the volume of sales. Lyons et al studied African traders who conduct 
business in Africa and China. They found a broad variety of traders in various industries but 
many bought and sold “low-value goods that enable entry into the market through a very diverse 
range of strategies” (Lyons et al 2013: 90). There is a market for copy goods in Nigeria particularly 
amongst customers who face price constraints. Nevertheless, in general Nigerian consumers 
inextricably link Chinese products with connotations of cheapness and unreliability, subsequently 
the stigma attached to buying Chinese products remains. Therefore, Teni did not disclose the 
country of origin for the products she sold to her clients. “I don’t tell people I buy from China; 
I want to sell”. Instead she focuses on quality and purchases high-copy level products. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Knowing the Right People: The Challenge of Visa Procurement  
As the entrepreneurs expanded their businesses, going to China and accessing the marketplace 
directly became their favoured option. It is generally regarded among Nigerian business people 
that business with China, whether supply or trade, requires a high level of interpersonal 
connections which can help in accessing quality products and good prices. But these 
interpersonal connections must be nurtured and maintained. Going to China allows business 
people to see products in person; create or build upon relationships with counterparts in person; 
and make informed decisions. Some business people don’t initially travel to China.  Instead, they 
go to other countries where Chinese goods are sold wholesale. In research on Nigerian traders 
in Lagos, most traders’ first buying trip was to Dubai (Afolayan 2011 et al. 67). “Although the 
price of Chinese goods is somewhat higher there [in Dubai] than in China, the journey is far less 
expensive than the journey to China and presents fewer bureaucratic hurdles” (Lyons et al 2013: 
86). Dante began purchasing goods from China by buying Chinese made products during his 
trips to Dubai. However, “more African traders [tend] to import on their own account, bypassing 
established local and Chinese importers” and travelling directly “to China, in particular, 
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Guangzhou” (Lyons et al 2013: 79). Overall the number of African business people visiting China 
continues to increase. From 2000 to 2005, China saw “…an annual increase of 33.3 percent 
[which is] far higher than other groups” (Lyons et al 2013: 81.  
 
Obtaining a visa to travel to China was a relatively easy matter for African entrepreneurs until 
2005. (Lyons et al 2013: 94). The process became more difficult due to stricter regulations from 
the Chinese government that tried to crackdown on the increasing number of African traders 
who delayed returning home, either in attempts to permanently stay in China or to conduct 
further business before returning home. The entrepreneurs discussed within this chapter 
describe a complex visa process that has both elements of ease and difficulty. Applying for a visa 
is fraught with bureaucratic challenges but with help of a broker, obtaining a visa can be easy. In 
Nigeria applying for a Chinese visa is not as simple as going in person to the consulate or embassy; 
purchasing an airplane ticket; and flying off to China. The Chinese visa application process 
sometimes requires that applicants place a hold on an airplane ticket before applying for a visa. 
Additionally, first time visa applicants must have a minimum of ₦4million (£14,000) in their 
bank accounts in order to prove their solvency and demonstrate that they have a lower likelihood 
of staying in China beyond their visa expiration date. Even if they meet all of these requirements, 
applicants rarely apply directly for visas. In fact, none of the entrepreneurs discussed in this thesis 
or other business people I met during fieldwork applied for a Chinese visa without the help of 
an intermediary. When Dante tried to directly apply through the consulate he encountered 
difficulties. He described the Chinese consulate representatives as “not friendly and not so nice 
when it comes to (their) visas; they won’t talk to you”.  
 
Therefore business people turn to brokers. Brokers are either individuals or organizations. 
Individual intermediaries are people who know people, who know more people; essentially 
people who have direct or indirect connections to employees of the Chinese consulate or 
embassy. Organizational intermediaries are companies, like GNIM, or groups that have well 
established relationships with the Chinese government and can vouch for the character and 
financial stability of the applicant. Two organizations which help entrepreneurs with the visa 
process, are the Nigerian Chinese Friendship Association (NCFA) and Nigeria-China Business 
Council (NCBA). Charles and Teni obtained visas by employing the help of individual 
intermediaries who knew others with connections to the Chinese consulate. Ultimately, Dante 
had to go through a similar route by applying for a visa through a friend of a friend who had 
access to the Chinese consulate. But after that connection was lost he decided to use an 
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organization as an intermediary. Dante joined the Lagos Chamber of Commerce but this 
organization did not have a strong connection with the Chinese government. At the time of our 
interview he was considering joining the NCFA. Itoro encountered similar issues as Dante did, 
when he initially tried to apply directly to the Chinese consulate for a visa. He eventually joined 
the Nigeria-China Business Council which helped him obtain a visa.  
 
Very few Nigerian entrepreneurs belong to a business association that can broker on their behalf 
(NBS and SMEDAN 2010: 72-73). When applying for a Chinese visa through a network, 
entrepreneurs pay a price closer to the visa prices quoted on the Chinese government’s official 
website. As of 2016, the website for China’s Lagos consulate quoted prices for business visas in 
the range of ₦5,000-₦11,000 (£19-£42) depending on the speed of service and number of entries 
allowed (Chinese Consulate 2013). This is far more affordable than what Dante paid for his first 
trip to China in 2008. Dante applied for a visa through individual intermediaries to which he 
paid ₦130,000 (£491) for a single entry-thirty day visa. The entrepreneurs as well as other 
Nigerians I spoke with usually mentioned ‘agent fees’ in relation to visas procured via individual 
intermediaries. Agent fees are the payments that people along the chain between the applicant 
and the visa officials receive. No one is quite clear of the process or how many people are 
involved along the chain as it changes depending on the applicant’s initial connection. 
Nonetheless, it is thought that there are Nigerian and Chinese sub-intermediaries along the way. 
Given the unknown number of intermediaries, in order for sub-intermediaries to profit from 
their work, the price listed on the website is vastly different than the actual price an entrepreneur 
like Dante pays in the end.  
 
Although organizations that serve as intermediaries do not charge ‘agent fees’, the cost to join 
associations detracts some business people. For example, in 2012, the annual application and 
membership fees for joining NFA was ₦82,300 [£329]. NCBA’s membership fees were in three 
categories: Women: ₦25,000 [£100]; Men: ₦50,000 [£200] and Corporate Organisations 
₦200,000 [£800]. Both organizations had prominent members [including former Nigerian 
ambassadors to China and international business people] and links to both the Nigerian and 
Chinese governments. Applying through these organizations is easy. The applicant completes all 
the necessary paperwork and a representative from the association submits the application under 
the auspices of the organization. Business people with membership in either of these associations 
are virtually guaranteed that they will receive a Chinese visa.   
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Without brokerage through individuals or organizations intermediaries, entrepreneurs are 
deterred from obtaining a visa. In order to access this area, entrepreneurs draw upon on social 
capital. Without connections entrepreneurs face a greater challenge in obtaining a visa. This 
creates boundaries where “…the same strong ties that enable group members to obtain privileged 
access to resources bar others from securing the same assets” (Thornton et al 2011: 108-109). 
Brokerage organizations serve as gatekeepers in controlling who can and cannot enter the 
exclusive world of Nigerian-Chinese relationships. Entrepreneurs who want to visit China, but 
lack the right connections have little chance of accessing travelling to China. Additionally, the 
requirement of ₦4million (£14,000) in a bank account is a substantial challenge for a number of 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, the visa requirements and opaque application process serve as a form 
of gatekeeping where the opportunity to interact with Chinese counterparts face to face becomes 
an exclusive opportunity.  
 
Face to Face Negotiations 
Most entrepreneurs expressed a desire to land in China, conduct business and leave. “The 
duration of their [Nigerian entrepreneurs] stay is short; the average length of stay of international 
traders being relatively longer than that for internal traders; for as soon as they achieve their goal 
(trading), they return to their base in the country…..” (Afolayan 2011 et al.: 94). When Dante 
and Teni discussed their trips to China they both acknowledged that they didn’t see much of the 
city. Instead, they shopped, slept and ate. Dante’s first trip was spent at the China Import and 
Export Fair (Canton Fair) in Guangzhou. The event is an international trade fair that has been 
held since the late 1950’s and runs twice a year. In 2014 over 180,000 attendees came from 
across the globe to make deals and purchase goods (Canton Fair Online 2014). While the 
majority of the over 20,000 firms who have booths at the fair are from China, an increasing 
number come from other countries. The bi-yearly sessions run for three weeks with different 
groups of products sold each week. Goods range widely and include: furniture; large and small 
machinery; construction machinery; food; clothing; electronic goods and food.  
 
Before visiting the trade fair, Dante was unaware of the difference in the quality of goods. He 
expressed surprise at the forthright manner in which sales people explained the differences 
between copy, copy-copy and high-copy. Dante attributed his surprise to his previous views on 
Chinese business people. “People think they [Chinese] are thieves, [and] of course there are 
rogues”. Despite these conflicting issues of whether Chinese counterparts could be trusted or not 
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Dante took a risk and after only meeting a company representative once in China, he sent 
$25,000 [£14,900] for goods to be sent from China to Nigeria. After a few visits to China, Dante 
hired a shopper who bought things on his behalf and arranged the shipment for him from China 
to Nigeria. Guangzhou is the manufacturing hub of China and as such attracts international 
business people year round. Teni visited Guangzhou to visit a mall full of showrooms dedicated 
to wholesale customers. She focused on makeup cases and makeup but was unimpressed with 
the ingredients and quality of the makeup, so she mostly purchased makeup cases. Eventually, 
Teni found a trusted makeup supplier located in the US to supply makeup which was also 
labelled and packaged with Teni’s firm’s logo. During Itoro and Charles travels to China they 
employed different purchasing strategies than Teni and Dante. Itoro and Charles did not focus 
on purchasing high-copy level items because they do not sell the products they purchase from 
China directly to their Nigerian customers. These products are components of the goods and 
services they provide customers. Therefore, while the two entrepreneurs focus on a moderate 
level of quality they don’t have to worry about customers’ perceptions of Chinese products.  
 
Instead Charles and Itoro are concerned with price and how they related to business 
counterparts. Upon meeting Charles, the first question he asked me connected to his 
relationships with Chinese associates. Charles asked me “How fake do you want it [the interview] 
to be?” Charles wanted to know if he could express his mixed feelings regarding his interactions 
with Chinese counterparts. After laughing he became serious and discussed his visits to China. 
Similarly to the other entrepreneurs, Charles first researched a variety of sources for his supplies, 
in his case construction machinery. He narrowed his choices down to a “fairly used” machine 
from the US and another “used” machine from China. The American model had the advantage 
of being built with parts which were used in subsequent models; this made it easier to repair the 
model as time progressed. The only drawback to purchasing the American model was that the 
price, which was considerably more expensive than the Chinese model. Additionally, Charles 
liked the rapport he had with the American sellers and viewed them as sincere while he was 
suspicious of the Chinese seller’s business practices which he described as “crooked”. After 
analysis Charles chose the Chinese model which were far cheaper and he eventually made a 
return on the investment into the machines. The idea of conducting business with people who 
one does not fully trust was a sentiment that was discussed by most of the entrepreneurs including 
Itoro, who found that treating an interpersonal connection was one way to remedy this issue.  
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In Itoro’s quest to purchase alarm systems which would suit his company’s needs, he reviewed 
hundreds of products on Alibaba.com and finally chose an alarm system from a firm based in 
Shenzen. The firm sent him test samples and he was pleased with the quality. Despite this, Itoro 
was advised by other Nigerian business people to go to China to meet with the manufacturers 
and confirm product quality before making a large investment. During his trip to China in 2011, 
Itoro visited the factory in Shenzen and found that “they [the firm] had good personal relations 
and were very friendly.” He spent over $15,000 [£9,063.45] which included the costs for a 
technician to come from Shenzen to teach Prestige employees how to operate the alarm systems 
from the firm’s command centre in Lagos. Itoro recalled that “they [the firm representatives] 
didn’t have good English but they had a manual in Chinese” which the firm had translated into 
English. The technician’s visit which was mostly professional, but included some socialising as 
well, went well despite the technician’s initial fears over safety. The combination of a good 
professional interactions coupled with socialising boosted Itoro’s confidence in his Chinese 
business counterparts. He argued that, quality products can be bought from Chinese 
manufacturers as long as one is willing to pay for them. Itoro credited both his visit to China and 
the technician’s visit to Nigeria with cementing the relationship between Prestige and its Chinese 
supplier. However, he also stressed the importance of double checking items, because “If you 
don’t know they [Chinese] will send you anything”.  
 
Through discussions with the entrepreneurs it was apparent trust and mistrust play a large part 
in their relationships with Chinese counterparts. 
 
Building Relationships: Negotiating the Liminality of Trust/Mistrust 
For me the critical factor that has granted me favour dealing with Chinese is God’s grace. The other 
is trust- the way to gain the trust of a Chinese man in my field is by carrying out certain task without 
demanding payment from them. (Preston) 
 
Social relationships are a crucial component of business for the entrepreneurs. They 
demonstrate varying approaches to developing and managing their relationships with Chinese 
counterparts. An analysis of these approaches revealed similarities between these forms of elite 
exchanges and those discussed within Chapters 3 and 4-The Family Firm and ‘Our Friend for 
Eternity’; namely issues related to managing trust and mistrust.  
 
Perceptions: What We Think of ‘Them’ 
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Because the majority of Preston’s clients are Chinese, he interacted with Chinese counterparts 
more frequently than the other entrepreneurs.  A number of Preston’s clients visited Nigeria 
regularly. Preston viewed his Chinese associates as good clients because as he put it, they “want 
to see what they’re buying”; pay in cash; buy in volume; don’t mind the clarity of gems and even 
buy rough gems. This was in comparison to European and American customers who tend to buy 
clear gems which take time to either find or refine blemished gems to a state of clarity. Moreover, 
his Chinese clients are not scared to travel to Nigeria unlike most of the Western business people 
that Preston has dealt with. Preston tried for months to convince a German customer to come to 
Nigeria and examine the gems he expressed interest in to no avail. Despite Preston’s assurances, 
the German customer was discouraged from coming by both Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike. 
Through the examples of Joe-one of his first clients and subsequent clients, Preston learned that 
Chinese clients were more likely to ignore the perceived dangers and visit Nigeria.  
 
During his first visit to Nigeria, Joe enthusiastically went around Lagos with Preston. In fact, Joe 
wanted to go as far as northern Nigeria to visit the well-known gem market in Jos. Jos has been 
the site of religious unrest between Christians and Muslims and many countries have warned 
their citizens not to visit Jos. Even so, Joe wanted to go because of the stories he heard about 
large varieties of gems sold at the Jos gem market. Preston was impressed with Joe’s tenacity and 
said that despite it being Joe’s “first time in Nigeria, he wanted to visit…The thing about them 
[Chinese] is that they are not fearful”. Preston, being more knowledgeable about the security 
situation in Jos, was able to convince Joe to visit a market near Lagos. Joe continues to visit 
Nigeria at least once a year. Conversely, most of Preston’s clients are not willing to travel to 
dangerous regions of Nigeria and there are some Westerners who are willing to travel to Nigeria. 
Preston’s story demonstrates the value of personal interaction. Through his experiences with Joe, 
the German and others Preston formed a general opinion of what he viewed as the opposing 
perceptions of Nigeria from Chinese and Western business people.  
 
Conversely Preston and other entrepreneurs expressed some downsides to conducting business 
with Chinese counterparts. Preston associated these issues to loopholes within Nigerian 
regulations. “They [Chinese] know our system is porous and they exploit it”. Preston illustrated 
this point by sharing the short story of a Chinese client. Preston’s client attempted to leave Nigeria 
without paying a formal customs or royalty fee on a large amount of quartz he purchased from 
Preston. When his baggage was examined at the airport the client simply paid around ₦;4,000 
(£20) to an airport official and was allowed to fly out. If the regulation were strictly enforced, 
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Preston’s client would have had to pay the government at least five times that amount. According 
to Preston although it is the Ministry of Solid Minerals Development’s duty to collect royalties 
and issue mineral trading licenses, most Chinese clients face no penalties for not obtaining these 
licenses or failing to pay royalty taxes. Preston described the Nigerian mining sector as poorly 
structured and one in which Nigerians sellers are outnumbered by a variety of people from other 
countries including Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and The Gambia.  
 
In order to have some input into shaping regulations so that they benefitted Nigerians, Preston 
attended monthly meetings organised by the Mining Ministry. His complaints about the poor 
regulations that allowed people to take gems out of the country without paying fees were met with 
ambivalence and a lack of responsibility. The ministry representatives placed the onus on 
customs and said that customs officers had been trained to identify gems and access fees. Preston 
believed that even if customs officers received training they didn’t conduct their jobs properly 
and thus, allowed gem buyers to flout regulations and “grease [their] palms”. Charles also asserted 
a similar view as Preston and stated that Chinese business people “understand the system” and 
took advantage of the situation by doing things “here [in Africa]” which could not be done in 
China; particularly flouting laws or using connections to get contracts. Charles’s thoughts on 
Chinese businesses is similar to what Solomon, GNIM’s HR director, expressed: the feeling that 
Chinese business people also play an active part in corruptive practices which are heavily placed 
on Nigerians. The entrepreneurs also read newspaper articles about deaths of Nigerian 
employees within Chinese firms due to atrocious working conditions and stories about poor 
working conditions in firms operating in China. This information added to their distrust of 
Chinese business practices. The entrepreneurs sought to mitigate this behaviour through 
interpersonal interactions and through government that held Chinese businesses accountable.  
 
Branding Impressions: What We Think They Think About Us 
Much like the government’s overarching public discourse campaign to encourage Nigerian-
Chinese interactions, the entrepreneurs also thought about branding and the perceptions 
Chinese counterparts had of them. Most of the entrepreneurs had some knowledge about 
Chinese history and social affairs which they used to help them understand their Chinese 
associates. Preston coupled his knowledge with the numerous group and individual interactions 
he had with clients. Most of Preston’s business meetings were conducted at Chinese hotels in 
Lagos which are owned by Chinese expatriates and exclusively patronized by Chinese patrons. 
Preston often met with clients in public spaces and poured out bags of gemstones out on tables 
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and floors of Chinese owned hotel lobbies. Only large deals were conducted in private rooms. 
“When they are amongst [other] Chinese they conduct business openly” said Preston. It was not 
uncommon for other patrons to approach Preston after lingering around and observing his 
transactions with clients. By conducting business in a public place Preston created trust through 
transparency which in turn acted as a form of marketing. Potential customers learned of his 
business by observing his dealings with others. When Preston discussed his relationship with 
clients he commented that “Once you learn them” it helps your business strategy.” While his 
statement indicated a level of awareness regarding his customers’ needs it also indicated an 
awareness of how they viewed him. 
 
Preston placed an importance on understanding his customers so that he could actively brand 
himself as someone who they wanted to do business with. Another way Preston attempted to 
engender trust was by procuring the gems before receiving payment from clients.  Preston asked 
for payment only after clients chose gems from the piles of gems Preston poured out for them 
to inspect and bargain over. When he escorted customers to markets Preston ensured they were 
not cheated and also deliberately covered his own expenses. Preston helped customers to 
procure taxis and travel when needed. In response to his help, clients commented on his 
sincerity; offered to buy small pieces of jewellery for his family as tokens of their appreciation; 
asked for his advice on other business matters; and most importantly clients continued to conduct 
business with him. Preston heighted his predisposition to be helpful and trustworthy which 
ensured customer’s trust.  
 
Preston continuously negotiated between the positive and negative perceptions of customers. 
Preston explained that, “Chinese people don’t like when you’re too smart”.  According to him 
being “too educated/smart” led clients to believe his prices were too expensive. In order to 
manage this issue, Preston sent an employee that clients were unfamiliar with to conduct the sales 
Clients bought the items at the same price Preston would have sold to them directly, but because 
the clients didn’t know the employee worked for Preston they did not associate Preston or a level 
of high education to the price. However, Preston stated that while it is best to not “let them know 
you know much about business...If you’re not smart you won’t understand how to deal with 
them.” He used the Malian and Senegalese traders in Lagos as examples. The Chinese clients 
are willing to buy from the traders because they view them as less educated and less business 
savvy which results in lower prices. In reality the traders are quite intelligent and know how to 
effectively deal with Chinese clients. These statements implied that in order to manage his 
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relationships with clients, Preston presented a public and private face. His perceptions about 
clients’ perceptions of him informed how he managed the relationship. Instead of actively 
attempting to change clients’ perceptions, he worked around these the perceptions and used 
them to his benefit. 
 
Charles expressed similar sentiments. One of the issues he found most challenging was that he, 
like most Nigerian entrepreneurs, did not speak Chinese. This became an issue when meeting 
with groups of Chinese counterparts. Charles shared a story about a dinner he attended on one 
of his many business trips to China. As the dinner progressed and many courses were eaten along 
with much libation, a drunk Chinese counterpart confidentially told Charles that some of the 
men were making derogatory comments about him. While Charles was not surprised, it was 
slightly jarring given that when these same people spoke to him in English they showed no signs 
of disliking him or the desire to not conduct business with him. He was also surprised that they 
made these statements in his presence and not in private. Charles hypothesised that this 
behaviour and what he termed the lack of “straight forward” business was a historical issue which 
lead to unbalanced relationships between countries. A lack of transparency is not atypical within 
business but Charles felt there was a higher level of covertness when dealing with Chinese 
associates.  
 
Despite his mistrust, Charles continued to conduct business with Chinese counterparts because 
he felt that Africans had the “biggest opportunity” in the relationship compared to their 
relationships with Western business counterparts. This opportunity included cheaper prices as 
well as opportunities to jointly work together on large-scale projects. Although Charles classified 
distrust as an issue which impacted international business he simultaneously trusted and 
distrusted his Chinese counterparts. Without trust he would not be able to operate. And Charles’ 
reflections upon his and other African business people’s position in relation to China and the 
West led him to believe that even though the West appeared more open and sincere it did not 
currently provide the best opportunities. Charles viewed China as the best choice out of a set of 
less than optimal options.  
 
Ultimately Preston described the relationship between himself and Chinese clients as symbiotic 
where both parties rely on each other. “If not for the option of Chinese customers, I would have 
left the gem business”. This idea of symbiosis emphasizes the benefits of these business 
relationships for both Nigerians and Chinese businesses. Preston relied upon his Chinese clients 
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but they also relied upon him for high quality gems and honesty. Whether this symbiosis benefits 
both sides depend upon the bargaining positions of both parties. As for Teni, she declared that 
“we probably can’t get everything from China but [I] don’t see myself doing without China. [I’m] 
definitely going to continue working with China-it’s indispensable”. Dante was the only 
entrepreneur to explicitly state that he trusted his Chinese business partners. Trust was required 
in order to pay $25,000 [£14,900] for products after only meeting a seller in person once; which 
is exactly what Dante did. The other entrepreneurs also had to place similar amounts of money 
on the line and this also required trust.  
 
There is an implicit trust that both parties engaging in a business agreement must place in each 
other; without trust business transactions would be completely imbedded in tension and unease. 
The entrepreneurs balanced trust along with mistrust of potential business partners and current 
business partners. They compared potential business partners from across the globe and 
carefully weighed their options which included prices and perceptions. The entrepreneurs 
interpreted the actions of their Chinese business counterparts and factored this into their 
relationships. This interpretation helped them make decisions that most benefited their 
businesses. 
 
Conclusion 
Entrepreneurship has been a cornerstone in Nigerian society for centuries. Post-colonial 
Nigerian society focused on institutionalizing entrepreneurship through the indigenization decree 
and the creation of numerous programmes and initiatives. Thus, entrepreneurship has been 
incorporated into the Nigerian government’s grand narrative for Nigerian-Chinese relationships. 
In theory, doing business with Chinese business counterparts is easy; one can simply log on to 
Alibaba.com and find items to purchase or find clients to sell to, yet the process is more complex. 
Entrepreneurs encounter a series of significant obstacles which require dexterity, persistence and 
most of all capital-social and financial-to surmount.   
 
While entrepreneurship is lauded as a way to help people out of poverty, it is those that have 
more access to resources who are able to establish businesses and capture the dream of doing 
business with China which is stoked by government initiatives and rhetoric. Conducting business 
with China remains an exclusive and elite project, far from the kind of inclusive and “free” market 
for all to exploit as the government is at pains to assert. The entrepreneurs discussed in this 
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chapter had high levels of education and grew up in upper-middle class families. Out of the four 
entrepreneurs, Itoro and Charles are the most successful. Itoro is regularly interviewed by media 
outlets about security issues in Nigeria and Charles’s property developments are continuously 
expanding. Even though they are still in the early stages of their respective businesses, Preston, 
Teni, and Dante’s entrepreneurial dreams and aspirations were developed long before they 
started their businesses. These entrepreneurs’ desires for upward mobility were instilled in them 
from early on and the ability to become an elite or maintain elite status is made manifest through 
Nigerian-Chinese relationships. Additionally, entrepreneurs like Teni and Charles primary target 
markets are aspirational and elite Nigerians. Hence, through their businesses, they are seeking 
to reproduce elite statuses. Through the lives of these entrepreneurs we can further understand 
the intergenerational aspects of future imagined elite statuses. 
 
This chapter’s opening vignette highlighted the government’s campaign to encourage young 
people to become entrepreneurs. Even before university, the government is attempting to stoke 
students’ appetites for Nigerian-Chinese relations as a way to help facilitate their future 
aspirations. This is done by promoting Chinese language education. In the next chapter I explore 
how Nigeria’s curriculum is incorporating Chinese language classes into the education system; 
how educators are aligning themselves with the Nigerian-Chinese narrative and cultivating parent 
and student aspirations; and the experiences of Nigerian students who studied in China.  
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Chapter VI-Ni Hao Naija: Elite Futures & Chinese Language 
Education in Nigeria  
Whether we admit it or not the Chinese are taking over the global economy and we are only preparing 
our pupils for the opportunities that the use of Chinese language as the possible language of the future 
might provide. (Vanguard 2013)  
Babatunde Fashola 
Federal Minister of Power, Works and Housing; Former Lagos State Governor 
 
‘The Journey’ 
In the spring of 2011, Chinese and Nigerian guests gathered at Excelsior, a Nigerian owned 
private school in Lagos, to celebrate forty years of official political relationships between China 
and Nigeria. At the end of the event, a group of Nigerian students performed a play entitled ‘The 
Journey’.  The play was created by faculty members of the school and it centred on two main 
characters, a Chinese girl and a Nigerian boy. The boy and girl are sent by a God like deity to 
find ‘the symbol of truth’. The two embark on a journey and encounter challenges represented 
by characters including ‘hunger’, ‘greed’, ‘sickness’ and ‘pride’.  The character of pride spoke 
with the two main characters individually and encouraged each of them to remember their 
superiority in relation to the other character. Both children proceeded to boast about what made 
them better than the other. The Chinese character explained that she had better technology and 
the highest population in the world. The Nigerian character rebutted by stating that he had many 
natural resources and the ability to sell anything including Chinese made laptops back to the 
Chinese. After going back and forth the children apologised to each other and returned to their 
mission as mandated by the God like deity. Shortly after their reconciliation, the two protagonists 
found the ‘symbol of truth’ which was love and they decided to live in unity with love as their 
focus.  
 
The play was clearly an allegorical depiction which celebrated cooperation between Nigeria and 
China. Audience members were entertained but the goal of the play was also to perform a specific 
ritualized form of Nigerian-Chinese relationships, one that emphasizes cooperation and mutual 
affection. This ritual is in line with the Nigerian government’s public discourse campaign as 
discussed in Chapter 2- Selling the Chinese Dream to the Nation: Public Discourse and 
Narratives in Action. Audience members included students, many who studied Chinese language 
and culture; their family members; Chinese and Nigerian government officials and Lagosian 
community members from Chinese and Nigerian businesses. By creating a play for students this 
message of cooperation and mutual affection is passed on to the next generation of Nigerians at 
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an early age. Indeed education, particularly Mandarin Chinese learning, is the third pillar of the 
Nigerian government’s discourse of engagement with China as a key partner in the nation’s 
development.  An increasingly important method of inculcating young people with this message 
is through Chinese language and culture curriculum. The Nigerian government and more 
recently educators, are promoting knowledge of Chinese culture and language to students and 
parents as a beneficial component for students’ futures. Are there are any similarities between 
the purported benefits for learning Mandarin Chinese language and other foreign languages 
taught in Nigeria? How has Mandarin Chinese been incorporated into the Nigerian curriculum? 
How are educators promoting Mandarin Chinese classes? What are the experiences of students 
who have studied Mandarin Chinese in Nigeria and in China? How are government officials and 
educators responding to the inclusion of Mandarin Chinese in Nigeria’s curriculum? 
 
Through this chapter I seek to analyse how Mandarin Chinese is marketed to students and 
parents as a tool to realise aspirations and to improve or maintain social ranking. I begin by 
placing the contemporary state of Nigerian foreign language education in context with a brief 
historical summary of foreign language learning in Nigeria. This is followed by an introduction 
to the various opportunities for Nigerians to learn Mandarin Chinese; including scholarships to 
study in China and classes in Nigeria ranging from primary to tertiary levels. I first discuss 
scholarships through the case study of a Nigerian student who studied Mandarin Chinese in 
Nigeria. Nigerian students have received scholarships to study in China for over fifty years, 
however the infrastructure for studying Chinese language in Nigeria was only established in the 
2000s. This exploration of a more traditional educational programme is followed by the 
discussion of a newer initiative, Chinese language education in Nigeria. This is done through a 
presentation of the main educational institutions in Lagos that provide Chinese language classes 
to adults and children. I explore the motivations of adult students that attend these classes. A 
discussion on Nigerian private schools and their branding of Mandarin Chinese language and 
culture follows via the example of Excelsior. The chapter concludes with a discussion on recent 
Lagos state policy regarding Mandarin Chinese language learning.  
 
I argue that although education is promoted as a way to materialize aspirations for everyone 
throughout society, this turns out to be an exclusive dream rather than the inclusive promise of 
the Nigerian government’s public discourse campaign. Access to Chinese language courses are 
in themselves a privilege which can lead to a cadre of Nigerians who have elite exchanges with 
Chinese counterparts. 
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The Perceived Benefits of Education 
Throughout my time in Lagos, the importance of education was constantly emphasized either in 
daily conversations or in the media. The general consensus was that education of some level was 
a necessity for one’s future and the chances of success without some level of education were quite 
low. My observations are similar to those found by educational research over the last twenty years 
(Ugbogbo et al 2013; Levinson 1996: 217). In 1999, then President Obasanjo reformed the 
universal education programme and announced the Universal Basic Education (UBE) 
programme which covered formal and informal education. Under the UBE, the government 
provides nine years of formal schooling or a shorter length of informal education. Nine years of 
formal schooling includes six years of primary school and the first three years of secondary school 
(junior secondary school). Informal education is provided through functional education courses 
which are designed for a range of citizens including: “unschooled children; illiterate youths and 
adults; rural dwellers and nomads” (Adegbija 2000). Functional education classes cover a variety 
of subjects including: functional literacy training; farming; internet; health; civic and business 
classes (UNIVA; Jaiyeoba 2007: 50). In 1977 under Nigeria’s National Policy on Education, 
English became the medium of instruction for education in formal school settings.  
 
Government will see to it that the medium of instruction in the primary school is initially the mother 
tongue of the language of the immediate community and at a later stage, English. (Bamgbose 1996: 
357) 
 
But over time English has increasingly become the medium of instruction for education starting 
from primary school onwards. This has sparked a debate over whether or not to teach children, 
particularly in the early years of school, in their local language. (Vanguard 2015). Besides English 
the main languages taught under the UBE in both formal and informal settings are Arabic and 
the top Nigerian languages-Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. In formal education settings, Arabic is an 
elective while the Nigerian languages and English are mandatory (Ministry of Education 2016). 
French classes are generally offered through formal education from grade four upwards as a part 
of the core curriculum.   
 
Despite the government’s provision of free education, the majority of Lagosian students attend 
private schools (Walker 2015). Although there are a number of private schools that provide poor 
levels of schooling, parents across the class spectrum view private schools as superior to public 
schools. (Tooley et al 2005: 127). In 2006, public schools accounted for just under 30% of the 
total number of schools in Lagos State. (Tooley et al 2005: 125) By 2013, “57% of the state’s 
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enrolled children” attended private schools (Härmäa 2013: 548). Private schools range from low 
fee paying schools where parents pay as low as £250 tuition yearly to internationally ranked 
private schools where parents pay upwards of £20,000 yearly. The perceived benefits of private 
school impact the ways these institutions market themselves, particularly elite private schools. I 
explore the branding of an elite private school later in the chapter.  
 
Conversely, the public generally places higher stock in public education on the university level 
while some private universities are viewed as providing simplistic curriculum. As of 2015, Nigeria 
had over 121 universities, which was almost evenly split between sixty-six public (federal and 
state) universities and sixty private universities (National Universities Commission; Usman 2015). 
The growing interest in private universities is mostly due to constant strikes by public university 
faculty. Since the 1990’s public university faculty have increasingly gone on strike due to poor 
working conditions and low pay (Anugwom 2002; Al Jazeera 2014). However, private university 
faculty are typically un-unionized and rarely strike. Strikes at public institutions have disrupted 
academic terms for months at a time. While there are still questions over the quality of education 
provided in some private schools and universities, the public confidence in private education is 
growing from the primary to the tertiary level. At the time of my research in 2011-2012, Chinese 
language courses in Lagos were mostly taught in private schools and in one public university. 
 
Foreign Language Learning in Nigeria 
Travelling the streets of Lagos it is not uncommon to hear numerous languages being spoken. 
Nigeria has over four hundred indigenous languages and Nigerians regularly speak their local 
language in addition to other ethnic group languages. Additionally as mentioned above, because 
English is used to teach most subjects in school, many Nigerians speak English and/or Pidgin 
English (a creolized mix of English, Portuguese and local languages). Officially the government 
recognizes four official languages, three indigenous languages: Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba and one 
foreign language: English (Figure 1)
ii
. Since colonisation a number of European languages have 
been taught in Nigeria, primarily: English, French, German and Portuguese. English language’s 
role as the dominant foreign language of Nigeria became inscribed into the national educational 
system through The Education Ordinance of 1882. “The ordinance stipulated clearly, however, 
that ‘the subject of teaching shall be reading and writing of the English language’” (Awoniyi 1975: 
66). Although English was originally used to indoctrinate Nigerians into Christianity, usually in 
missionary led schools; English began to influence society at large.  
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….the colonial administrators cultivated it [English language] and made English the language of all 
official transactions. So Nigerians had to learn English not only as a matter of practical necessity, but 
also for reasons of economic advantage. (Omodiaogbe 20) 
 
Learning English was essential for anyone who wanted to participate in society, particularly on 
elite levels. This still holds true in contemporary Nigeria as much as it did in colonial days. 
Adegbija proposes that although there are a few predominant foreign languages spoken in 
Nigeria, like French and Arabic, English will continue to dominate due to its usage throughout 
society. “English is the predominant language of education, the print and electronic media, the 
judiciary, most official transactions, and the national House of Assembly and Senate. 
International diplomacy is also conducted in English.” (Adegbija 2004: 183). 
 
Nonetheless, Arabic and French continue to serve a purpose in Nigerian society. Arabic 
language’s usage in Nigeria stretches back to 7th century AD when it was first used in religious and 
trading circles between North and West Africa (Ayuba  2012: 193).  
 
Previously it had been the written language of the educated elite and of the government for nearly 500 
years. For the fact that Arabic predated any other foreign languages in Nigeria in particular and Africa 
in general, the language was used officially in administration where chancery proses, official letters, 
other materials were documented. (Salisu and Abdullahi 2014: 23) 
 
When British colonial forces came to Nigeria, Islam and Arabic were viewed as potential threats 
to Christianity and English (Ibraheem 2012: 89). In order to reduce this threat, in 1914 the 
Northern and Southern regions were joined together to form contemporary Nigeria. Arabic and 
Hausa were the predominate languages used in the North; but the unification of North and 
South, caused English to displace Arabic in official usage (Salisu and Abdullahi 2014: 24-25; 
Ibraheem 2012: 89).  Beginning level Arabic students can attend class outside of the formal 
Nigerian education system in “non-formal Qur’anic schools” and intermediary level Arabic 
students can study in formal religious schools. (Sirajudeen and Adebisi 2012: 129). Additionally, 
starting from primary school Arabic is offered as an elective in the UBE system. Arabic classes 
and degrees are also offered on the university level. Proponents of Arabic language education 
argue that one of the major benefits of speaking Arabic is that it helps in maintaining business 
and diplomatic relationships with Arab speaking countries across the globe (Ayuba  2012: 197-
198). 
 
Currently French is studied by primary, secondary and tertiary students; many of whom use it as 
a signifier of education. In 1983, the non-profit organization Alliance Française opened up 
centres across Nigeria to teach French language and culture. In 1996, during his regime as 
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Nigeria’s de facto head of state, Abacha made French an official language as a political response 
to the majority of English speaking countries who “boycotted and ostracised him [Abacha] due 
to his draconian policies and appalling record on human rights” (Adegbija 2004: 214). 
Nonetheless, in recent years different sectors of the Nigerian government have called for a 
renewal of French studies so that Nigerians can interact with French speaking Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries; and increase employment 
opportunities with business and non-governmental agencies including the African Union and UN 
(Iroegbu 2013; Punch 2013 Omonigho 2016; Olayiwola and Ogundele 2015).  In 2009, the 
Rivers State Commissioner for Education, Dame Alice Lawrence-Nemi, publicly discussed the 
government’s endorsement and collaboration with the Alliance.  
 
The world is now a global village and the need to give our students an alternative was necessary…..We 
have been working with them since I became the Commissioner for Education. We have sent quite a 
number of our teachers for courses and also have sent our students on holiday tours and summer 
schools to enable them speak the French language. You know the world is now a global village and 
the need to give our students the opportunity to learn an alternative foreign language outside English 
was necessary. (Adesulu 2013) 
 
Lawrence-Nemi’s statement bears a striking resemblance to the statement from Babatunde 
Fashola, the former governor of Lagos state. Fashola also discussed importance of preparing 
students for a global world, but in his case Fashola spoke in regards to China. This brief historical 
review of foreign language education in Nigeria highlights the perceived benefits for studying 
these languages. Without a historical comparison we run the risk of viewing Mandarin Chinese 
language learning as exceptional and trendy. As I will discuss in the next section, Chinese 
language learning shares some similarities with other foreign language education in Nigeria.  
 
Nigerian Students of Mandarin Chinese Language-Abroad  
Unlike Nigerian students of French, Arabic and English, Nigerian and other African students 
who studied Chinese from the 1950’s onwards, usually attended school in China. These students 
received scholarships from the Chinese government (Shinn and Eisenman 2012: 212). Chinese 
scholarships were steeped in a Marxist ideology of anti-capitalism, good will and brotherhood. 
China sought to find alliances in a growing competition between China, the former Soviet Union 
and the West that were all vying for an interest in post-colonial Africa. China cultivated its 
relationships with African counties in various ways including the construction of the Tanzanian-
Zambian railway as well as educational scholarships for African students. In the early years of the 
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scholarship programmes Africans complained about quality of life issues including “inadequate 
social life, outright hostility, and racial discrimination” (Larkin 1971: 142). During the 1960’s 
when China underwent mass social and political upheaval (due to the Cultural Revolution and 
the Great Leap Forward), African students protested in Beijing against the racist treatment they 
received in their host county and demanded to go home (Cheng 2016: 176-177). Due to the 
protests and China’s political and social instability, the scholarship programme was put on hold 
until the 1970’s. In the 1980’s Chinese citizens began to publicly protest the scholarship 
programmes for African students. These protests took place in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and 
Nanjing (Ceng 2016: 177). Chinese protestors were angry because African students received 
larger stipends than Chinese students. There was also a growing sentiment among Chinese 
citizens that African students, particularly male students, should not be in relationships with 
Chinese citizens. This sentiment manifested itself into discriminatory policies, including 
mandatory STI testing, which negatively impacted all international students. (Dikötter 1997: 27).   
 
It wasn’t until 2000 when China renewed its interest in Africa at the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), that education initiatives were redeveloped. (See Chapter 1-Introduction 
for a discussion on FOCAC). During the first and subsequent FOCAC meetings, China pledged 
greater funding and programmes for Africans students to study in China and for Chinese teachers 
to teach across Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 2012: 212-213). The new wave of Nigerian students 
studying in China and Nigeria are taking up the promise of the Nigerian government that knowing 
Mandarin Chinese will be beneficial to their futures. China has become integral to elite 
educational aspirations and the imagined futures of Nigerian elite youth. Students carry with them 
this promise and their own future aspirations. One such student is Femi, a student who studied 
in China through a Chinese Ministry of Culture programme.  
 
Femi and the Acrobats  
Before Femi went to China, she planned to attend university and perhaps travel abroad from 
time to time. China never factored into her plans, but when she was nineteen Femi was 
encouraged to apply to a Chinese study abroad programme for young Nigerians. Her mother 
heard of the programme through her job at the Nigerian Ministry of Tourism. Other students 
heard of the programme through family and friends who worked at the ministry. Children of 
ministry employees like Femi and her colleagues took full advantage of their familial connections 
and applied for the programme. According to Femi, when she and the other students first heard 
of the programme they “didn’t know [what they]…were going to learn. It was presented as an 
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intercultural programme with ballet pictures.” The students only knew that their plane tickets; 
room and board and meals would all be paid for by the Chinese government. The idea of going 
to China filled Femi with visions of neighbourhoods dotted with sleek buildings; clean roads 
filled with luxury cars and trendy people dressed in fashionable clothing. When the group first 
arrived in Beijing the surroundings met Femi’s expectations, but she quickly learned that their 
studies would take place six hours away from Beijing in the countryside of Hebei province. Femi 
and her colleagues were shocked at the differences between modern and sleek looking Beijing 
and the countryside in Hebei. “I was crying, why did I come to China? I didn’t believe I was in 
China when I was in Heibei. It reminded me of my hometown [village] in Ekiti State.” What 
little Femi knew of China before her trip did not include the idea that places like Heibei still 
existed in China. Instead students are sold the ideal of Chinese modernity which is promoted 
through public discourse and education and in turn internalized by Nigerians like Femi. The 
group was disappointed but focused on becoming acclimated to their surroundings and 
understanding what the programme entailed.  
 
The Nigerian students joined international students mostly from other Africa countries including 
Tanzania, Liberia, Egypt and Mauritius. The cultural programme centred on training 
international students in Chinese acrobatics and gymnastics. A typical daily schedule was 
comprised of language classes in the morning and intensive acrobatic and gymnastic training in 
the afternoon. One of Femi’s colleagues, Yetunde described the university as a “Shaolin school” 
where students rigorously trained like characters from the martial arts film Shaolin Temple. 
Femi’s speciality was foot juggling, a skill she acquired through hours of practice sometimes late 
into the evening.  Femi explained that it was “very very difficult. If you want to do something with 
your hands it’s easy because you’ve been doing that since you were a baby.” Femi initially felt 
that her teacher expected too much from her without providing enough guidance; she spoke with 
the programme’s management who helped Femi switch coaches. Although her new coach was 
better, Femi battled feelings of isolation because she trained separately from the rest of her 
classmates who trained together in mastering unicycle riding and hand juggling.  
 
The gifts of scholarships and training did not go without the obligation of reciprocation. Although 
the students did not initially know this, after going to China they found out that reciprocation 
came in the form of performing for audiences in China and audiences in their home countries. 
In exchange for room and board; language classes and training, international students performed 
at various cultural exhibitions throughout the year in China. Additionally the students performed 
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at cultural events when they returned to Nigeria. In Nigeria they showed off the acrobatic and 
gymnastics skills they learned in China to Nigerian and Chinese dignitaries. In China they 
performed both Chinese acrobatic skills and traditional Nigerian dances. The cultural shows in 
China were a mixture of performances from Chinese and international students for audiences 
which included dignitaries from various ministries. The students’ performance schedule was 
exhaustive and sometimes included over twenty performances in one day. It is important to note 
that before going to China neither Femi nor her Nigerian colleagues performed Nigerian dances 
at public events. In their roles as international students in China, they were required to perform 
and draw upon their respective Nigerian cultures.  
 
As one of the show’s most popular acts, Nigerian students performed more than other 
international students. Students found themselves serving as unofficial ambassadors of Nigeria. 
There was a sense of ambivalence and reluctance to serve as diplomats. Although Nigeria has 
hundreds of cultures as students whose backgrounds were not in cultural performance or 
heritage, the picture of Nigeria that the students presented was limited. While it is not uncommon 
for foreigners in China to be treated as walking/talking symbols of their home country cultures 
even if they lack any performance arts training (This American Life 2012), as students enrolled 
in a performance arts programme, Femi and her colleagues faced even more demands to serve 
as representatives of Nigeria. There is a racial element to the performance (Wong 2000; Cowan 
1990). Nigerian bodies are observed by crowds of Chinese audience members.  These 
performances are a form of touristic entertainment which brings Nigerian cultures to Chinese 
audiences (also discussed in Chapter 2- Selling the Chinese Dream). Touristic dance has the 
potential to alter traditional dance forms and transform them into dance forms that are more 
palatable to audiences. These palatable forms of dance run the risks of creating a perception that 
“conforms to a popular idea of ‘Africanness’ ” which differs from authentic representations of 
Nigerian dance (Daniel 1996: 790). Throughout this thesis, performance has been a consistent 
theme that is utilised in public displays of Nigerian-Chinese elite exchanges. (Chapter 2- Selling 
the Chinese Dream, Chapter 3-The Family Firm, and Chapter 4-“Our Friend for Eternity”) I 
will return to this point later in this chapter. 
 
Much of Femi’s time was spent with fellow international students and Chinese teachers but 
throughout her travels to cultural exhibitions on long haul trains, Femi encountered Chinese 
people from various walks of life. These interactions and time spent with her teachers and coach 
constituted the bulk of interactions Femi had with Chinese people. Her mostly positive 
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exchanges contributed to Femi’s views on Chinese people and how Chinese language and cultural 
knowledge came to fit into her future goals. When Femi went to China in 2010 she was nineteen 
with plans to attend university but unclear about what to study. By the time she returned to 
Nigeria, Femi had decided to study international relations and to find work related to China upon 
graduation. Despite the difference between what Femi thought China would be and the reality of 
China, particularly in the countryside of Heibei where she spent most of her time, Femi still 
found the experiences to be valuable enough to continue studying Chinese language and align 
her future goals with China.  
 
Traditionally scholarships rooted in cultural exchange were the prevailing way for African 
students to study Chinese language. In the early 21
st
 century with diverse and increased 
interactions between Africa and China, Chinese authorities created Hanban, a non-profit 
organisation which helps dispense Chinese language classes all over the world through the 
Confucius Institute model. In Nigeria, Confucius Institutes are utilised from primary to tertiary 
education, usually in elite academic institutions. My research took me to some of these 
institutions, starting with the University of Lagos. The stories of Nigerians related to these 
institutions highlight motivations that students have for studying and how administrators use 
Chinese classes as a means to market their institutions.  
 
Chinese Language Learning in Nigeria 
University Level-UNILAG & the Confucius Institute 
On the campus of the prestigious University of Lagos (UNILAG) sits a one-story building 
constructed in a style which harks back to traditional Chinese architecture. This building is the 
Lagos satellite of the Confucius Institute. In 2004, the Chinese government created the Confucius 
Institute initiative. The programme is overseen by Hanban, a non-governmental organization 
which is closely aligned with the Chinese Ministry of Education. Hanban “sets the criteria for 
teaching Mandarin as a foreign language…Most importantly, it develops and promotes relevant 
teaching materials for those countries that are keen to implement Chinese programmes” (Kheng 
et al 2011: 953).  
When people from two countries want to communicate, language is the first barrier they meet. 
Proficiency in other languages can minimize the possibility of misunderstanding and further promote 
friendship and cooperation between people of different nationalities.  
Youbin Yu former co-director of the Lagos Confucius Institute (Chinafrica 2012). 
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This statement provides insight into the party line and the publicly stated motivations of the 
Confucius Institute. In order to create stronger relationships between China and its international 
counterparts across the globe, the Institute leverages soft power in the form of language and 
cultural studies with the aim of breaking barriers. Producing a cadre of international students 
who not only speak Chinese but also understand the complexities of Chinese culture, creates a 
group of people who are more predisposed to favourably view China as an ally. This favourable 
view subsequently helps foster economic, political and diplomatic relationships. International 
universities host Confucius Institutes on their respective campuses with funding from Hanban. 
As of 2013 there were more than one-hundred branches in over eighty countries. Many countries 
initially faced opposition from educators or government officials when Confucius Institutes were 
introduced, due to the Institute’s connection to the Chinese government and concerns of 
censorship over controversial topics such as human rights, the Dalai Lama and Tibet. 
(Guttenplan 2012; Marcus 2013).  
 
The Confucius Institutes is modelled after the Alliance Française, which is a French non-profit 
education organisation. In 1883, the Alliance was originally created to teach French language and 
culture in French colonies (Roberts 2007: 38). The Alliance is separate from the government but 
endorsed by the French government, which originally contributed a significant amount to the 
Alliance’s funding. The organization now receives most of its funding from tuition fees and 
private donors along with a small amount of funding from the French government. “Thus, 
although the Alliance Française is not a government agency, its work can be considered a form 
of government action in language planning and policy work” (Liddicoat 2013: 193). Confucius 
Institutes were created for a similar reason and with the government’s support. 
 
Nigeria currently has two Confucius Institute sites. The first one, located on the campus of the 
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, opened in 2008 while the second one opened a year later on the 
campus of the University of Lagos (UNILAG). Both universities rank within the top twenty 
universities out of over 100 universities in Nigeria. Nnamdi Azikiwe ranks at twenty and 
UNILAG at five (Webometrics: 2016). While it is hard to uncover any public opposition tracing 
back to when the two Confucius Institutes were built in Nigeria, one informant at UNILAG 
privately expressed his issues to me over the need for the institute on campus. He argued that 
Nigeria and other African countries have a vast array of equally important cultures to study. His 
attitude had an underlying ambivalence towards the promotion of Nigerian-Chinese relationships 
and whether Nigerian interests are being placed behind Chinese interests in order to achieve elite 
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aspirations. This sentiment was similar to that of some Nigerian officials who objected to the idea 
of teaching Chinese language in public schools across Lagos, which is discussed later in this 
chapter.  
 
Like all Confucius Institutes UNILAG’s Institute is partnered with a sister university in China; 
UNILAG’s sister university is the Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT). While some Institutes 
are co-managed by two Chinese directors, UNILAG’s Confucius Institute was managed by two 
co-directors: Muyiwa Falaiye, a Nigerian professor from UNILAG and Professor Jiang Lirong a 
Chinese professor from BIT. What made the UNILAG Confucius Institute unique was the co-
directorship representing both the host country and China. Much of the day to day management 
of the Institute, including curriculum and coordination of courses for the university and Lagos 
primary and secondary schools, was handled by Jiang. Falaiye’s background in African 
philosophy and culture led him to advocate for the appreciation of African cultures around the 
world. While Falaiye accepted the Chinese presence on campus he also vocalized the importance 
of knowing Nigerian culture and history. It could be construed that Falaiye’s position was little 
more than that of a figurehead to appease Nigerian interests. Nonetheless, Falaiye’s background 
and passionate belief in sharing African culture could be leveraged when reciprocating the 
cultural exchange between Nigeria and China. The choice of Falaiye, an African and philosophy 
scholar, highlights an attempt to maintain a balanced relationship between Nigeria and China in 
terms of representation at the UNILAG Confucius Institute.  
 
Another Nigerian who played a role in the UNILAG Confucius Institute was Adele, a Mandarin 
Chinese language teacher. On average the institute employed ten instructors throughout the year. 
When this research was conducted there were nine Chinese teachers and one Nigerian teacher. 
Adele, the only Nigerian teacher at the Institute, studied Mandarin Chinese when she 
accompanied her husband to China when he was awarded a scholarship to study at a Chinese 
university. During a one-to-one tutoring session with a sixteen year old Nigerian student, Adele 
and her student sat in the main room of the UNILAG Confucius Institute where they practiced 
introductory sentences. The lesson was designed to prepare the young man for his move to China 
to first attend university and medical school. As a teacher Adele asserted that being multi-lingual 
was a boost for young people’s self-esteem which could give them the confidence to navigate the 
world. Furthermore as a Nigerian educator, Adele saw the potential for Nigerians to utilise the 
increased presence of Chinese businesses in Nigeria. “In Nigeria there are lots of Chinese and 
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their English is not good, so they come to the Confucius Institute seeking Nigerian employees 
who speak [Chinese]. If you speak a little [Chinese] you have no problem”.  
 
Adele viewed Nigerian-Chinese relationships as becoming integral to the point where neither 
country could work without the other. She foresaw an increased demand for more the Confucius 
Institute in Nigeria and predicted that Mandarin Chinese would become a lingua franca in 
Nigeria’s near future. Adele discussed these issues from a multi-layered perspective as a Nigerian; 
a former Chinese language student; as an expatriate in China and as an educator. The benefits 
Adele associated with Chinese language learning were similar to those associated with other 
foreign languages taught in Nigeria; language would be helpful for one’s future, both personally 
and professionally. Members of the UNILAG Confucius Institute staff like Falaiye and Adele 
served as key figures in mediating the relationship between Chinese and Nigerian actors. 
Furthermore, Falaiye’s position as co-director helped to preserve a balance between Nigerian 
and Chinese interests. The experiences of top level administrators on the university level 
provides some context for the environment in which Chinese language classes on the university 
level take place in Nigeria. In the next section I explore the experiences of adult students who 
studied at the UNILAG Confucius Institute. 
 
University Level-UNILAG & Beyond 
The University of Lagos (UNILAG) held language classes throughout the week, including 
weekends. Weekday classes were chiefly attended by full-time university students while weekend 
classes were usually attended by students who either worked full-time or attended other 
universities. A three month course cost ₦10,000 [£22]. This is compared to Nigeria’s ₦18,000 
[£45] minimum monthly wage which the National Labour Congress called “unrealistic” in the 
face of rising prices (Jimoh and Onochie 2015). Therefore the course fee is not accessible to 
many Nigerians and is reserved to those with access to greater financial resources, elites. Each 
class lasted three hours and students ranged in ages from their late teens to early forties. Some 
students were preparing to enter university; others were already in university and others were 
professionals who graduated from university and worked full-time. Teachers from UNILAG’s 
Confucius Institute taught first and second level Chinese classes and the classroom atmosphere 
depended on the teacher. The regular Saturday teacher, Pang, had a friendly demeanour and an 
easy rapport with the students.  
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When she taught there was a sense of enthusiasm and the lessons went by quickly. First year 
students reviewed introductory sentences like ‘Ni shi na guoren [What nationality are you?]’ and 
‘Shei shi ni de hao pengyou?’ [Who are your good friends?]. As classes progressed students also 
went into more complex lessons and vocabulary about hobbies and sports. When students 
chatted in pairs or groups their discussions generally focused on issues that related to class such 
as how to pronounce words or their meanings. Students were active and volunteered to write new 
vocabulary on the board. The class worked from two textbooks which they copied or shared 
copies with colleagues. Pang explained components of words so that students looked for themes. 
When discussing sports she explained that the word ‘da’ meant to hit or to strike and its 
relationship when used in conjunction with other words. By breaking down the components of 
the words and giving the students time to analyse and understand the language it appeared that 
the students felt more engaged and active in the learning process rather than passive recipients 
of lessons. But Pang also cautioned the students not to get too immersed in the logic stating that 
“language is just a tool not knowledge and not a skill. It is not like math”. Her objective was to 
help students navigate the challenges of learning Mandarin Chinese.  
 
While there was a level of respect and deference due to the inherent power dynamics in the 
relationship between teacher and student, adult students questioned teachers and interacted with 
them on a more equal footing. The adult students made a choice to attend classes and as such 
they readily engaged with the teacher and the material. When teachers made errors or treated 
students in a manner which students viewed as disrespectful, students did not hesitate to call this 
to everyone’s attention. The way teachers like Pang interacted with adult students coupled with 
their enthusiasm meant that the students stayed focused despite the long sessions which lasted 
for three hours. Adeola, an architect in his early forties, took Chinese classes due to his long-
standing interest in Chinese culture while Kefe, an entrepreneur in his mid-thirties, wanted to 
learn basic conversational Mandarin to improve negotiations with Chinese counterparts. Kefe 
was a university educated business man who specialized in buying and selling a variety of goods 
that ranged from spices to oil. He aspired to expand his business to include Chinese, European 
and African suppliers and buyers.  
 
Initially Kefe faithfully attended classes but with increased business and personal commitments 
he began to miss classes. When he returned Kefe was behind the other students and felt 
overwhelmed. Around this time, Kefe’s negotiations with his Chinese associates stalled and he 
turned his attention towards potential ventures in Africa and Europe. By the end of the semester 
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Kefe stopped attending classes but considered returning in the future. Adeola and Kefe represent 
the divergent reasons Nigerian adult students have for studying Mandarin. For most students, 
studying Mandarin is a way to fulfill personal and/or professional aspirations. Adeola’s personal 
interest helped fuel his desire to learn the language and consistently attend classes. Kefe’s interest 
in learning Mandarin was exclusively for expanding his business opportunities. When 
negotiations with Chinese associates stalled, he focused on other deals with English speaking 
associates and found that attending Chinese lessons were no longer beneficial. However, there 
are students who have both personal and professional motivations for studying Mandarin. How 
Nigerian students seek to leverage Chinese language and cultural knowledge for future gains is 
apparent on the university level; particularly through the story of Lanre, a student who began 
studying Chinese language courses at UNILAG and went on to study in China. 
 
Upon meeting Lanre it was clear that he had two passions: making meaningful connections with 
people and studying Mandarin Chinese language and culture. When we first met he was in the 
audience at the China Bridge competition (discussed later in the chapter; see Chapter 3-The 
Family Firm) along with Femi and other UNILAG Chinese students. Lanre was sociable and 
made encouraging comments in support of various teams. After the primary and secondary 
school competitions Lanre and two colleagues were called up to the stage to receive awards for 
high scores on Chinese examinations. At that time Lanre was in his second year of Chinese 
classes at the University of Lagos. Lanre’s journey to studying Mandarin began in his childhood. 
His interest in Chinese was sparked after from hearing stories about Chinese people like his 
mother’s friend who lived in the United Kingdom and his uncle’s neighbour in Nigeria. Growing 
up he had an interest in other cultures and at one point Lanre thought about studying Spanish. 
In his early twenties and having graduated with a degree in chemistry but working in the 
telecommunications industry, Lanre sought to differentiate himself professionally whilst 
enriching himself professionally. Mandarin language studies was the perfect way to accomplish 
this goal.  
 
While Lanre took classes at UNILAG’s Confucius Institute he immersed himself in Mandarin 
Chinese language and culture outside of the classroom. This immersion included studying and 
speaking Mandarin Chinese daily; socialising with Confucius Institute staff as well as watching 
and listening to Chinese media. Lanre even stopped to speak with Chinese people on the streets 
of Lagos which helped him initiate friendships.  Lanre proclaimed his enthusiasm for cross-
cultural exchange: “I love meeting people [and enjoy it] if I can speak their language.” Whenever 
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he was on campus, Lanre spent most of his time at the Confucius Institute. Lanre focused on 
creating and maintaining good relationships with the Confucius Institute staff. During his first 
year at the Institute he quickly became known by the staff because he sought to interact with 
people, particularly the teachers, outside of the classroom on a personal level. During his second 
year at UNILAG Lanre applied for a scholarship through the Nigerian government to study in 
China. During one meeting, he excitedly showed me the newspaper notice which described the 
scholarship. The notice was for the Bilateral Education Agreement scholarship (See Chapter 2- 
Selling the Chinese Dream to the Nation: Public Relations in Action for an in-depth discussion 
of the BEA). Because he already earned an undergraduate degree, Lanre applied for the BEA’s 
master’s degree scholarship  
 
Although Lanre did not receive the BEA scholarship, he eventually went to China through 
another scholarship programme. The scholarship was provided by Hanban, the directing body 
of the Confucius Institute. Lanre received a one year scholarship to study in Fujian. Much like 
Femi, the student who studied acrobatics in China, Lanre leveraged a social relationship which 
helped him to attain the scholarship. Although Lanre lacked the familial connections that Femi 
had, Lanre’s relationships with UNILAG’s Confucius Institute staff helped him gain the 
scholarship. Lanre originally heard about the scholarship through the Institute’s staff and they 
also served as references for his application. Lanre’s motivations for studying Mandarin were tied 
to both personal and professional aspirations. His desire to make friends with Chinese expats 
both on and off campus led him to become friendly with the Confucius Institute staff. 
Consequently, Lanre’s relationships with the Institute’s staff were already in place before the 
Hanban scholarship opportunity arouse. These connections coupled with his excellent grades 
(as witnessed through his award at the China Bridge competition) helped Lanre attain the 
scholarship.  
 
During his time in China, Lanre spent most of his days with fellow international students in daily 
language classes and the additional tai chi class twice a week. Lanre and his international 
colleagues were located in a different part of campus from their Chinese counterparts so the only 
time they interacted with native Chinese speakers were at language corner evenings. Language 
corner evenings are popular events held throughout the country where Chinese and English 
speakers meet for the express purpose of practicing Chinese and English. Even when Lanre fell 
ill and spent weeks in a local hospital, he kept up his spirits by making friends with the hospital’s 
staff. Due to the cost of health care Lanre returned home early but eventually found another 
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scholarship to return to China. He envisioned his future as one intrinsically tied with China both 
personally and professionally. “There are big opportunities...I will help in work related to 
Chinese-Nigerian relations.” Overall Lanre’s purpose for studying Chinese language and living 
in China was the opposite of Kefe, the entrepreneur. Kefe’s purpose was strictly utilitarian with 
a goal to improve his business opportunities. Conversely, Lanre was motivated to learn about 
culture for personal enrichment. His aspirations were to travel the world and enjoy various 
cultures. Lanre had elements of a dilettante but he invested his time and effort into learning 
Chinese language and culture. To this effort, China was one of the first stops on his grand tour.  
 
Mandarin language learning for Nigerians started on the university level which allowed students 
to study both in China and Nigeria. With the advent of the Confucius Institute, there are now 
opportunities for Nigerians to study Mandarin from the primary school level. In the next section 
I discuss pre-tertiary Mandarin language education in Nigeria. I argue that while these 
opportunities are increasing, they are limited to students who attend schools that careful brand 
themselves as Mandarin Chinese class providers. This argument is illustrated through the 
example of Excelsior. 
 
Xuexiao Tian-School Days 
It is our desire for our pupils to communicate in Nigerian languages, English, French and now 
Chinese. We are the first Nigerian school to introduce Chinese Language into our curriculum. The 
purpose for including Chinese in the school curriculum was not only to make our pupils multilingual 
in outlook but also to take advantage of the immense investment the Chinese Government is making 
in Nigeria and Africa as a whole.  
 (Excelsior’s Administrator- Bosede Olarewaju) (Punch 26 April 2013) 
 
On a Friday morning children eagerly poured into their classroom at Excelsior school and loudly 
greeted their Chinese teacher, Vincent, stating: ‘Ni hao laoshi’ [‘Hello teacher’ in Chinese]. 
Vincent took attendance as the students talked amongst themselves. As class was called to order 
Vincent began the lesson by reviewing various posters that were placed on walls around the room. 
Each poster had English and Pinyin [Pinyin is the way students write Mandarin language using 
the Romanised alphabet while learning the language.] Students took turns reciting terms from 
each poster with words related to various themes. Vincent switched between English and Chinese 
throughout the lesson and when students were distracted he went around the classroom to regain 
their attention. In addition to the posters, Vincent used the blackboard to write sentences in 
Pinyin and English while the students copied them down in their notebooks. Beyond this typical 
scene that could take place in any country, is a unique story. Excelsior, the school where this 
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class took place, played a pivotal role in the introduction of Chinese language into Nigeria’s 
curriculum. The school which educates children from nursery to high school, was the first pre-
tertiary academic institution in Nigeria to offer Mandarin language classes.  
 
Excelsior’s inclusion of Mandarin language into its curriculum was a key component of the 
school’s branding and mission that focused on “creating a conducive environment, using top class 
facilities and human resources for academic, moral, religious and skill development of a total 
child” (Excelsior Website). The school was founded by Clara Fagbayi a woman whose story of 
humble beginnings in a lower class family is well circulated in Excelsior lore; both on the school’s 
website and in the media. Through education and hard work she was able to rise within the ranks 
of society and establish Excelsior. The school is now run by Fagbayi’s daughter Bosede 
Olarewaju who serves as the school’s administrator.  
 
Olarewaju promoted Excelsior to elites through the promise of providing quality education 
taught and developed by internationally trained staff.  Excelsior’s clients are the children and 
grandchildren of upper middle class Nigerians including business people, bankers and 
government officials. Olarewaju embodied the international factor which represented a much 
more elite and cosmopolitan trajectory than her mother’s. Olarewaju’s education included 
undergraduate and graduate degrees from top British universities and regular continuing 
education classes abroad. Further international connections were demonstrated through the 
school’s decision to hire expatriate employees for top level positions. Along with Olarewaju, the 
primary school’s headmistress Anika Chatterjee and the secondary school’s principal Damon 
Kruger, were in charge of overseeing Excelsior’s curriculum and staying attuned to national and 
international trends. The utilization of two expatriate school heads, Chatterjee from India and 
Kruger from South Africa, added to Excelsior’s cosmopolitan ethos. The school might be in 
Nigeria but students are prepared to become citizens of the world. Placing expatriates in key 
administrative positions is Excelsior’s way of stating that they do not just aim to prepare students 
for the world but the world has come to Excelsior.  
 
In 2015 Excelsior received an award from the British Council for including international aspects 
in its curriculum. What is even more telling is the school’s branding and image in the media, 
which is led by Olarewaju who also serves as the school’s spokesperson. Most articles discussing 
the school mention Olarewaju or include interviews with her. The articles read like press releases, 
listing the accolades of Excelsior students and management. Olarewaju’s image is that of an expert 
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on education, children and family as opposed to a business woman. In one article Olarewaju 
discussed a variety of educational issues including her mother’s legacy alongside tips for parents 
on educating and raising their children. She also discussed the school’s curriculum and 
scholarship programme for ‘indigent students.’ (Ogar 2012). Timing of these articles usually 
coincide with an announcement from the school about a new initiative or student honours in 
competitions. When Excelsior students won a national IT competition Olarewaju was 
interviewed about the need to improve the Nigeria’s educational system and how Excelsior won 
the competition.  
We just have to show more commitment to educational development. I am afraid, if we continue like 
this our children with be at a disadvantage in comparison to their peers all over the world..... Let them 
[parents] make up their minds to search for the best schools with up-to-date facilities. They should 
not settle for just any school just because it is cheap…We have invested heavily in information 
technology. We have hired very competent ICT teachers who have done a lot of work to impart the 
latest techniques to the children. We have E-libraries and internet enabled computers which our 
students use for research work. With commitment and hard work, we participate in the competitions 
at all the levels from the zonal to national level. It is not a surprise to us that we eventually emerged 
overall best because, with all modesty very few schools can surpass the latest technology we have 
acquired as far as ICT is concerned… (Nigerian Tribune 2013) 
 
Olarewaju leverages her role as an educator to sell her school to parents. Her pitch is targeted to 
parents who not only want the best for their children but more importantly, can afford it. The 
school also used its opulent facilities and links to prominent members of society as ways to appeal 
to upper class clients. During visits to the school I was shown around the campus grounds which 
were comparable to leading schools across the globe. The campus included a library, computer 
rooms, swimming pool, laboratories, cafeterias and even a zoo. Excelsior adds to its exclusivity 
by not publicly disclosing the cost of tuition or boarding to anyone but the guardians of potential 
students at in person meetings. Private schools that provide similar classes and co-curricular 
activities charge tuition and board that can run upwards of £20,000 (Olupohunda 2015). For the 
most part Excelsior students come from upper class Nigerian families but the school provides 
scholarships to junior secondary students from families who cannot afford Excelsior’s tuition.  
 
The scholarships are highly coveted and until recently the school provided three scholarships; 
now it provides two scholarships (Kuye 2016). In 2011, approximately 400 students took the 
exam to compete for three scholarships. Scholarship awardees receive free tuition; room and 
board as well as any other educational expenses from year of entry through university. (Ogar 
2011; Samson 2015). Through diligence and hard work, a few economically disadvantaged 
students can join the elite ranks of Excelsior. This is similar to the story of Olarewaju’s mother, 
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the founder of Excelsior. Olarewaju spoke about the scholarship programme in a newspaper 
interview: 
This scholarship was started as a way of giving back to the society to help pupils from humble 
background to gain access to quality education….The scholarship is only open to pupils who have 
finished the junior secondary school class, showed traits of academic brilliance, must be from 
government public schools and come from a less-privileged home. (Asaolu 2010) 
 
Opportunities for aspirational and elite Nigerians to interact on an equal footing are rare. Via 
education, elite schools like Excelsior provide a forum for this to occur. Nonetheless, the small 
number of scholarships that are provided coupled with the rigorous level of the scholarship 
exam, serves to strictly maintain the boundaries for entry into this exclusive world. In this world 
aspirations, values, and capital are reproduced and cultivated. This capital can be leveraged to 
achieve future success (Bordieu 1986). The building and maintenance of capital is a crucial 
component in Excelsior’s branding campaign. Excelsior sought to consistently demonstrate to 
parents that by attending the school their children would receive top level education. This 
education will aid students in achieving the aspirations their parents have for them, particularly 
entering a quality university and subsequently obtaining a good job. Good jobs are high paid 
positions in corporations, entrepreneurial enterprises and government positions on a par or at a 
higher level to the positions their parents hold. Similarly, to the second generation of GNIM (See 
Chapter 3), Excelsior parents want their children to acquire the values and capital needed to 
make their familial dynasties successful.  
 
Excelsior management taps into this need and cultivates its image as a place where students can 
acquire this capital. The school remains keenly aware of the work and political environments its 
graduates will join in the future, both domestically and internationally. This awareness was shown 
in Olarewaju’s statement during the Nigerian-Chinese celebration where students performed 
‘The Journey’, the play discussed at the opening of this chapter. Olarewaju stated that “the 
purpose for introducing Chinese in the school curriculum was not only to make our students 
multilingual in outlook but also to take advantage of the immense investment the Chinese 
government is making in Nigeria and Africa as a whole” (ATI News segment). Excelsior 
harnesses the aspirations of upper class Nigerians who often have links abroad and taps into their 
desires to have their children maintain or improve their familial social standing. In this vein 
Excelsior under the leadership of Olarewaju has positioned itself as an intermediary between 
students and China. In 2008 Olarewaju began campaigning to bring Mandarin language classes 
to Excelsior. After several failed attempts at meeting with the Chinese consulate in Lagos she 
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finally found a connection to UNILAG’s Confucius Institute. Olarewaju’s struggle to enter the 
world of the Confucius Institute and use of a broker parallel that of GNIM and Nigerian 
entrepreneurs (as discussed in Chapters 4- ‘Our Friend for Eternity’ and 5- The Entrepreneurial 
Spirit of Nigeria). Olarewaju had to leverage social connections in order to gain access to the 
Confucius Institute’s management. This connection came through an associate of Chatterjee’s 
who had a number of Chinese patients. Chatterjee’s associate served as a broker between 
Olarewaju and the Confucius Institute via his patient who also served as a broker.  
 
The networking and negotiation process took upwards of two years. By 2010, Chinese classes 
started at Excelsior. During a visit to the school Chatterjee discussed Olarewaju’s efforts to bring 
Chinese classes to Excelsior. Chatterjee described Olarewaju as “really passionate…. [in her 
efforts she] goes as far as a human being can go”. These efforts included hiring an extra Chinese 
teacher who the schools paid directly. This teacher worked alongside the two teachers (one each 
for the primary and secondary schools) that the Confucius Institute provided. Olarewaju went 
another step further by providing housing to all of the Chinese teachers, complete with a car and 
driver. During my fieldwork there was also a discussion of holding additional Chinese classes on 
Saturdays. As of 2016, Chinese classes were compulsory for Excelsior students in primary and 
secondary school. Olarewaju’s goal was to make Excelsior’s Chinese programme the most 
extensive and exclusive of the programmes offered in Lagos and potentially the whole of Nigeria. 
The results of this strategy were tested at the China Bridge competition where ten schools 
competed against each other to test student’s proficiency in Chinese language and culture. This 
event was a clear display of the variations between Chinese programmes in primary and 
secondary schools as well as how the UNILAG Confucius Institute links students together with 
members of the Chinese and Nigerian business and government communities. The event also 
highlights the performance, branding and celebration of the relationship, partnership and 
courtship between Nigeria and China.  
 
China Bridge Competition 
On the stage of a UNILAG auditorium Nigerian primary and secondary school students danced 
to traditional Chinese music complete with costumes and fans. The audience represented a wide 
range of guests including Nigerian and Chinese governmental officials; UNILAG administration; 
heads of schools; teachers; parents; students; business people; community members and 
journalists. Each group of students received enthusiastic rounds of applause and in between 
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performances audience members discussed their favourite performances. These performances 
were a part of Nigeria’s first China Bridge language competition hosted by UNILAG’s Confucius 
Institute in February 2012. Each country with a Confucius Institute holds a yearly China Bridge 
competition. Ten Lagosian schools with Chinese programmes, including Excelsior, competed 
against each other in the preliminary round of the competition but only the schools that made 
the final round competed at the China Bridge competition. The competition was split between 
primary and secondary levels and teams were judged on language and cultural knowledge skills 
which were tested through questions on mathematics, Chinese geography and history.  
 
The event began with the entrance of young Nigerian men dressed in military cadet uniforms 
who marched into the auditorium carrying the Chinese and Nigerian flags while the Nigerian 
national anthem played on the public announcement system. The procession was followed by a 
brief speech from Professor Jiang Lirong, the co-director of the Confucius Institute. Jiang 
welcomed the audience and recognized dignitaries from various organizations. Some of the 
dignitaries welcomed the crowd and briefly spoke about the historical and contemporary links 
between China and Nigeria. A high ranking UNILAG official joked that as a nation with many 
languages, Nigeria was the perfect place to welcome Chinese language courses. The event was 
hosted by two Chinese language teachers from the UNILAG Confucius Institute Staff, Wang 
and Adele the only Chinese teacher of Nigerian descent. The two women greeted the audience 
in both Chinese and English and introduced the competition judges: two Chinese judges and one 
Nigerian judge. One of the Chinese judges was from the Chinese consulate while the other was 
from GNIM. The Nigerian judge was Eleanor Achebe, a Nigerian entrepreneur whose father is 
a former Nigerian ambassador to China.  
 
After the introduction of the judges the competition started first with the primary school students 
and then the secondary students. Both levels were conducted in the same manner: each team 
appeared on the stage dressed in their school uniforms, with an average of four students 
representing each team. They were given cultural and language questions; some questions were 
asked in Chinese and translated in English for the audience. The quiz segment was followed by 
the talent segments where each team sang one Chinese song and danced to another Chinese 
song. Dancing and singing were judged on a variety of criteria including showmanship, costumes, 
duration and creativity. Once the scores were compiled, team members and school heads went 
to the stage to receive plaques and prizes presented by community dignitaries. Excelsior 
dominated the competition by winning first place for both primary and secondary levels. The 
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school received digital decoders and televisions from the event sponsor Star Times, a private 
Chinese digital television service provider. During the event, Lanre and other winners of the 
Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi Examination (HSK), an international exam testing Chinese language 
students’ proficiency, were presented with certificates. 
 
Again we see the role of performance utilised in the public performance of Nigerian-Chinese 
relations. Students were taught choreography by Chinese language teachers most of whom were 
not trained dancers. Therefore, the Chinese cultural representations had a level of inauthenticity 
to them, similarly to Femi and her colleagues’ performances of Nigerian dances for Chinese 
audiences. Additionally, a Nigerian university student sang a traditional Chinese song and the 
Confucius Institute’s kung fu teacher performed the same routine he performed at GNIM’s 
Chinese New Year party (See Chapter 3-The Family Firm). In accordance with other public 
displays of Nigerian-Chinese exchanges, the event also included a Nigerian cultural performance. 
A Nigerian drum and dance troupe performed as the event’s closing act.  
 
In 2013 Excelsior won the secondary level of the China Bridge for a second year in a row. 
Members of the team were awarded with trips to China. Excelsior’s continued dominance in the 
China Bridge competition was due to the school’s strategy of providing a curriculum that is more 
intensive than those provided by other schools. The competition and ensuing press coverage 
helps Excelsior build on its branding as an internationally competitive school. Excelsior also 
capitalised on its success at the China Bridge competition by building stronger links with the 
Chinese government. After the first competition Excelsior received a visit from the Consular 
General of the Republic of China and a Chinese official from Abuja. Pictures from the visit along 
with others from the China Bridge competition and the Chinese-Nigerian celebration were 
prominently displayed on the schools website. Visitors to the website had no doubt that Excelsior 
not only boasts a competitive Chinese curriculum but it also has direct links to the Chinese 
government. Access to a global world via Chinese language learning is limited to a small number 
of elite Nigerians but the Lagos State government is attempting to provide more students with 
this opportunity.   
 
Conclusion: Chinese Language for All? 
In the fall of 2012 legislation backed by the Lagos State Commissioner for Education was 
proposed to include Mandarin Chinese in all Lagos state public schools. At that time only ten 
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Lagosian schools incorporated Chinese language into their curricula. These schools ranged from 
publicly funded prestigious schools to lesser known private schools to prestigious private schools 
such as Excelsior. The initiative has the potential to democratize the learning of Chinese language 
which until the legislation was proposed, was solely available to students enrolled in elite schools 
and universities. Another related indication of the increased importance of Nigerian-Chinese 
relationships was the March 2013 announcement that plans were underway to create a bachelor’s 
degree in Mandarin Chinese at The University of Lagos (UNILAG).  
 
Creating a degree programme in Mandarin Chinese language indicates not only the increasing 
importance of Chinese investment in Nigeria but the Nigerian response to this presence. The 
addition of Mandarin Chinese into Lagos state curriculum signals the importance that the 
Nigerian government places on building the next generation’s desire for developing relationships 
with Chinese counterparts. Nonetheless this legislation faced opposition from a subsection of 
Lagos State House of Assembly members. Questioning the importance of Chinese language 
knowledge in Nigerian society, they argued instead for the imperative to study national languages 
(Olufowobi, 2012). The sentiments of the assembly members echoed the same ambivalence to 
broker relationships with China as the respondent at the Confucius Institute who voiced his 
displeasure of Chinese culture displacing the myriad of cultures within Nigerian.  
 
The chapter started with Fashola’s statement which he made when the curriculum plan was 
announced. Fashola’s statement highlighted a clear directive from the state government that as 
the economic capital of Nigeria, Lagos city and state sought to promote ways for its citizens to 
engage with the increasing Chinese presence within the state. Given that the majority of students 
in Lagos state attend private schools the legislation might not have the desired impact of spreading 
Chinese language studies and increasing future job prospects. Furthermore, the ten schools that 
originally provided Chinese classes were some of the top schools in the state. Additionally, since 
the majority of parents in Lagos state send their children to private schools, will the introduction 
of Chinese into public school curriculum have the purported desired effect of increasing future 
opportunities for a larger number of students through Chinese language and culture learning? 
 
In this final ethnographic chapter, we see the reoccurring themes that appeared in previous 
chapters. These themes included aspirational and elite cultivation, public discourse, business, 
performance and ritual which are all directed at the cultivation of a new generation of Nigerians 
who believe in the promise of Nigerian-Chinese relationships from an early age. Mandarin 
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Chinese is the newest language in the history of foreign language learning in Nigeria. There are 
striking similarities between Mandarin Chinese and other foreign languages like Arabic, English 
and French, that are taught in Nigeria. This includes the teaching model for Mandarin Chinese 
and the associated hopes for future successes which are linked to learning Mandarin Chinese.  
 
Femi and Lanre’s Chinese language learning highlights how aspirations are cultivated by families 
and how these aspirations influence children’s choices. In Femi’s case, her mother directly 
connected Femi’s future goals to Chinese language learning, by guiding her daughter to apply for 
a scholarship to study in China. Furthemore, Femi’s mother heard of this scholarship through 
her work in a government ministry. Lanre’s upbringing fostered his desires for upward mobility. 
Although Lanre’s parents did not directly influence his decision to study Chinese, Lanre’s 
reasons for studying Chinese are directly linked to his upbringing where he was encouraged to 
attend university and pursue his interest in making international friends. Lanre regarded Chinese 
language learning as a way to see the world and to enjoy an international life full of travel and 
cultural understanding. Femi and Lanre’s parents were determined to ensure that their children 
not only maintained, but exceeded the upwardly mobile lifestyle in which they were raised. 
 
The example of Excelsior and Olarewaju also highlights the connection between Mandarin 
Chinese language and elite reproduction as well as the theme of business. Olarewaju utilizes the 
promise of Nigerian-Chinese relationships in the positioning of her business as an elite 
educational institute that can help students reach their future aspirations. The school markets 
itself to elite and aspirational parents as the best place to help their children become a 
cosmopolitan citizen of not just Nigeria, but of the world. Chinese language learning is just one 
of the ways students can achieve this. Opportunities to study at Excelsior and other high level 
institutions are limited and even with the inclusion of Mandarin Chinese in Lagos public schools, 
schools like Excelsior still have an advantage due their access to resources. Thus, education, 
much like business and entrepreneurship, is exclusive and the promise of modernity through 
Nigerian-Chinese relationships, remains accessible only through elite exchanges.  
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Chapter VII-Conclusions  
This thesis examined elite Nigerian-Chinese relationships ethnographically through the areas of 
business, entrepreneurship and education. I sought to explore how Nigerian’s attempt to 
manifest the government’s grand narrative of Nigerian-Chinese relationships and exercise their 
agency in these interactions.  
 
In Chapter 1, I began with an introduction to the context of African-Chinese relationships and 
Nigerian-Chinese relationships. I sought to examine Nigerian-Chinese relations through the lived 
experiences of elite Nigerian actors as a counter to the and highly polarized and often macro 
level debates surrounding Africa and China’s contemporary relationship. I outlined my areas of 
focus: business, entrepreneurship and education, the key pillars of Nigeria’s public discourse 
campaign. The chapter also forecasted themes that would emerge throughout the thesis: 
exclusivity; trust and mistrust; brokerage; and performance and ceremony. 
 
In Chapter 2, I explored the Nigerian government’s attempts to shape public discourse through 
narratives of Nigerian-Chinese relationships that emphasize development and modernity. This 
discourse is popularized through the inscription of individual aspirations around China through 
education and business opportunities. I explored the emerging public critique of Nigerian-
Chinese relations and argued that the government has learned from past experiences like the 
Niger-Delta conflict. The government seeks to avert these critiques with complex and alluring 
narratives that help to focus public discourse. Public discourse is developed on two levels: state 
and individual; both of which play critical parts in the government’s grand narrative. 
 
On the state level, Nigerian-Chinese relationships are presented through high profile diplomatic 
meetings that are full of rituals and ceremony in the form of photo ops, speeches, flowers and 
state dinners. On the individual level, Nigerian-Chinese relations are packaged as cultural 
experiences where Nigerian and Chinese citizens can learn about each other from the comfort 
of their home countries via cultural event. The last piece of the campaign is the most powerful 
part because it links the hopes and dreams of Nigerians with Nigerian-Chinese relations. 
Numerous bilateral agreements in the form of MOUs are signed and publicly promoted through 
ceremonial signing events and press releases. These agreements focus on three key pillars: big 
business, entrepreneurship and education. They are promoted as ushering in modernity and 
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economic development for Nigeria as a whole and any Nigerian who aligns him/her self with 
these opportunities. These pillars are explored in detail throughout the ethnographic chapters 
 
In Chapter 3, I began to examine the first key pillar big business through the example of Great 
Northern Industrial Manufacturers (GNIM), a Chinese owned family firm that has been 
operating in Nigeria for over 40 years. I argued that GNIM utilised kinship and paternalism in 
its quest to maintain, expand and secure its operations in Nigeria. The extremely complex politics 
of a Chinese owned family firm that operates in Nigeria was visible through an exploration of the 
experiences of Nigerian upper management. Solomon and Alhaji are a part of the second 
generation of GNIM’s upper management. They rose through the ranks of the firm. Matti is the 
grandnephew of the founder and the son of a Nigerian business woman; Segun is Alhaji’s son. 
 
The top Nigerian management worked in positions that included interfacing with fellow 
Nigerians on behalf of GNIM. These Nigerians ranged from employees within the firm to 
external government officials to Nigerian business associates. Although Nigerian management 
was hired to conduct other business, a major part of their work involved interacting with other 
Nigerians on behalf of the firm. I argued that the choice of Nigerians for these roles was not a 
case of tokenism and that the senior level Nigerian executives were considered members of the 
founder’s extended family. Due to Alhaji’s role as chairman and family member, his son Segun 
was hired and treated like other members of the third generation of GNIM. The firm employed 
flexible kinship to include and exclude people in its social network. Flexible kinship allowed the 
firm to grow and utilise the knowledge of members within its social network. Both Solomon and 
Alhaji enjoyed their familial relationship with the family but they both acknowledged a need for 
GNIM to hire more Nigerians in upper management positions.  
 
As members of the third generation of GNIM, Matti and Segun faced tension between their 
desire to change the firm and maintaining the status quo. Matti and Segun were sent abroad to 
study and learn things that could help improve the firm. Nonetheless upon their return, they had 
to learn the firm’s management style by shadowing members of the second generation’s upper 
management team. Matti and Segun tried to assert themselves by incorporating different 
management styles than the second generation. They also expressed a frustration with and a 
desire to lessen the bureaucracy within GNIM.  
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In Chapter 4, I continued my discussion on GNIM through an analysis of the firm’s use of 
brokerage. Brokerage is a crucial component of Nigerian-Chinese relationships. Historically 
brokerage has been a part of Nigerian society before colonisation. Contemporary brokerage 
particularly in the manner it is utilised at GNIM, involves diverse actors. The firm relies upon a 
variety of relationships which includes Chinese and non-Chinese actors. For example, the firm 
has relationships with the Lagosian Chinese community and the Chinese consulate. GNIM also 
has relationships with Nigerians within the firm and outside of the firm. Nigerians range from 
government officials to royalty to business associates to community members in the areas the 
company operates. Additionally, GNIM’s social network extends to European and Asian 
business partners.  
 
GNIM’s form of brokerage includes corporate gift giving and guanxi. Corporate gifts depend 
upon the reciprocal nature of gifts to help further social relations. Gift recipients reciprocate by 
allowing GNIM to gain access to resources. Reciprocity converts the corporate gift into a form 
of brokerage. GNIM’s gifts help the firm access recourses [land, introductions, relationships, 
help, etc…]. The case study of the king highlights the nuanced nature of brokerage. The king 
brokers resource deals on behalf of his people in the hopes of bringing economic development 
to his area. In turn, GNIM provides a small tribute and small white goods to the king. The firm 
also provides the area with more sizeable gifts which range from scholarships to health care to 
jobs.. Thus the king’s brokerage have proved successful and his role as a leader is legitimized 
and GNIM is able to expand its operations.     
 
Brokerage in these varying forms is linked with corruption because there is a perception that 
brokerage can lead to an atmosphere where favouritism; nepotism; bribery and other forms of 
corruption can flourish. Anthropology explores the local definitions and understandings of 
corruption instead of relying solely on definitions from international development organizations 
and Western politicians. The fact that corruption does occur is not contested, what is interrogated 
is the level of corruption; what constitutes corruption; solutions to reduce it and how people 
experience and respond to corruption. While GNIM representatives and those in their social 
network do not speak about corruption explicitly, the firm attempts to navigate corruption 
through the utilisation of brokerage. 
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The next two chapters explored the ways in which individuals are attempting to harness the 
promise of China through entrepreneurship and education.  
 
In Chapter 5, I traced the inspirations, disappointments and successes of a range of Nigerian 
entrepreneurs who sought to make good on the promise of doing business with China. I argued 
that the entrepreneurs most able to conduct business with China did so by building and drawing 
upon various forms of capital. Historically and contemporarily Nigerian entrepreneurship has 
been heralded as a way to relieve poverty; improve the Nigerian economy and help create job 
opportunities. International development organizations have moved towards funding 
entrepreneurial programmes. Consequently, Nigeria has seen a number of government led 
initiatives to help stimulate entrepreneurialism. These have ranged from educational 
programmes to seed money and technical assistance. Nonetheless research has shown that 
successful entrepreneurs were more likely to have greater access to capital either financial, social, 
or educational (Dolan and Scott 2009). The entrepreneurs I studied all had access to educational 
capital. Most of them purchased goods from China that helped them develop their business.  
 
With the exception of Preston, all of the entrepreneurs travelled to China to help expand their 
operations. Travelling to China required brokerage due to the difficulties of accessing the 
Chinese consulate. The cost for accessing this brokerage combined with the cost of the visa itself, 
limits the number of people who are able to acquire a visa. Entrepreneurs who can go, take full 
advantage of their trips to maximize negotiations and deals. Additionally, Nigerian entrepreneurs’ 
negotiated the line between trust and mistrust when engaging in elite exchanges with Chinese 
colleagues. They formed opinions of their colleagues as to whether and how they could build 
relationships with them. For instance, Preston the gems dealer, was impressed with his clients’ 
willingness to travel to Nigeria, unlike American clients he dealt with. This made Preston more 
willing to work with his Chinese clients. The chapter highlighted the challenges Nigerian 
entrepreneurs face when conducting business with China and the challenges of turning 
aspirations into reality. 
 
In Chapter 6, I explored the third pillar of the Nigerian government’s public discourse campaign, 
education. I sought to analyse how Mandarin Chinese is marketed to students as a tool to 
manifest the desires of aspirational Nigerians to become upwardly mobile. Chinese is the latest 
foreign language to be taught in Nigerian schools. English, Arabic and French are the main 
foreign languages taught in Nigeria. 
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I discussed the experiences of Femi, a student who studied in China at an acrobatic university. 
Femi was shocked by her university’s rural surroundings. Before going to China she had images 
of sleek modern cities as opposed to places that reminded her of her home village in Nigeria. 
For decades majority of the Nigerian students who studied Chinese language did so through 
scholarships rooted in cultural exchange. This changed in the late 2000’s when Chinese 
authorities created Hanban, a non-profit organisation which organizes Chinese language classes 
all over the world through the Confucius Institute model. The Confucius Institute is modelled 
after the Alliance Français, a government sanctioned organization that organizes Chinese 
language classes throughout the world. Confucius Institutes in Nigeria help with providing classes 
from the primary to tertiary level; most of which are associated with elite academic institutions. 
Classes on the university level were attended by adult students from university age upwards. 
Students had varying motivations to learn Chinese. Some wanted to learn for fun while others 
aspired to work with Chinese counterparts in the future either through business or government 
employment.  
 
On the primary and secondary level, one of the most well-known schools that taught Mandarin 
Chinese is Excelsior, an elite private school. Bosede Olarewaju the owner and administrator 
leveraged her image as a well -respected educator and the addition of Mandarin Chinese into its 
curriculum to promote her school. Excelsior demonstrated the exclusive nature of Mandarin 
language learning.  
 
Emerging Themes 
A number of themes have emerged throughout this thesis. These themes relate to the overall 
hopes and aspirations that the grand narrative of Nigerian-Chinese relations seeks to tap into. 
These themes are exclusivity, brokerage, ritual, ceremony, and performance. 
Although the grand narrative is promoted as an accessible dream that all can partake in, an 
analysis of each pillar exposed the exclusive nature of Nigerian-Chinese relations. In GNIM, the 
firm’s use of kinship and brokerage serves as way to include and exclude members from the 
firm’s social network. There was no attempt to interrogate the tales of Nigerian corruption. Even 
by Matti, a Nigerian member of the third generation. Here we find the nexus of exclusivity and 
trust and mistrust within. The firm has closed ranks and exercised the use of kinship to create 
familial borders to manage distrust. Only a rarefied few Nigerians are allowed into the firms 
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upper ranks and these employees are also considered family. Using kinship logic and mistrust 
serves to exclude talented candidates from consideration. This not only harms candidates, but it 
also harms GNIM by denying itself access to the best and the brightest.  (Stewart 2003: 386).  
How does GNIM and other Chinese firms begin to develop trust with Nigerians outside of the 
family circle? 
 
Entrepreneurship and education also indicate a fairly exclusive realm but with slightly more 
opportunities. The government’s initiatives for entrepreneurship can help a budding 
entrepreneur accumulate the financial, educational and social capital needed to run a business. 
Initiatives offer loans and seed money as well as training; networking and mentorship. Although 
this capital helps to provide an initial advantage in establishing an entrepreneurial venture, when 
entrepreneurs attempt to expand by purchasing from China and travelling to China, another level 
of social and financial capital is needed to navigate the bureaucratic and expensive process that 
working with China entails. This makes the Nigerian-Chinese entrepreneurial relationship 
exclusive. 
 
Mandarin Chinese language learning is also exclusive. While the government has proposed the 
inclusion of Mandarin in Lagos state public schools, private schools like Excelsior have an 
advantage. Excelsior has the financial and social capital that most institutions do not. Excelsior 
can mobilize this capital to ensure that its students have extra classes; exclusive meeting with 
Chinese government officials and anything else students require. Although the school offers 
scholarships, only two to three slots are available per year compared to the more than 400 
students who usually take the exam for the scholarship.  
 
Another reoccurring theme is brokerage. Brokerage was discussed at length in regards to GNIM 
and entrepreneurs but it also has a role in education. One striking example relates to the 
scholarships that the two students who travelled abroad received. Both Femi and Lanre received 
scholarship through the help of others. Femi had a familial connection in a government ministry 
who suggested she apply. Lanre leveraged his relationship with the staff of the Confucius Institute 
who served as references for his scholarship application. Brokerage did not necessarily guarantee 
the success of Femi and Lanre’s applications but brokerage was crucial in allowing providing 
them with help. For Femi it was information and for Lanre it was a reference. Brokerage is 
essential to the Nigerian-Chinese relationship in its varying forms. 
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Lastly, I reviewed the joint theme of ritual, ceremony and performance which played a role in 
every pillar. GNIM’s Chinese New Year resembled a potlach in its display of conspicuous 
amounts of food, drink and gifts. GNIM used this and other events to uphold its social and 
economic position. In entrepreneurship ritual and ceremony usually involved business dinners 
during trips to China. Student performances in plays and cultural dances provided a way for them 
to embody the Nigerian-Chinese relationship. Femi and her colleagues performed Nigerian 
dances and served as representatives of their home cultures while living in China. Just like the 
Excelsior students, Femi and her colleagues also learned about Chinese culture through the 
practice of Chinese performance art. In turn students performed for Nigerian and Chinese 
audiences back in Nigeria. These performances transformed the students into living symbols of 
Nigerian-Chinese elite exchanges.  
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Figure 1: Hierarchy of Languages within Nigeria (Adegbija 2004: 190) 
 
